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THAT WONDERFUL YEAR: SMALLPOX, GENETIC
ENGINEERING, AND BIO-TERRORISM
DAVID A. KoPLOW*
In retrospect, 1973 was a most remarkable year. In January, the
Miami Dolphins won Super Bowl VII, capping the only undefeated
season in National Football League history;1 through the spring, Sec-
retariat, perhaps the greatest thoroughbred ever, swept horse racing's
Triple Crown;2 and in September, Billy Jean King whipped Bobby
Riggs in tennis's much-hyped "Battle of the Sexes."' More seriously,
1973 was the year of the Supreme Court's famous Roe v. Wade4 deci-
sion on abortion; Chile's President Salvador Allende Gossens was
ousted and assassinated in a military coup d'etat,5 the disastrous Yom
Kippur war erupted between Israel and its neighbors;6 and a cease fire
agreement brought U.S. disengagement from Vietnam and the return
of the first American prisoners of war.7 In addition, of course, the
year was thoroughly dominated by the televised spectacle of the Sen-
ate Watergate hearings,8 the "Saturday Night Massacre" of Special
Prosecutor Archibald Cox,9 and the resignations, indictments, and
convictions of the perpetrators of the infamous "third rate burglary."1 "
Hidden beneath the glare of those most luminous events, 1973
has also proven-with the benefit of three decades of hindsight-to
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article is adapted from
the author's book, Smallpox: The Fight to Eradicate a Global Scourge (2003).
1. Year by Year Results, USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 2002, at 10C.
2. AMERICAN DECADES: 1970-1979, at 505 (Victor Bondi ed., 1995).
3. Id.
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. AMERiCAN DECADES 1970-1979, supra note 2, at 9.
6. Id. (noting that on October 6, 1973, war erupted between Israel and its neighbors
Egypt and Syria).
7. Id. at 220.
8. See id. at 220-22 (tracing the development of the Watergate scandal throughout
1973); Richard Milhous Nixon: 1913-1994, Key Events in the Life of the 37th President, ATLANTAJ.
& CONST., Apr. 23, 1994, at All.
9. Jack Torry, Watergate 30 Years Later; The Scandal that Changed the Nation, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, June 16, 2002, at Al.
10. Id. In another ominous harbinger of some of the issues addressed in this Article,
1973 also witnessed two lethal terrorist attacks upon European airports. The first, in Au-
gust, killed three and injured fifty-five in Athens. AMERICAN DECADES 1970-1979, supra note
2, at 9. The second, in December, killed thirty-one in Rome. Id. at 10. On a more per-
sonal note, 1973 was also a watershed year for the author: I became engaged to my wonder-
ful wife, Karen, and I graduated from college that year.
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be a watershed year in three other important, seemingly unrelated
areas of public policy: biochemistry, public health, and arms control.
Now, in the early days of the twenty-first century, these three areas
have combined in unforeseen ways to offer the promise of dramatic
advances in human health and well-being, but simultaneously
threaten the very foundations of global peace and security.
The three sectors-biochemistry, public health, and arms con-
trol-were revolutionized in 1973 in ways that even the principal ac-
tors of the day could barely begin to appreciate. First, that year
brought the dawn of the miracle of genetic engineering when Califor-
nia biochemists Herbert W. Boyer and Stanley N. Cohen succeeded
for the first time in transferring a snippet of DNA between creatures
of unrelated species.' They developed a technique for deftly slicing a
genetic fragment from the ribosome of an African clawed frog Xe-
nopus laevis and splicing it into a chromosome of the bacterium Es-
cherichia coli. They witnessed the world's first genetically-altered
creature, which proceeded to function with both sets of hereditary
instructions.' 2 The succeeding years, of course, have greatly refined
the techniques and expanded the range of recombinant creatures
that can be created and manipulated in this way, leading to breathtak-
ing success (but also considerable dangers, as well as arcane ethical
quandaries) in pharmacology, agriculture, and other far-flung
applications.' 3
Second, 1973 marked an unmistakable milestone in the global
campaign against the dread disease smallpox'*-previously responsi-
ble for millions of needless deaths each year. 5 In that year, the World
Health Organization (WHO), the driving force in mankind's grand
struggle to eradicate the planet's most devastating illness, reinvigo-
11. Stanley N. Cohen, The Manipulation of Genes, Sci. AM., July 1975, at 25, 31 (report-
ing in detail the history and scientific processes behind cutting strands of DNA and import-
ing them into other organisms).
12. See id. at 31 (providing a description of the events at the Stanford laboratories from
the perspective of one of the key researchers).
13. See generally PAUL BERG & MAXINE SINGER, DEALING WITH GENES: THE LANGUAGE OF
HEREDITY 221-38 (1992) (exploring the use of recombinant DNA technology in genetic
engineering of plants and animals); Sarah Crawford Martinelli, Genetic Engineering, in I
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENETICS 243-49 (Jeffrey A. Knight ed., 1999) (describing key discoveries
in the field of genetic engineering).
14. See FRANK FENNER ET AL., SMALLPOX AND ITS ERADICATION 495, 503 (1988) (identify-
ing 1973 as "a year of hope" when global eradication seemed attainable).
15. Lawrence K. Altman et al., Smallpox: The Once and Future Scourge?, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 1999, at F1 (reporting that smallpox caused up to half a billion deaths in the twentieth
century).
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rated its Intensified Smallpox Eradication Programme. 16 The WHO
was able in 1973 to certify the complete elimination of smallpox from
the Western Hemisphere, and to concentrate its full administrative,
financial, and personnel resources on only six countries where the
stubborn disease remained endemic.1 7 Although 135,904 cases were
still reported in 1973, s the WHO's objective, a global "Target Zero,"' 9
at last appeared within reach, and in just four more years it was finally
realized.2 ° The triumph over smallpox-the first disease ever com-
pletely eradicated from the human population 2 -remains the crown-
ing achievement of the WHO and of public health officials around the
world and provides the template for the ongoing campaigns against
polio, measles, and other noxious impairments.22
Finally, and purely coincidentally, 1973 also witnessed a remarka-
ble development in international security, as previously-bickering
countries finally united behind the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC),23 the first arms control agreement to accomplish a measure of
genuine disarmament-the total removal of an entire category of le-
thal weaponry from national arsenals around the world.24 The treaty
had been signed in grand fashion in 1972, but it was subject to ratifica-
16. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 530 (detailing the intensified efforts of the
WHO that began in 1973).
17. Id. The remaining six countries were India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Bot-
swana, and Nepal. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 530.
20. Id. at 536 (stating that smallpox was finally eradicated in October, 1977).
21. See David Brown, Campaign to Eradicate Polio Is Near an End, Officials Say, WASH. POST,
Apr. 17, 2002, at A2.
22. See id. (reporting that the WHO's effort to eliminate polio, building upon the
model of the smallpox success, has reduced occurrences to only ten countries, which re-
ported 537 cases in 2001); UNICEF, A WORLD WITHOUT POLIO (observing that by the end
of 2002, polio was endemic in only seven countries worldwide), at www.unicef.org/polio
(last visited Mar. 27, 2003); WORLD HEALTH ORG., DISEASE ERADICATION OR ELIMINATION
(identifying several other diseases that the WHO is on the threshold of eliminating in the
same way as it did smallpox, including leprosy, guinea worm disease, and chagas disease),
at www.who.int/archives/who50/en/elimination.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
23. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signa-
ture Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Biological Weapons
Convention].
24. See id. at 585-86, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 164-66 (articulating the goals of the BWC); see also
Charles C. Flowerree, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Arms Contro in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 999, 1006 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993) (noting that
the "[United States] confirmed that the entire U.S. stockpile had been destroyed and [bio-
logical-warfare] facilities [had been converted to peaceful] purposes" on March 4, 1975).
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tion by all participating countries before it could enter into force25-a
process that in many instances requires years of delicate diplomatic
maneuvering. In the case of the BWC, however, the timetable was
vividly compressed: the necessary number of countries rushed to de-
posit their instruments of ratification in 1973, paving the way for for-
mal legal acceptance of the document two years later.26 While the life
of the BWC has not always been smooth,2 7 its swift ascent in 1973 was
most impressive, providing a solid initial basis for the legal regime 28
and a model for later accords on chemical weapons, conventional
forces, and other armaments. 29
This Article undertakes to weave together those three seemingly
disparate strands into a single coherent story-one that concludes
with the world today confronting an unprecedented danger of biolog-
ical terrorism. In 2003, as the world celebrates a quarter century of
freedom from the ancient scourge of smallpox, and as we contem-
plate the final eradication of the insidious virus that caused that loath-
some disease, we simultaneously face the specter that this noxious
little bug, a hardy, complex, and near-unique virus known as variola,
may once again be unleashed upon an unsuspecting and largely un-
prepared public. Worse yet, a genetically modified variant of the vi-
rus, perhaps created and housed in secrecy for years in Soviet/Russian
or other rogue facilities, may lurk on the horizon, capable of evading
whatever modest defenses modern medicine has managed to create to
battle the natural versions of the creature.
25. The BWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972; and it specified that it would
enter into force upon ratification by twenty-two countries, including the United States, the
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, who were designated as depositaries for the treaty.
Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 23, 26 U.S.T. at 591-92, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 168.
26. Eight signatories deposited their instruments in 1972, nineteen in 1973, six in
1974, and twenty-six (including the three depositaries simultaneously) in 1975. U.S. ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS:
TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF NEGOTIATIONS 128-31 (1982) [hereinafter ACDA TREATY BOOK].
Entry into force occurred on March 26, 1975. Id. at 124.
27. See infta notes 227-257 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the
BWC and recent American opposition to attempts to enhance its provisions).
28. See Flowerree, supra note 24, at 1006 (observing that the immediate responses of
the BWC member countries to the treaty's provisions were encouraging). Prior to entry
into force of the BWC, the United States and the United Kingdom were in complete com-
pliance with its provisions and the Soviets asserted that they were making progress. Id. In
1978, the U.N. General Assembly gave an unreserved, favorable report on the BWC. Id
29. Id. at 1011-14 (describing international efforts to regulate chemical weapons after
adoption of the BWC); see also ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 26, at 137-99 (providing
descriptions of several treaties negotiated after the BWC, limiting anti-ballistic missiles, in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, environmental modification tech-
niques, and other arms).
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The thesis of this Article is that the United States, Russia, and by
extension, the world as a whole, are pursuing a fundamentally sound
strategy in retaining, rather than destroying, the last known remaining
samples of the variola virus. For now, those samples are housed in
secure, deep-freeze storage at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia3 ° and at the comparable
Russian facility, known as Vector,3 1 near Novosibirsk, Siberia. But that
basic decision is about the only correct move we are making at this
time-and even it is animated by fundamental misapprehensions
about the stakes and the long-term strategy.3 2 Instead of undertaking
a crash program of smallpox-related research, as demanded by the
Bush administration, 3 3 and instead of manufacturing and possibly ad-
ministering hundreds of millions of doses of anti-smallpox vaccines,
we would be well-advised to turn our attention and our resources else-
where.3 4 We should preserve the virus, despite insistent pressure from
most countries in the WHO to destroy it, but we should mostly con-
fine it to continued long-term storage while we proceed judiciously in
pursuit of other biological, public health, and national security oppor-
tunities first identified in 1973. 3 5
This Article unfolds in five steps. First, it explores the centuries-
old saga of smallpox, revealing how the disease has ravaged popula-
tions around the planet and left a trail of unmitigated human death
and suffering. At the same time, the human struggle against, and ulti-
mately our collective triumph over, smallpox provides one of the most
stirring stories of human industry, collegiality, resourcefulness, and
panache. By eradicating the disease and subduing the causative virus,
human beings have imposed their will on a recalcitrant segment of
nature and have done so with unalloyed virtue. Even as we celebrate
that triumph, however, we worry that our collective guard has been let
30. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1341.
31. World Health Organization, Report by the Director-General, Communicable Dis-
ease Prevention and Control: Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Virus Stocks,
EB97/14 (1995) (formally designating the facilities of Vector to be a WHO collaborating
center and variola repository).
32. See infra notes 523-537 and accompanying text (outlining the steps the United
States should take in response to the current threat of biological warfare including a repri-
oritization of our financial resources dedicated to research and prevention, as well as diplo-
matic maneuvers that may help address the threat).
33. See infra notes 508-511 and accompanying text (articulating a more restrained ap-
proach to variola research).
34. See infra notes 490-502 and accompanying text (suggesting several other avenues
the United States should pursue instead of overstocking the current vaccine).
35. See infra notes 486-537 and accompanying text (illustrating several ways the United
States can combat biological weapons through advances in other areas of domestic and
foreign policy).
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down, perhaps exposing us once again to the predations of the dis-
ease, and we recognize the unfinished business on the global agenda:
do we now destroy the virus, conduct additional experiments upon it,
or retain it indefinitely?
The second part of the Article examines the security dimension
of the issue, recounting how smallpox was one of the handful of bio-
logical agents that has been regularly considered, occasionally devel-
oped and stockpiled, and episodically used as a tool of warfare and
terrorism. Societies across the millennia have repeatedly sought to
marry the cellular secrets of the life sciences with the battlefield
secrets of the military sciences;36 a string of treaties has only partially
reined in this rapacious instinct.37 Certainly, illnesses like smallpox-
deliberately induced or erratically encountered as part of the misfor-
tunes of war-have exerted a dominant influence in military matters
through history, swinging the tide of battles, tilting the outcome of
wars, and triggering the rise and fall of empires. Today, the leading
legal prohibition against biological warfare, the BWC, is under un-
precedented stress as its inherent shortcomings in the areas of verifi-
cation and enforcement, 8 and its inadequacies in dealing with the
onslaught of modern super-terrorism, are fully exposed. Unfortu-
nately, it has been the United States that has shamefully led the resis-
tance to diplomatic efforts to ameliorate the problems.39
Third, the Article presents a lay person's introduction to genetic
engineering, especially the intricate ways in which the most sophisti-
cated DNA manipulations now open the door for deft reformation of
the genetic legacy of creatures from bacteria to sheep to human be-
ings. The danger that the viral genome may be manipulated in simi-
lar fashion-to render variola even more deadly and impervious to
36. See infra notes 191-207 and accompanying text (describing some of the inventive
methods armies have used to infect their enemies).
37. See infra notes 208-232 and accompanying text (discussing the historical progres-
sion of treaties designed to curtail the use of biological weapons).
38. Currently, the BWC does not have an inspection arm to verify compliance with the
convention. See THOMAS GRAHAM JR., DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 29 (2002) (asserting that while "Articles V, VI, and VII
of the BWC provide the verification mechanism.., in essence, the BWC has no verification
provisions at all"); Jeremy Feiler, U.S. to Focus on Biosecurity, Legal Issues at November BWC
Meeting, INSIDE THE PENTAGON, Jan. 30, 2003, 2003 WL 8752179 (discussing the United
States' agenda for the November 2002 BWC meeting as well as its opposition to previous
verification proposals).
39. In an effort to protect domestic biotechnology companies from possible industrial
espionage and to safeguard classified defense programs, the United States has rejected
BWC proposals. Feiler, supra note 38 (citing an unnamed U.S. government official); see
also GRAHAM, supra note 38, at 30 (noting U.S. biotech industry opposition to the develop-
ment of a verification protocol for the BWC).
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our defenses-is horrifying. Even worse is the possibility that it may
already have happened, as defectors from the Soviet enterprise
claim.4 ° The invocation of a biological warfare "chimera," an agent
that genetically combines the most lethal aspects of variola, Ebola, or
other incurable pathogens, is a scenario we must now confront.
41
The fourth part of the Article pulls those distinct disciplines to-
gether, summarizing how the world has so far responded to this rap-
idly evolving thicket of threats. It surveys the misadventures by the
WHO; the American and Russian resistance to the drumbeat in favor
of destroying the last variola samples; and the spasmodic reaction to
the terrorist onslaughts of September and October 2001-including
the procurement of vast quantities of an old, highly-successful, but still
problematic anti-smallpox vaccine.
Finally, the Article offers recommendations for a revised future
course. Various legal tools are surveyed including treaty amendment,
codification of public health statutes, upgrading national and interna-
tional scientific research facilities, and enhancement of international
cooperation. All of this is done in the effort to develop augmented
physical health and national safety. As we seek to apply the lessons of
1973 to the circumstances of 2003, we must draw upon all our re-
sources to avoid the horrors of smallpox biological terrorism.
I. THE ANCIENT SCOURGE OF SMALLPOX
No other infectious disease has afflicted human beings with more
death, suffering, fear, and revulsion, over a longer period of time, and
with a wider geographic coverage than smallpox.4 2 The virus killed
twenty to thirty percent of the people it infected, there was no cure,
and it was so readily transmitted between individuals that a perpetual
supply of fresh victims was assured.4" Those who somehow managed
to survive were generally left with disfiguring scars and were fre-
40. See infta notes 346-348 and accompanying text (discussing the claims of a Russian
defector regarding the development of a dangerous viral "chimera").
41. See infra notes 337-355 and accompanying text (describing potential military appli-
cations of modem biological weapons).
42. Nicolau Barquet & Pere Domingo, Smallpox: The Triumph over the Most Terrible of the
Ministers of Death, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 635, 635 (1997).
43. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 3-4 (stating that smallpox "was regarded as a
uniformly severe disease, associated with a high case fatality rate, in every part of the
world"); Abbas M. Behbehani, Smallpox, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MICROBIOLOGY 33 (Joshua
Lederberg ed., 1992) (explaining that smallpox "killed more people than any other infec-
tious disease"); Donald A. Henderson et al., Smallpox as a Biological Weapon: Medical and
Public Health Management, 281 JAMA 2127, 2127-28 (1999) (stating that smallpox admits no
specific therapy, it has a mortality rate of 30%, and prior to vaccinations almost everyone
contracted the disease).
423
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quently blinded.44 It has been estimated that over a run of years in
many countries, fully ten percent of all human deaths each year were
attributable to this single cause. 45 In the twentieth century alone, per-
haps 500 million people were felled by variola virus.46
A. Smallpox Through History
No one knows when or where smallpox originated; some specu-
late that variola may have emerged near the Ganges River in India
around 10,000 B.C. as a mutation from some earlier animal-infecting
microorganism.4 7 Inspection of three Egyptian mummies from 1570
to 1085 B.C. has uncovered evidence of ancient smallpox. Pharoh
Ramses V, who died in 1157 B.C. carries the distinction of being the
first individually identified smallpox victim.4 8 Other antiquarian em-
pires-the Hittites, Athenians, Carthaginians, and Romans among
them-have handed down records reflecting devastating diseases that
may have been smallpox, and societies from India to China to sub-
Saharan Africa also struggled unsuccessfully with variola through the
centuries.49
The roster of prominent smallpox victims reads like an historic
Who's Who. Queen Elizabeth I of England, King Louis XIV of France,
George Washington, and Abraham Lincoln each somehow survived
the disease, but so many others were less fortunate.5" As physician-
Significantly less lethal versions of the smallpox virus also came into existence: Variola
minor killed only approximately 1% of its victims, and Variola intermedius was fatal about
12% of the time. FENNER ET AL., supra, at 3-4, 38-40, 242-43; DONALD R. HOPKINS, PRINCES
AND PEASANTS: SMALLPOX IN HISTORY 6 (1983). These strains are quite similar genetically,
and no one knows how the different types evolved. Id, at 287. Variola minor became
much more common than Variola major in the United States and certain other regions
during the twentieth century. The markedly reduced severity of this version of smallpox
led some communities to take smallpox much less seriously than those afflicted primarily
by the most virulent Variola major. See id. at 287-90.
44. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 49-50, 135, 1117-18; see also HOPKINS, supra note 43,
at 5 (describing how permanent blindness occurred in approximately 1% of the cases).
Smallpox lesions usually appeared first on the face, and permanent scarring, found in 65-
80% of the survivors, was usually heaviest there. FENNER ET AL., supra, at 49.
45. E. WAGNER STEARN & ALLEN E. STEARN, THE EFFECT OF SMALLPOX ON THE DESTINY
OF THE AMERINDIAN 135 (1998); see also FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 715 (describing how
smallpox caused 13% of all recorded deaths in Calcutta, India).
46. Altman et al., supra note 15.
47. See HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 13 (speculating that the virus emerged in agricultural
settlements in Asia or Africa about 10,000 B.C.).
48. I& at 14.
49. See generally FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 210-17 (surveying global smallpox expe-
rience prior to 1000 A.D.); HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 16-21, 103-24 (discussing probable
evidence of smallpox in the Hittite Empire, India, and China).
50. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 1-3, 36, 258, 277-81.
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epidemiologist Donald R. Hopkins reports, smallpox assassinated "a
queen of England, an Austrian emperor, a king of Spain, a tsar of
Russia, a queen of Sweden, and a king of France in the eighty years
before 1775."' Of course, the disease ravaged the common people
and anonymous children too. In some cultures, smallpox was such a
frequent killer of infants "that custom forbade the naming of a new-
born until the infant had caught the disease and proved it would
survive."
5 2
B. The Disease Process
The disease progression in a standard case 53 began with a ten- to
fourteen-day incubation or latency period, following which the first
symptoms (headache, backache, fever, chills, and convulsions) would
appear.54 Then, oddly, for a day or two, the victim would feel better,
and the fever would subside as if some other, less deadly ailment had
been the cause.5 5 After that, however, the smallpox infection aggra-
vated: a rash would erupt, and spread over the face, arms, chest, back,
and legs; the rash would rise into pimples, blisters, and then pustules;
and these would eventually dry into scabs or crusts. 56 The victim's
skin turned pink or red, felt hot to the touch, and might peel off in
limp sheets. 57 While those external signs were intensifying, the inter-
nal developments were even worse. The virus would infest the lungs,
liver, heart, and other organs, causing hemorrhaging and toxemia.58
Opportunistic bacteria could invade the skin lesions, generating an
additional source of infection.5 9 Death might occur within a few days
51. Id. at 41; see also Michael Radetsky, Smallpox: A History of Its Rise and Fall, PEDIATRIC
INFECrIOUS DISEASE J., Feb. 1999, at 85, 85 (citing other historical figures killed by
smallpox).
52. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO FACr SHEET ON SMALLPOX (2001), at http://
www.who.int/emc/diseases/smallpox/factsheet.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
53. Several distinct types of smallpox illness were identified, characterized by different
arrays of fever, pustules, internal organ damage, and fatality rates. FENNER ET AL., supra
note 14, at 4-38. These came to be categorized as hemorrhagic, malignant, confluent, flat,
and other types. Id.
54. See id. at 5-6, 188 (describing symptoms such as headaches, backaches, and convul-
sions); HoPKINs, supra note 43, at 3-4; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 52, at http://
www.who.int/emc/diseases/smallpox/factsheet.html (listing fever, headache, severe back
pain, and vomiting as among the symptoms of smallpox).
55. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 4 (describing the end of the prodromal stage during
which the victim temporarily felt better).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 4; see also FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 19-21 (describing skin lesion pro-
gression and rash distribution).
58. HoPINS, supra note 43, at 4-5.
59. Id. at 5.
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after the onset of the most vivid symptoms, or the victim might linger
for days or weeks.6"
The smallpox virus remained communicable for up to three
weeks, and the disease was readily spread to surrounding persons. 6'
Each sneeze or exhaled breath could propel millions of infectious vi-
ruses into the atmosphere, where they could linger for days before
wafting into someone else's inhalations.6 2 The scabs contained infec-
tious pus too, and the victim's clothing, linens, or shroud often served
as vehicles for transmitting the virus to succeeding generations of suf-
ferers.63 Up to half the people exposed to the virus could contract the
illness.64
Three key characteristics shaped the patterns of smallpox trans-
mission and marked humans' interactions with the virus. First, small-
pox was a once-in-a-lifetime event. Anyone who contracted the
disease and somehow survived it was probably permanently immune
from any subsequent re-infection by variola.6 5 Second, the virus is
human-specific; there is no reservoir for variola to lie dormant in
plants, animals, or the environment, as there is for so many other
pathogens.66 Third, the disease manifests in an acute, highly-detecta-
ble form. There are no asymptomatic carriers who might spread the
disease without knowing it.67
60. Id. at 4-5.
61. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 189-90 (discussing contamination through di-
rect contact with a victim's skin, scabs, or bedsheets); HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 3 (discuss-
ing infection through face-to-face contact).
62. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 123-24, 182-88, 191-94. The variola virus can persist
for lengthy periods in a favorable environment. See id. at 115 (describing how samples of
the virus remained viable for thirteen years when stored in an envelope in a laboratory
cupboard).
63. Id. at 185-86, 189-94. Transmission of variola virus usually depended upon close
physical contact with an infected person or his or her personal effects. HOPKINS, supra note
43, at 3. Because infected persons were usually too ill to travel or work, smallpox was not
routinely communicated through public markets, schools or job sites; instead, family mem-
bers and hospitals became the primary conduits for transmitting the disease throughout
the community. See FENNER ET AL., supra, at 68, 189, 201-03 (citing epidemics in Glasgow in
1950 and Yugoslavia in 1972, as characteristic of this pattern); WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra
note 52, at http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/smallpox/factsheet.html.
64. See HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 3 (stating that a susceptible person who shared a
household with a smallpox victim had a 50% chance of being infected).
65. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 51-52, 146-47 (describing one study that ob-
served one repeat attack in one thousand cases at an average interval of fifteen to twenty
years).
66. Id at 96, 479-80, 1333.
67. Id, at 190. Subclinical infection by variola was unusual and epidemiologically unim-
portant, although some types of smallpox did not manifest the usual array of pox erup-
tions. Id. at 208.
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As a result of these factors, smallpox traditionally appeared in
waves, several years apart.6" It might flare in a particular city, when it
was introduced by an infected visitor from abroad, and rampage
through the local population until most people in the community
were either killed or rendered immune by surviving the attack. There-
after, there might be no local smallpox cases for several years, until a
new generation of unexposed children was born and the virus was
once again haphazardly introduced.69 Accordingly, in many loca-
tions, smallpox became an episodic illness of children. In eighteenth
century Britain, for example, ninety percent of the victims were under
ten years old.7 °
C. Treatment for Smallpox
There was, and still is, no cure or specific treatment for small-
pox.7 1 Desperate people through the ages invented all manner of
medical regimens for combating the disease, building upon the then-
prevailing sense of medical arts. Some prayed to a variety of smallpox-
designated deities;72 some practiced bleeding the body of excessive
humors; 73 some (over-reacting to the color of the smallpox rash) ap-
plied "red treatment" by surrounding the victim with red sheets, cur-
tains, and implements, and supplying him or her only red food and
drink.7 ' For several centuries, the leading routine in many countries
was "heat therapy," which consisted of confining the victim in warm
clothes and huddling him or her around a fire.75 Later, that routine
68. Id. at 178; see also id. at 227, 230 (charting the cyclical peaks and valleys in smallpox
fatalities in the Hida district on Honshe Island, Japan, and in London).
Smallpox could be sustained as endemic-always locally present and subject to occa-
sional flare-ups-in a relatively populous area. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 8. Some calcu-
lated that a minimum population of 200,000 would be required to incubate variola in this
way. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 118. In smaller towns, in contrast, the virus would
appear, cause a temporary epidemic, and then fade away until a sufficiently large vulnera-
ble group had been born and the virus re-introduced. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 8.
69. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 8.
70. Behbehani, supra note 43, at 34; see also HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 52 (stating that
most children born in eighteenth century London had the disease before they reached the
age of seven).
71. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 52, at http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/
smallpox/factsheet.html.
72. See HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 135-38, 159-63, 200-03 (discussing various cultures'
gods and goddesses of smallpox).
73. Id. at 11-12; see also id. at 295 (describing different treatment regimens for smallpox
from diverse societies throughout history, including purgatives, liniments, special diets,
and Spartan or environmentally pure lifestyles).
74. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 228; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 295-300.
75. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 27; Radetsky, supra note 51, at 86. The dominant ap-
proach to smallpox in Europe during the Middle Ages was shaped by the contributions of
427
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was abrupdy inverted by others who favored a cooling treatment, but
had no better results. 76 Modern post-exposure protocols are no more
promising. Even in the twentieth century, smallpox patients were af-
forded little more than sympathetic and skilled nursing care, pain
control, symptom relief, avoidance of secondary infection, and
quarantine.77
D. Vaccination
Instead, the most efficacious method for dealing with smallpox
was to avoid contracting the disease in the first place. 78 To that end,
the world's first vaccine against any disease was developed by the in-
quisitive English country doctor, Edward Jenner, who observed that
dairymaids who had previously been infected with a mild skin disease
known as cowpox thereafter seemed immune to smallpox. 79 After me-
Baghdad physician Rhazes (850-925), whose work, A Treatise on the Small-Pox and Measles,
introduced the concepts that those two illnesses were distinct entities, and that "heat treat-
ment" or "sweat therapy" provided the appropriate regimen for smallpox. HOPKINS, supra
note 43, at 27. That remained the prevailing medical view in much of the world for seven
centuries until England's Thomas Sydenham reversed the customary wisdom by 180 de-
grees and promulgated "cooling treatment," featuring open windows and lighter bed cov-
erings, in the mid-1600s. Id. at 33. It was Sydenham who noted the partially iatrogenic
nature of the high fatality rates for smallpox, observing that wealthy victims, who could
afford the "best" available treatment routines, died of smallpox at greater rates than did
the poor. Id.
76. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 33.
77. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 68.
78. An important alternative strategy, known as variolation or inoculation, involved
precisely the opposite approach. Under it, a person would deliberately incur a relatively
minor case of smallpox and hope that the disease could be managed at the non-fatal level,
thereby establishing lifetime immunity to subsequent exposures. Id. at 245-46. Variolation
proceeded in different ways in different countries. Sometimes a dried powder derived
from smallpox skin crusts harvested from a current victim was inhaled by others. Id. at 252.
In other cases, a quantity of pus from a smallpox lesion was injected into a cut on the arm
of the person to be protected. Id. at 253; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 46. Variolation had
been practiced in Africa, China, and elsewhere for centuries, and it was famously intro-
duced into Europe by Lady Mary Wortley Montague, the wife of the British ambassador to
the Ottoman Empire, and into America by the Reverend Cotton Mather, both in 1721.
FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 252-58; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 47-48, 248.
Ordinarily, a person who acquired smallpox artificially in this way would suffer re-
duced symptoms and had only a 1-2% chance of dying. However, he or she was still fully
infectious and could pass full-strength smallpox to anyone nearby. FENNER ET AL., supra
note 14, at 246. Therefore, while some saw variolation as a viable technique for reducing
the danger of incipient smallpox epidemics, others argued that the methodology served
more often to initiate a new chain of disease transmission. Id. at 255-56. In some commu-
nities, the practice of variolation persisted well into the twentieth century. Id. at 253 (citing
the common practice of variolation in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan through the
1970s).
79. Others had made the same observation and had occasionally attempted to validate
cowpox as an anti-smallpox treatment, but Jenner was the first to study in detail the con-
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ticulous empirical observation, Jenner conducted his famous experi-
ment in 1796 by injecting eight-year-old James Phipps with infectious
cowpox material. When the boy recovered from that transient illness,
Jenner attempted-unsuccessfully-to infect him with smallpox.8 0
Jenner's insights revolutionized the world's struggles against
smallpox.8 ' Within only a few years, the technique, and the precious
cowpox infective materials, had proliferated throughout the world. 2
Thomas Jefferson, for example, quickly became an enthusiastic con-
vert, vaccinating his own family and groups of visiting Indian chiefs.8 3
As the innovative therapy saved millions from the predations of the
disease, Jefferson enthusiastically wrote to Jenner, "You have erased
from the calendar of human afflictions one of its greatest. Yours is the
comfortable reflection that mankind can never forget that you have
lived. Future nations will know by history only that the loathsome
smallpox has existed.
84
E. Limitations upon Vaccination
Jefferson's praise notwithstanding, vaccination did not prove to
be quite the panacea its enthusiasts had contemplated. 5 First, it did
not provide life-long immunity, as surviving a bout of smallpox did.
After exposure to cowpox, which is now recognized as being a closely-
nection between the two illnesses, to undertake empirical surveys, and to publicize the
results. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 258-61; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 77-81.
80. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 258-61; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 79. Jenner's
experiment did not draw immediate, universal acceptance, but before long, the efficacy of
the new procedure became manifest, and the process spread rapidly. FENNER ET AL., supra
note 14, at 263-67, 271-73; HOPKINS, supra, at 81-86.
81. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 261-63 (observing that vaccination was taken up
with remarkable alacrity throughout Europe and the United States, and it paid immediate
dividends by dramatically increasing average life expectancy).
Jenner coined the term "vaccination" from the Latin word "vacca," for cow. Id at 292.
In homage to the 1796 accomplishment, Louis Pasteur in 1881 generalized the use of the
word, so that "vaccination" now applies to all sorts of immunizing injections against a wide
range of diseases. Id.
82. Id. at 261-63; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 262-67. King Carlos IV of Spain was espe-
cially prominent in the global dispersion of vaccination, promulgating the practice in
Spain's New World colonies. Id. at 223-25.
83. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 265.
84. Id. at 310 (quoting Jefferson's 1806 letter to Jenner).
85. An important subsidiary mystery about smallpox must be noted. Although Jenner's
original vaccination was accomplished with the cowpox virus, the material used for this
purpose in modern times is not cowpox virus, but another related virus known as vaccinia,
which itself might be a polyglot creature, perhaps evolving from cowpox, horsepox, or
other sources. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 74, 278. No one now knows how this
transformation occurred. Sometime in the 200 years since Jenner's discovery, the conver-
sion from cowpox to vaccinia as an anti-smallpox prophylactic was somehow completely
universal, inadvertent, and invisible to practitioners. Id.
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related cousin of variola,16 both members of the orthopox virus genus,
protection seems to wane erratically.8 7 No definitive studies were con-
ducted, but it appears that the immunity was most robust for only a
decade or so, after which a re-vaccination would be necessary."8
Second, there were side effects from vaccination. These were mi-
nor for most people, but quite problematic, or even life-threatening,
for some.8 9 Cowpox was generally a relatively benign virus, but for
certain categories of people, it was strongly contraindicated. Those
who suffered from eczema or related skin anomalies; pregnant wo-
men; people with certain disorders of the central nervous system; and
more importantly today, people whose immune systems were sup-
pressed by cancer treatments or by diseases such as AIDS were all high
risk for vaccinia. 9 Careful statistics were not collected in the early
years, but today it appears that of every one million vaccinations, ap-
proximately 1-2 people would be expected to die from untreatable
complications; another 14-52 would suffer life-threatening reactions;
and 49-935 other people would experience serious, but not critical
effects. 9' Moreover, vaccinia virus was itself communicable: anyone
86. Id. at 72-73.
87. Id. at 278.
88. Jenner always insisted that proper vaccination would confer permanent immunity
to smallpox. Id. at 260. However, experience soon demonstrated that the protection
would degrade depending upon the strain of vaccine used, the vaccination procedure, the
person's age at vaccination, the person's genetic resistance to disease, and other idiosyn-
cratic factors. Id. at 4243. For most people, vaccination provided robust protection for at
least five years, but by the twenty-year point, there was little residual immunity. Id. at 42-43;
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 52, at http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/smallpox/
factsheet.html. But seeJon Cohen, Smallpox Vaccinations: How Much Protection Remains?, 294
Sci. 985, 985 (2001) (citing a 1996 study, which demonstrated that some immunity in re-
sponse to smallpox vaccination may persist for up to fifty years). Even an old vaccination
might help reduce the severity of any smallpox that was incurred. FENNER ET AL., supra
note 14, at 42-44, 52-53; Cohen, supra, at 985; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra, at http://www.
who.int/emc/diseases/smallpox/factsheet.html. Pox researchers and others at special risk
were routinely re-vaccinated every three years. Even today, uncertainty persists regarding
the durability of the immunity conferred by vaccination, and there is no way to obtain
reliable data. Cohen, supra, at 985.
89. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 296-306 (stating that post-vaccination symptoms
include lesions and post-vaccinal encephalitis).
90. Id. at 299-302; see also Steven R. Rosenthal et al., Developing New Smallpox Vaccines, 7
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 920, 921 (2001) (discussing the risks of vaccination for per-
sons who are immunodeficient or pregnant).
91. Richard W. Stevenson & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Threats and Responses: Vaccinations;
Bush Lays Out Plan on Smallpox Shots; Military Is First, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 2002, at Al (re-
porting the opinion of Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, director of the National Institute for Allergy
and Infectious Diseases). But see Laura Maclnnis, Smallpox Shot Safer for Those Already Immu-
nized, REUTERs HEALTH, Dec. 24, 2002 (suggesting that vaccinia would be appreciably safer
for adults who were immunized against smallpox years ago as children and would probably
be more able to tolerate a second vaccination now).
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who encountered a recently-vaccinated person would be in danger of
acquiring the potentially problematic infection too.9 2
Third, the methods used to produce the vaccine were, when
judged by modern standards, quite primitive, running the risk that the
injection would expose the recipient to other, unwanted infections in
addition to cowpox. The standard mechanism for generating the vac-
cine-harvesting cowpox materials from scarified calf tissues-would
inevitably collect other miscellaneous impurities and germs tOO. 9 3
Likewise, some of the early routines for dispensing the vaccine, such
as passing cowpox via serial arm-to-arm injections, could convey other
infections as well.94
Finally, as with any new medical technology, there were practical
considerations: the cost of vaccination placed the treatment out of
reach of many, especially in poor communities and countries. Many
early practitioners, not really understanding the biochemistry of their
procedures, were incompetent in administering the vaccine, had ac-
quired non-viable strains to work with, or were blatantly dishonest.
Moreover, logistical difficulties-producing mass quantities of vac-
cine, transporting it to areas of need, preserving it adequately, and
training people to administer it effectively and safely-often impeded
lifesaving efforts.95 As a result, the progression toward a smallpox-free
world was halting and irregular.
F. Modern Smallpox Outbreaks
Through the nineteenth century, three major epidemics rocked
even the most developed European countries, and the economically
disadvantaged majority of the world had obtained only slight relief
from Jenner's innovation.96 Even into the twentieth century, small-
92. Kent A. Sepkowitz, How Contagious Is Vaccinia?, 348 NEw ENG. J. MED. 439, 442-43
(2003) (describing reports of the spread of vaccinia virus within families as well as other
inadvertent infectious occurrences).
93. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 265-67, 279-81, 551-54; Rosenthal et al., supra note
90, at 920.
94. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 85 (describing the transmission of vaccinia-syphilis to
forty-four of sixty-three children vaccinated with material taken from one infant with an
inapparent syphilis infection). Arm-to-arm vaccination was finally banned in Great Britain
in 1898. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 266.
95. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 264-68, 274 (noting the difficulties in obtaining ade-
quate supplies of potent vaccinia virus in nineteenth century America); JONATHAN B.
TUCKER, SCOURGE: THE ONCE AND FUTURE THREAT OF SMALLPOX 28-29 (2001) (describing
King Carlos IV of Spain's attempt at delivering the vaccine to North and South America by
employing a living chain of cowpox carriers recruited from local orphanages).
96. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 272-73 (discussing smallpox epidemics in Eu-
rope that were especially severe in 1824-1829, 1837-1840, and 1870-1871); HOPKINS, supra
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pox persisted as a global scourge: it was endemic in 124 countries in
1920.17 Russia lost over 400,000 people to the disease in 1900-1909;9'
outbreaks of a relatively mild form of smallpox in the United States
afflicted 135,000 in 1901-1902 and another 200,000 in 1920-1921. 9
The post-World War II period amplified the disease's economic
discrimination. Because of comprehensive national vaccination pro-
grams, smallpox was essentially eradicated in the United States in
19490 and in most of Europe (despite occasional reintroductions of
the disease, imported by travelers from Africa and Asia)."' Into the
1950s, however, there were probably as many as fifty million smallpox
cases per year in the developing world. 10 2 As late as 1967, smallpox
was still reported in thirty-one countries, most of them poverty-
stricken, and there may have been as many as ten to fifteen million
cases, with some two million deaths, annually.'
0 3
note 43, at 86-96, 124-31, 147-54 (examining nineteenth century smallpox outbreaks in
Europe, East Asia, and India).
97. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 171-72 (explaining that in 1920, smallpox was
absent in Oceania and had been eliminated in Europe only in Denmark, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden).
98. Id at 321 (depicting numbers of reported smallpox deaths in selected European
countries between 1900 and 1919).
99. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 290-91. The dominant form of smallpox in the United
States in the twentieth century was Variola minor, which carried a greatly reduced risk of
death. Partly as a result, the United States was relatively reluctant to adopt mandatory
vaccination policies, and the American population experienced lower rates of smallpox
protection than those of most other developed countries. Id. at 290-92.
100. No smallpox cases were reported in the United States between 1929 and 1946,
when the disease was re-introduced by a soldier returning from Japan to Seattle, sparking
an outbreak of 51 cases that caused 16 deaths. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 330-31. In
1947, a man died from smallpox in New York City, and 12 other people were infected,
triggering the immediate vaccination of six million people. Id. at 331-32. The last inci-
dence of smallpox in the United States, with 8 cases and 1 death, occurred in Texas in
1949. Id. at 332 (noting that the case was likely imported from Mexico).
101. The ease of international travel facilitated frequent importations of the disease into
European countries where endemic smallpox had been eradicated. Id. at 1070. There
were 34 re-introductions of smallpox into Europe between 1959 and 1974, producing 573
cases, including 90 fatalities. Id. at 1074. In the most famous instance, a religious pilgrim
returning from Mecca was infected with smallpox in Baghdad. Id. at 1091-92. When he
arrived home to the Kosovo province in Yugoslavia in March 1972, he triggered an out-
break of 175 cases, including 35 deaths. Id at 1094.
102. See TuCKER, supra note 95, at 63 (asserting that "the true magnitude of the problem
was unknown: Widespread nonreporting and underreporting of cases had created a huge
gap between the official statistics and reality").
103. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 517-19, 1363; TuCKER, supra note 95, at 63.
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G. World Health Organization Actions
In response to this heartbreaking toll, the WHO (the relevant
"specialized agency" of the United Nations) 104 rose haltingly, and per-
haps somewhat reluctantly, °5 to the occasion. It launched an Intensi-
fied Smallpox Eradication Programme (ISEP) in 1967, with an
ambitious ten-year time horizon for complete global eradication of
the disease. 1°6 A melange of diverse factors promoted success: modest
amounts of money (the total cost of the enterprise came to approxi-
mately $300 million) ;107 a small, but preternaturally skilled and dedi-
104. The World Health Organization was created by treaty in 1948 and quickly con-
cluded a formal relationship agreement with the United Nations, becoming the parent
institution for global cooperation in the wide array of health-related activities. See PEACE BY
PIECES-UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND THEIR ROLES: A READER AND SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRA-
PHYw 5 (Robert N. Wells, Jr. ed., 1991). Today, the WHO is one of the largest of the sixteen
United Nations specialized agencies, with 191 states as members and an annual budget of
approximately $1 billion. 1 WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS: THE UNITED NA-
TIONS 241-54 (10th ed. 2001). It has become the leading international authority regarding
smallpox eradication and the primary forum within which decisions about destruction of
the variola virus have been taken. Id. at 246.
105. The WHO and others had previously attempted to eradicate other notorious global
diseases, such as yellow fever and malaria, but those efforts had always foundered due to
shortages of funding, discord over priorities, and lack of institutional skills or resources.
FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 388-89. Even with smallpox, some countries disputed
whether greater attention should be devoted to other diseases, and some in the WHO
leadership remained skeptical that complete eradication would ever be achievable, that
member countries could be persuaded to dedicate sufficient resources to the effort, or that
the organization should commit itself so fully to that single overarching goal. Id. The
WHO's first foray into the field, the 1959 launching of a Smallpox Eradication Program,
soon sputtered; in 1967, advocates succeeded in "intensifying" that effort, and in injecting
renewed energy and funding. Id. at 365-419.
106. World Health Assembly, Res. 20.15, Smallpox Eradication Programme (May 17, 1967).
In fact, the last smallpox case was recorded in Somalia ten years, nine months, and twenty-
six days after the adoption of the ISEP objective. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 538
(stating that the World Health Assembly formally declared on May 8, 1980 that smallpox
had been eradicated).
107. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1365. The original proposals projected that global
eradication of smallpox could be accomplished for $180 million, of which about 30%
would come from international sources, including WHO and voluntary donations. Id. at
413. The initial WHO allocation for the smallpox campaign, a $2.4 million fund, was ap-
proved by the World Health Assembly in 1966 by only two votes-the closest margin for
adopting a budget in the organization's history. Id. at 416. Ultimately, the total interna-
tional funding for the ten-year smallpox eradication effort came to $98 million, of which
$34 million came from the WHO's regular budget. Id. at 459. Endemic countries spent
approximately $200 million of their own fighting smallpox during the campaign. Id. at
1365. For comparison, the annual costs of smallpox itself, such as health care and lost
wages for the victims, the price of vaccination programs, and the costs of adverse side
effects, were estimated at $150 million per year for the United States, and $1.35 billion per
year for the world as a whole in 1967. Id. The United States, the largest donor to the ISEP,
was said to realize in savings the total of all its contributions to the program every twenty-six
days. Id.
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cated staff, under the inspired leadership of D.A. Henderson, on
detail to the WHO from the U.S. Public Health Service; 0 s generous
donations of vaccine and other materials (the U.S.S.R. alone supplied
1.4 billion doses);O9 and remarkably timely innovations (both the rel-
atively high-technology 'Jet injector" capable of vaccinating over one
thousand people per hour,"0 and the much simpler bifurcated nee-
dle, suitable for manual use in the most primitive conditions)."'
In addition, two organizational innovations, both still of current
relevance, made prominent contributions to the WHO success. First,
it was essential to improve the system for reporting disease outbreaks,
diagnosing cases of interest, and recording accurate health statis-
tics." 2 In 1967, it was estimated that only one to two percent of the
actual smallpox cases were properly identified and tabulated by na-
tional public health officials." 3 A combination of incompetence, in-
adequate training, and fear of delivering bad news often led to drastic
under-reporting and a failure to identify and treat emerging
108. The WHO professional staff assigned to smallpox eradication never numbered
more than 150 and they coordinated activities in over fifty countries, involving 150 thou-
sand workers. Id. at 423.
109. Id. at 469. The United States provided over 190 million doses, mostly to western
and central African countries. Id, Eventually, endemic countries produced millions of
vaccine doses for their own use. Id. at 468-69. It has been estimated that 2.4 billion doses
of vaccine were administered as part of the ISEP. Radetsky, supra note 51, at 91.
110. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 406. The jet injector was a device for forcing vac-
cine, under high pressure, through the skin. Id. It provided clean, safe, and highly relia-
ble vaccination, and it proved very useful in situations where large groups of people could
be assembled for vaccination. Id. at 577. However, in many locales, only smaller numbers
were collected at any time, so the advantage was largely moot, and the machinery required
significant training for proper operation, as well as bothersome maintenance encumbering
its use in the field. Id. at 579.
111. Id. at 578. A bifurcated needle is one in which the tip is split into two prongs like a
small fork. Id. at 569. The shape ensures delivery of an adequate amount of vaccine and
minimizes waste. Id. The bifurcated needle was developed during the 1960s; it replaced a
variety of conventional needles, lancets, and other devices that had proven less accurate
and effective as delivery mechanisms. Id. at 568-69. The bifurcated needle could be easily
sterilized for re-use; it was quite inexpensive ($5 per 1000); it was fully safe; it required no
special handling or maintenance for use in the field; and unskilled workers, even the illit-
erate lay persons employed by the WHO campaign in many countries, could be adequately
trained in its use within ten to fifteen minutes. Id. at 572-73. The bifurcated needle, there-
fore, quickly became the instrument of choice for the ISEP, displacing the jet injector and
other applicators for most mass vaccination purposes. Id at 579. The WHO eventually
acquired some fifty million bifurcated needles and distributed them to almost all endemic
countries. Id. at 572. Unlike most other vaccinations, smallpox protection is not provided
by an injection through a hypodermic syringe. Instead, a droplet of vaccine is placed on
the surface of the skin (usually the upper arm) and then driven through the skin by a
cutting or puncturing motion. Id. at 568-69.
112. Id. at 173 (indicating that there was inaccurate diagnosis and reporting of cases in
endemic countries); see also TUCKER, supra note 95, at 63.
113. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 173.
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epidemics in a timely fashion. 14 WHO officials undertook to educate
local health officials, to develop streamlined monitoring equipment
and systems, and to reward accuracy (including, in the latter stages of
the ISEP, offering a cash bounty for anyone who could find a valid
case of smallpox infection).115
Second, WHO experts eventually concluded that the original
strategy of attempting to vaccinate everyone in a target country was
both unattainable and unnecessary. So many remote villages could
not be routinely monitored, so many nomads were impossible to track
down, and so many babies were born each year that the herculean
enterprise was doomed to frustration.' 16 Instead, strategists eventually
conceptualized and implemented a "surveillance-containment"'1 7 ap-
proach of promptly identifying and diagnosing any new smallpox out-
break and immediately dispatching a "quick reaction"'1 18 team to
surround the area and vaccinate everyone inside the perimeter and
everyone else who had possibly come into contact with the initial vic-
tims.119 This approach, while still quite demanding of logistical sup-
114. Id. at 516.
115. Id. at 447-48, 473-78, 1123. Eventually, the WHO offered a cash reward of $1000 to
anyone who could locate an active case of smallpox. Id. at 1123. The heavily advertised
program stimulated energetic searching for pox-like illnesses and facilitated the organiza-
tion's efforts to investigate potentially-suspicious disease outbreaks, but the bounty was
never collected. Id.
116. Id. at 482-83. The ISEP teams encountered enormous obstacles in reaching iso-
lated communities and tribes around the world. Id. at 829 (indicating that ISEP con-
fronted monsoons); id. at 1013 (rugged terrain); id. at 1018 (unmapped regions); id. at
1025 (native hostility to strangers); id. at 1233 (warfare in the Horn of Africa).
117. Id. at 482-85.
118. Id. at 493-94.
119. Id. Some in the WHO leadership and officials in many endemic countries were
initially skeptical about the notion of de-emphasizing mass vaccination campaigns and ced-
ing greater priority to the surveillance-containment approach (also known as "ring vaccina-
tion"-to treat everyone in a tight circle surrounding a discovered case). TUCKER, supra
note 95, at 75-82. Eventually, however, the greater efficiency of the more selective ap-
proach was demonstrated, and the ISEP developed an enhanced capability to activate a
"health radar system" to discover emergent smallpox cases in a timely manner and attack
them with focused resources. Id. at 80-82. See generally FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 493-
515 (discussing the strategy, implementation, and success of the ISEP's surveillance-con-
tainment approach for smallpox eradication).
Notably, 1973 was a watershed year in the development of the surveillance-contain-
ment strategy. Before then, relatively simple operations, combined with continuing mass
vaccination efforts, had sufficed to eliminate smallpox from most previously endemic coun-
tries. Id. at 503. After September 1973, a more elaborate system of case detection was
inaugurated, involving larger numbers of WHO and local health officials, to combat the
disease in the handful of most persistent smallpox countries in South Asia and East Africa.
Id,
Critical to the success of the operation was the fact that vaccination proved effective in
warding off smallpox even if administered after the person had already been exposed to
435
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port and dependent upon valid, timely data, proved to be the answer,
enabling the WHO to strike down variola in country after country.120
In the ISEP decade, teams of vaccinators eventually succeeded
around the world, with smallpox transmission interrupted in much of
Western Africa in 1968,121 most of Asia becoming rid of the disease by
1972, t22 and only the Horn of Africa still showing active cases in
1975.123 Finally, in 1977, the last naturally-occurring case of smallpox
was recorded, in Ali Maow Maalin, a twenty-three-year-old cook in the
coastal Somalian town of Merca. 124 After two more years of punctili-
ous monitoring, the WHO proudly pronounced the world free of the
disease, and no one in Somalia or elsewhere around the world has
encountered endemic smallpox in the past quarter century.
125
H. Laboratory Accidents
That triumph, however, was not quite the world's last experience
with the disease. Startling laboratory accidents in England in 1973
and again in 1978 provide a suitably cautionary note for our public
variola. See id. at 65. If the incipient victim could be identified and vaccinated within three
or four days, protection was achieved. See id
120. Mass vaccination campaigns also continued to be a foundation of the ISEP; if 80%
of the population could be reached in that more routine way, the country would achieve a
basic level of protection-referred to as "herd immunity"-that would enable the more
focused surveillance-containment policy to succeed. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 424,
484.
121. Id. at 849. The United States had previously undertaken a major smallpox interdic-
tion effort in West Africa, demonstrating that a well-planned and moderately funded eradi-
cation program could succeed even in countries with entrenched poverty and
underdeveloped health infrastructures. Id. at 908.
122. Id. at 528-29 (explaining that in 1972 smallpox in Asia remained endemic only in
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal).
123. Id. at 534-35 (noting that in 1975, smallpox remained endemic only in Ethiopia,
along with some re-importations of smallpox across the border into Somalia).
124. Id. at 1062. Although Mr. Maalin had previously volunteered as a WHO smallpox
vaccinator, he had never been successfully vaccinated himself. Id. On October 12, 1977,
he escorted some arriving smallpox patients on a short trip to an isolation camp and was
exposed to the virus for only those few minutes. Id. at 1062-63.
125. World Health Assembly, Res. 33.3, 8th Plen. Mtg., May 8, 1980; FENNER ET AL., supra
note 14, at 1104. The WHO procedures specified a two-year period of disease-free condi-
tions before a country could be officially certified as being rid of endemic smallpox, and
during that interval, vaccination campaigns and intense monitoring continued to investi-
gate suspect cases and root out any rumors about additional smallpox outbreaks. FENNER
ET At.., supra, at 1107-10.
WHO also instituted an International Commission for the Global Certification of
Smallpox Eradication, to oversee the completion of the national monitoring programs. Id.
at 1130. On December 9, 1979, this group issued its final report officially finding that the
disease had been eliminated worldwide and promulgating nineteen recommendations for
follow-up activities. Id. at 1134.
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policy choices today. 1 26 In the earlier incident, an unvaccinated tech-
nician at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine ob-
served a co-worker who was manipulating some variola samples on an
open workbench. The observer subsequently fell ill, and was hospital-
ized with what was later diagnosed as a mild case of smallpox.12 7
Before that diagnosis was registered, however, she was admitted to a
general hospital ward, where she passed the infection to two visitors,
who became the first smallpox fatalities in Britain in over a decade,
and through them, to a nurse. 128
The second, more bizarre, anomaly occurred in Birmingham five
years later, nearly a year after the world's last "natural" case of small-
pox had hit Somalia.129 This time, the initial victim was a medical
photographer, Janet Parker, working out of a small office and dar-
kroom located one floor above the University of Birmingham's De-
partment of Medical Microbiology. 30 Postmortem investigators
concluded that variola might have crept silently upward through an
unsafeguarded ventilation and service duct.13 ' Diagnosis, once again,
was not immediate and the photographer, who eventually became the
last smallpox fatality on earth, soon passed the virus along to her
mother, who survived. 1
3 2
The 1978 Birmingham incident is particularly instructive regard-
ing the failure of supposedly secure laboratory facilities. It had long
been operated by Professor Henry S. Bedson, a leading authority on
smallpox who had earned the implicit trust of United Kingdom and
WHO health authorities, who consequently failed to inspect the
shoddy reality lurking behind his purportedly state-of-the-art safety
procedures.1 33 When Bedson, quarantined at home for fear of his
126. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1095-99; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 98-99.
127. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1095-96; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 98-99.
128. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1095-96; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 98-99.
129. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1064-67; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 99.
130. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1097-99; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 99.
131. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1097-99; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 99.
132. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1097-99; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 99.
Twelve years prior to this incident, another medical photographer, who worked in the
exact same suite of offices that Janet Parker was later to occupy, contracted smallpox (Vari-
ola minor) and accidentally triggered a significant outbreak of seventy-two cases of the
disease in Birmingham, the West Midlands, and Wales. In that 1966 incident, investigators
could not definitively conclude whether the virus had leaked upstairs from the laboratory,
or whether the photographer had encountered the disease elsewhere. In Parker's case,
however, there seemed to be no doubt about the origin of the infection. FENNER ET AL.,
supra, at 1098-1100; HOPKINS, supra, at 99.
133. Nigel Hawkes, Science in Europe/Smallpox Death in Britain Challenges Presumption of
Laboratory Safety, 203 Sci. 855, 855-56 (1979); see also TUCKER, supra note 95, at 126-32
(describing the smallpox incident).
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own exposure to the virus, realized the disastrous sequelae of his de-
ceptive failure to adhere to the published protocols, he committed
suicide.' 34
I. Post-Eradication Actions
In response to that disaster, and on the heels of the stunning
ISEP success, WHO authorities adopted a series of organizational and
institutional measures that still shape the smallpox debate two de-
cades later.'3 5 First, they resolved to reduce the number of locations
at which variola samples and residues were held.' 36 For most of
human history, of course, infectious smallpox materials were every-
where and all countries had ready access.' 37 During and after the
ISEP, however, only a relatively small number of facilities retained
such items. By 1977, only eighteen laboratories reported that they
had any relevant variola samples in their freezers.' Upon prodding
by the WHO, that number was gradually reduced to seven in 1979 and
to only two in 1983.'13
134. Radetsky, supra note 51, at 92; Smallpox: Ignorance Is Never Bliss, 277 NATURE 75, 77
(1979). Bedson had agreed with prior WHO inspection teams that his laboratory facilities
and procedures were not up to modern safety standards and should not host further vari-
ola work. However, he misled both WHO and British authorities about his intentions and
greatly accelerated the pace of the research in order to complete it before the facility was
to be closed at the end of the year. In a suicide note, he wrote, "I am sorry to have mis-
placed the trust which so many of my friends and colleagues have placed in me and my
work." Radetsky, supra note 51, at 92.
135. TUCKER, supra note 95, at 132-33. For the most part, the WHO does not have the
power to issue legally-binding instructions to its member countries. With few exceptions, it
is limited-even on top priority matters of global health and communicable diseases, such
as smallpox eradication and the management of the variola virus residuals-to making
recommendations, leading by example, providing scientific expertise and support, and ap-
plying moral or political suasion. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 444.
136. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1338-39. In 1976, the World Health Assembly re-
quested all governments and laboratories to cooperate in compiling an international regis-
try of facilities retaining stocks of variola virus, and urged those institutions which did not
require such inventories to destroy them. World Health Assembly, Res. 29.54, 12th Plen.
Mtg., May 19, 1976.
137. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1339-40. No one knew how many laboratories
might hold variola stocks, but a 1975 survey revealed that at least seventy-five facilities,
dispersed all over the world, had some sort of smallpox inventories. Id. at 1338-39.
138. Id. at 1340.
139. Id. at 1340-41. The 1979 Global Commission, and subsequently the World Health
Assembly, recommended that no more than four WHO "collaborating centers" should be
designated to hold and to handle variola stocks, and all other facilities should destroy their
inventories or transfer them to an approved collaborating center. World Health Assembly,
Res. 33.4, May 1980. By 1983, only two facilities held known variola stocks: the Centers for
Disease Control in Atlanta and the lvanovsky Institute for Viral Preparations in Moscow.
FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1341; TUCKER, supra note 95, at 134-36.
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The physical security of those last two installations, now desig-
nated as WHO Collaborating Centers for smallpox research, has natu-
rally become a matter of international concern. The CDC in Atlanta,
Georgia, has not encountered untoward incidents; it reportedly stores
its 450 variola samples in the innermost, rigidly guarded portions of
the installation with secret and redundant layers of protection.14 ° But
at the same time, it is notable that other leading United States institu-
tions (including those with the strongest reputations and safety stan-
dards) that formerly conducted variola work have hardly been free of
accidents or safety and security lapses in handling other extremely
hazardous pathogens,"
The Soviet variola stash was initially deployed at the Ivanovsky In-
stitute for Viral Preparations in Moscow, but shockingly inadequate
protections there alarmed the authorities.142 In 1994, those 120 sam-
ples were suddenly and without advance notice to, or permission
from, the WHO transferred to the Vector facility in Koltsovo, near
140. Charles Siebert, Smallpox Is Dead: Long Live Smallpox, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 21,
1994, at 30, 34. Some feel we need to tighten security at the CDC even further in the
aftermath of September 11. Ceci Connolly, Smallpox Vaccine Plan Called Lacking, WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 2001, at A39.
141. Arjun Srinivasan et al., Glanders in a Military Research Microbiologist, 345 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 256, 256 (2001) (describing accidental infection of a U.S. microbiologist by glanders,
a possible biological weapons agent, at a U.S. Army laboratory); Anthrax Contaminates Army
Lab; Employee Tests Positive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at All (describing an anthrax leak
into a hallway and administrative area at Fort Detrick, the U.S. Army's leading biological
research institute); Rick Weiss & David Snyder, Anthrax Leaks a 2nd Time at Army Lab, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 24, 2002, at B01 (describing a second anthrax leak at Fort Detrick in which one
worker tested positive for anthrax exposure); see also Bioweapons Labs 'Could Unleash Forgot-
ten Diseases,' 412 NATURE 470 (2001); Report Finds Easy Lab Access to Deadly Pathogens,
REUTERS, May 7, 2002 (finding that many of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's 124
laboratories, including those housing deadly biological agents, were vulnerable to theft,
dangerously open to casual visits by unauthorized strangers, and unable to maintain valid
records about their pathogen holdings), at http://preventdisease.com/news/articles/
easy-lab accessDpathogens.shtml (last visited May 21, 2003).
142. See Howard Witt, Russian Lab Sits on Dread Secret: Smallpox Cache; Fears of Terrorists'
Stealing Virus, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1994, at A15 (noting that the variola stocks at the
Ivanovsky Institute were woefully unprotected). The laboratory's deputy director was
quoted as acknowledging, "If some terrorist really wants to do something with this small-
pox virus, there is nothing that can stop him." Id. The WHO had not inspected the facility
in the previous eight years. Id. Another commentator describes the facilities at the Insti-
tute in 1982 as "deteriorating, its supplies of water and electricity were unreliable, and the
security arrangements limited to an iron fence topped with barbed wire and a small brick
guardhouse near the front gate." TUCKER, supra note 95, at 174; see also Carl Levitin &
Alison Abbott, Electricity Debt Could Mean Lights Out for Russian Virus Institute, 407 NATURE 5,
5 (2000) (reporting that the Ivanovksy Institute, unable to pay the bills of its electricity
supplier, may suffer a power outage that would lead to the loss of rare viral holdings).
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Novosibirsk in southern Siberia.' 43 Physical custody there seems far
more certain, but other, equally ominous portends may be lurking, as
surveyed below. 144
Those two inventories, of course, cannot confidently be adver-
tised as being the "last" or the "only" variola stocks left in the world.
They are, instead, merely the final deposits that the general public
knows about. Persistent rumors, impossible to verify or to dismiss,
suggest that additional stashes may have been secreted away by rogue
laboratories, military zealots, or unrepentant countries, without offi-
cial acknowledgment or authorization from the WHO.'45 The loca-
tion of any such caches and the identity and motivations of their
possessors remain obscure, but senior United States government offi-
cials and private observers alike concede the possibility that Russia,
North Korea, Iraq, or others have not declared or destroyed all the
smallpox materials they once possessed.146
143. A WHO inspecting team of biosafety and orthopoxvirus experts reviewed the safety
aspects of the Vector facility in June 1995, and the facility was formally designated as a
collaborating center in 1997. World Health Organization, Communicable Disease Preven-
tion and Control: Smallpox Eradication-Destruction of Variola Virus Stocks, EB97/14,
Sept. 13, 1995; see also Vladimir Pokrovskiy, Vector Science Center's Achievements, Financial Need
Described, Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, May 8-14, 1997 (discussing Vector's safety standards
as including "a six-story reinforced concrete cube" which houses the virus) (translated
from Russian).
144. As discussed below, Vector was for many years the leading component of the Soviet
Union's biological weapons program. Some feared that the Moscow variola samples were
transferred to Koltsovo largely to provide "cover" for weapons-related smallpox work that
would continue there, now under the guise of a civilian, WHO-approved institute. Richard
Preston, The Demon in the Freezer, NEW YORKER, July 12, 1999, at 44, 46.
145. Other, more innocent, residual variola caches might be available, too. For exam-
ple, there may still be unlabeled ampoules of the virus buried in the inner recesses of any
laboratory's deep-freeze cabinet, some of which are poorly inventoried and rarely purged.
TUCKER, supra note 95, at 136-37 (stating that "[m]ost virologists were poor librarians ....
and they rarely catalogued or cleaned out their laboratory freezers on a regular basis.
Thus, over the years, specimens of variola virus tended to get lost among the mass of ice-
encrusted tubes and bottles."). Given the inadequacies of human memories, and the nor-
mal turnover in personnel, it is possible that long-forgotten samples might surface at any
time. Indeed, previously-undeclared variola virus stocks were discovered in two locations
in 1979: a laboratory in California and one in Tanzania. Id. at 137; see also FENNER ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 1341. Moreover, some have posited that viable variola samples may be
extracted from prehistoric smallpox victims among northern cave dwellers who contracted
the disease, died from it, and were frozen in near-cryogenic conditions in the permafrost,
which might have preserved the virus for discovery centuries later. TUCKER, supra, at 161-
62; Pokrovskiy, supra note 143 (stating the opinions of researchers from Vector regarding
the threat of smallpox re-emerging from the Siberian permafrost zone).
146. David Brown, Destruction of Smallpox Samples is Reassessed, WASH. PosT, Mar. 15, 1999,
at A01 (quoting experts who suspect hidden variola virus samples exist outside the WHO
repositories); Steve Goldstein, Smallpox a Big Terrorism Worry, SEATrLE TIMES, Apr. 25, 2000,
at A8 (quoting a senior scientist at Sandia National Laboratories as saying "it's far more
likely than not" that variola virus is held outside the known repositories); Smallpox: U.S. to
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In addition to attempting to consolidate and conserve the variola
stocks, the WHO undertook in 1980 to procure and maintain indefi-
nitely a suitable stockpile of viable, freeze-dried vaccine as a precau-
tion against any future resurgence of the virus. 147  As initially
envisioned, the organization itself would permanently retain at least
200 million doses and suitable bifurcated needles in two widely-dis-
persed locations.' 48 Individual countries were expected to conserve
another 100 million high-quality vaccine doses in their respective na-
tional inventories.' 49 Relatively quickly, however, that collective re-
solve faded: difficulties in sustaining quality and temperature controls
led to the WHO stocks being reduced and consolidated in Switzer-
land; 5 0 the production of any new vaccine was abruptly halted in
most nations; 51 and the ability to quickly generate additional supplies
atrophied.'5 2 The current WHO inventory of smallpox vaccine totals
no more than 500,000 doses, and the various national supplies-of
starkly uneven quality-may have accumulated to only 60-110 million
by 2000.153
In connection with the elimination of the immediate threat of
smallpox, the WHO also recommended the termination of all coun-
Oppose Destruction of Last Samples, AM. HEALTH LINE, April 23, 1999 (quoting Ken Bernard of
the National Security Council staff as stating, "We are relatively sure that most of the virus
is in the two declared stocks. There's just no way to ensure that if we destroy the two
declared stocks that we will destroy every smallpox virus that exists.").
147. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1267-70 (detailing WHO plans to maintain
suitable stores of smallpox vaccine).
148. See id. at 1267-68 (stating that by 1985, the organization actually held about 300
million vaccine doses and 3.7 million bifurcated needles in repositories in Geneva and New
Delhi).
149. See id. at 1270 (stating that in 1985, twenty-two countries reported holding national
reserves of smallpox vaccine, totaling over 100 million doses, but only about 84 million
doses were being properly maintained).
150. Id. at 1268 (stating that after persistent fluctuations in refrigeration and a serious
flood, the New Delhi vaccine inventory was transferred to Switzerland in 1984).
151. Id. at 1270 (stating that in 1975, eighty-four laboratories in seventy-six countries
produced smallpox vaccines, but by 1985 only fourteen laboratories in eleven countries
were producing minimal amounts of new vaccine).
152. Id.
153. WORLn HEALTH ORG., supra note 52, at http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/
smallpox/factsheet.html. In 1985, the relevant WHO committee determined that it was no
longer necessary for the WHO to maintain its vaccine inventory, and the organization's
holdings quickly plummeted. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1269-70; Henderson et al.,
supra note 43, at 2131-32 (stating that "[a]lthough quantities of vaccine have also been
retained by a number of other countries, none have reserves large enough to meet more
than their own potential emergency needs. WHO has 500,000 doses."). Similarly, national
vaccine stocks declined, both in quantity and quality. James W. LeDuc & John Becher,
Current Status of Smallpox Vaccine, 5 EMERGING INFEcrIous DISEASEs 593, 593 (1999).
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tries' routine vaccination programs. 15 4 Because of the danger of side
effects, including a statistically foreseeable number of infant and
childhood deaths, public health authorities in many nations had
quickly suspended automatic vaccination of the civilian populations
whenever their countries became reliably smallpox-free. 155 In the
United States, for example, routine smallpox vaccination became a
thing of the past in 1972, except for some military personnel and
health researchers deemed to be at special risk. 156 Most of the rest of
the world followed suit in the 1970s or early 1980s. 157
Finally, in the afterglow of smallpox eradication, WHO expert
committees also inaugurated a spirited debate about whether to de-
stroy those last known remaining samples of the variola virus housed
in the United States and Russia.' 58 In 1985, a leading WIO commit-
tee surveyed sixty recognized academic and public health experts in
twenty-one countries, finding that only five held the view that variola
should be retained indefinitely for research purposes.1 59 Accordingly,
in 1986 and again in 1990, the relevant WHO expert groups unani-
154. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1264-67.
155. Id. at 1264-65 (stating that while fifty-two WHO member countries were still con-
ducting routine vaccination programs in 1980, routine vaccination ceased in all countries
by 1984).
156. See Henderson et al., supra note 43, at 2131-32 (noting that routine vaccination in
the U.S. ceased in 1972); U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SMALLPOX QUESTIONS AND AN-
swERs: THE DISEASE AND THE VACCINE (2003), at 7, available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
agent/smallpox/overview/pdf/faq (last updated Mar. 31, 2003). Between the last small-
pox case in the United States in 1949 and the termination of routine vaccination in 1972,
the country tolerated the incidence of adverse side effects from vaccination in order to
preserve the bulwark against imported smallpox. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 309-10.
In 1963, for example, fourteen million vaccinations were conducted, resulting in 132 cases
of severe complications and 7 deaths. Id. at 309. At that rate, between 1949 and 1972,
there may have been 3000 cases of severe vaccinial complications and 150 deaths. Id.
Analysts then compared two hypothetical situations: a continuation of routine small-
pox vaccination in the United States from 1970 to 2000, and suspension of vaccination
except for high-risk groups (hospital workers, international travelers, and military induct-
ees), coupled with a surveillance-containment program to deal immediately with any im-
ported cases. Id. (citing a 1969 study by J.M. Lane and J.D. Millar). The first scenario
would have resulted in 210 vaccination induced deaths. Id. The second scenario would
cause an equivalent number of deaths only if there were as many as twenty-one separate
importations of smallpox during the period. Id.
157. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1264-66 (discussing the cessation of routine vacci-
nation programs in various countries).
158. See D.A. HENDERSON, DELIBERATIONS REGARDING THE DESTRUCTION OF SMALLPOX VI-
RUS: A HISTORICAL REVIEW, 1980-1998 (Ctr. for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, Comm. of
the Inst. of Med., Working Paper 1998) (providing conflicting points of view), at http://
www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/news/deliberations.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2003);
TUCKER, supra note 95, at 169-74 (outlining the respective positions of those who favored
destruction of the remaining virus and those who supported retention).
159. Scientific Activities, 64 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 801, 801-02 (1986).
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mously recommended destruction of the two repositories, eventually
setting a target date of December 31, 1993.160 When that deadline
slipped by, the objective was re-cast as June 30, 1995.161
Other supposedly final deadlines for variola's destruction have
similarly come and gone without dispositive action,1 62 despite what
still appears to be overwhelming global sentiment in favor of eradica-
tion. 113 A 1998 survey, for example, found seventy-four WHO mem-
ber countries expressing themselves in favor of prompt incineration,
four undecided, and one opposed-but the four undecided nations
were Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, and the sole oppo-
nent was Russia.' 64 In May 1999, the WHO, at America's urging, again
punted the issue into the future, deciding "to authorize temporary
retention up to not later than 2002 "165 for the purpose of permitting
additional international research on antiviral agents, improved vac-
cines, genetic mapping, and augmented diagnostic and detection ca-
pabilities.1 66 But in 2002, even that deadline was erased, when the
160. See id. (stating that the 1986 Committee also recommended that global reserves of
vaccine were no longer necessary, seed stocks should continue to be maintained, and
smallpox vaccination of military personnel should be terminated); see also HENDERSON,
supra note 158, at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/news/deliberations.html; De-
struction of Variola Virus: Memorandum from a WHO Meeting, 72 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG.
841, 843 (1994).
161. By this time, considerable controversy had arisen about the destruction decision,
and the issue was debated by virologists and others inside and outside the WHO structure.
When the relevant WHO committee assembled in 1994, cracks in the previous consensus
emerged. While the members were once again unanimous that the two variola repositories
should be eliminated, there was disagreement about precisely when that step should be
taken. Eight members favored June 30, 1995, while two others would have postponed the
action for five more years to permit additional scientific research. Destruction of Variola
Virus, supra note 160, at 842-43; see also TUCKER, supra note 95, at 177 (discussing the meet-
ing of the Ad Hoc Committee on Orthopoxvirus Infections and its ultimate decision to
recommend destroying remaining stocks on June 30, 1995).
162. See TUCKER, supra note 95, at 187-89, 213-17.
163. See Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Virus Stocks: Report by the Secre-
tariat, World Health Org. Exec. Bd. 109th sess., Provisional Agenda Item 3.14, at 3-4, EB
109/17 (2001) (noting the sixteen member Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Re-
search's conclusion that variola research should continue).
164. TUCKER, supra note 95, at 190; Meredith Wadman, Scientists Split on US Smallpox
Decision, 398 NATURE 741, 741 (1999).
165. World Health Assembly, Res. 52.10, 9th Plen. Mtg., Agenda Item 13, at 1, A52/VR/
9 (1999), available at http://www.who.int/emc/pdfs/cwha5210.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2003); see also Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Virus Stocks, Report by the
Secretariat, World Health Org. 54th World Health Assembly, Provisional Agenda Item
13.7, at 1, A54/16 (2001) (noting the deadline extension).
166. World Health Assembly Res. 52.10, supra note 165, at 1. Under the resolution, any
such research is to be funded by member states and "conducted in an open and transpar-
ent manner only with the agreement and under the control of WHO." Id. The Director-
General has appointed a new group of experts to advise the WHO on the progress of the
research and on inspection of the facilities where variola activities are conducted. WHO,
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WHO again bowed to American pressure and deferred the destruc-
tion of the variola stocks once more-this time without even setting a
new due date for the virus's ultimate incineration. 6 7
The international debate on variola destruction quickly outgrew
the channels of the scientific literature, and it has continuously inten-
sified.1 68 Proponents of prompt incineration argue that only by de-
stroying the virus can we be assured that it will never escape its current
confinement and again ravage humankind; that we no longer require
access to live, intact variola for scientific research purposes; and that
destruction provides a necessary symbolic coda to the eradication of
the disease, a human triumph that remains incomplete as long as any
residue of the virus lingers. 169 Retentionists, on the other hand, argue
that there is possible future value in additional scientific research on
variola; 171 that it is unwise to destroy the two stockpiles we know
about, so long as there may remain other secret stashes possibly acces-
sible by hostile or rogue regimes; and that it is ethically problematic
for human beings to deliberately destroy another life form.171
Report by the Secretariat, Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Virus Stocks, at 1,
EB 106/3 (2003).
167. World Health Assembly, Res. 55.15, 9th Plen. Mtg., Agenda Item 13.16, at 1, A55/
VR9 (2002). Some countries, notably China, had advocated setting a new fixed date for
destruction of the samples, but that proposal was dropped. The director of the Vector
laboratory where the Russian samples are stored has interpreted the WHO action as fore-
casting "another 5 to 7 years" of continued retention and research on the samples. Rich-
ard Stone, World Health Body Fires Starting Gun, 296 Sci. 1383, 1383 (2002).
168. The public forum for debate was triggered by a pro/con debate in Science magazine
in 1993. See Wolfgang K Joklik et al., Why the Smallpox Virus Stocks Should Not Be Destroyed,
262 Sci. 1225 (1993); Brian W.J. Mahy et al., The Remaining Stocks of Smallpox Should Be
Destroyed, 262 Sci. 1223 (Nov. 19, 1993). As recent events have stimulated the public's
interest in bioterrorism and related topics, smallpox has become a prominent subject for
popular culture, including novels, television programs, and video games. Ruth J. Katz,
Editorial, How to Prepare for Smallpox, WASH. POST, June 1, 2002, at Al 9 (television); Mar-
garet Talbot, Losing the Home Front, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002, § 6, at 13 (video games).
169. Mahy et al., supra note 168, at 1224. As Russian smallpox scientist Otar
Andzhaparidze put it, if the planet's epochal struggle against variola were to end without
total eradication, "it would be as if a piece of music were to end before the final note was
struck." Siebert, supra note 140, at 32.
170. Joklik et al., supra note 168, at 1225-26 (suggesting that further inquiries may en-
hance our ability to deal with smallpox should it ever recur, with other viral diseases that
may operate along similar cellular pathways, and with human immunology more gener-
ally). See generally COMM. ON THE AsSESSMENT OF FUTURE SCIENTIFIc NEEDS FOR LIVE VARIOLA
VIRUS, BD. OF GLOBAL HEALTH, INST. OF MED., AsSESSMENT OF FUTURE SCIENTIFIC NEEDS FOR
LIVE VAJROLA VIRUS (1999) [hereinafter INST. OF MED.] (analyzing the scientific advances,
including development of improved vaccines, antiviral medications, and diagnostic and
detection equipment-possibly useful against a range of other viruses, in addition to vari-
ola-that might be achievable through additional research on smallpox).
171. TUCKER, supra note 95, at 172-73. Some leading scientists, noting that a virus does
not meet the traditional biological criteria defining "life," conclude that any philosophical
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J. If Smallpox Escaped Today
The most horrifying scenarios-and the images that animate
much of the debate about the future of the virus samples-spring
from the irreducible possibility that as long as variola exists anywhere
on earth, we cannot be one hundred percent confident that it could
never return to the human population. 7 2 Several such pathways may
be imagined because no laboratory, even one as diligent and attentive
to security as the CDC, can ever be absolutely protected. The recent
experience with high-level spies at the FBI and CIA, for example, re-
minds us that disloyal or disgruntled employees may be found in any
institution as long as greed, ideology, and blackmail remain human
motivations.'1 3 Natural disasters, too, can pose threats, as earthquakes
and hurricanes can strike with little warning, unleashing nature's fury
against even reinforced buildings. Likewise, the skill and discipline of
the September 11, 2001 terrorists underscore the fact that no facility
can be immunized from the threat of hijacked airliners turned into
flying bombs. Reportedly, the CDC itself was considered a possible
target of an additional diverted aircraft on that horrific day.' 74
If variola did somehow escape its current frozen storage and in-
vade the biosphere today, the consequences could be monumental.
In 2003, an overwhelming number of the human population is pre-
cariously vulnerable. First, there are relatively few survivors of earlier
smallpox attacks who possess lifetime immunity. Second, most coun-
tries stopped routine vaccination two or three decades ago; therefore
upwards of half the world's population, born after that period, has
never been vaccinated, and the protection accorded to older people
by their childhood vaccinations has now largely worn off.175
or ethical squeamishness about eradicating the last variola samples is misplaced; however,
others would admit a broader range of moral considerations as relevant to the issue. FEN-
NER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1339 (arguing that the only consideration should be whether
maintaining the virus is necessary for scientific research).
172. See Siebert, supra note 140, at 55 (noting some scenarios that might result in the
virus's re-introduction into the human population).
173. See Walter Pincus, Catch a Spy-And Look What Happens, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2001,
at B01 (noting several recent, high-profile cases in which American government officials
were exposed as spies for the Soviet Union or other countries).
174. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Judith Miller, Bioterror Role an Uneasy Fit for the C.D. C., N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at IA (noting that the Federal Bureau of Investigation passed along a
tip that another hijacked aircraft appeared headed toward Atlanta, and possibly toward the
CDC, which then promptly evacuated its premises).
175. WilliamJ. Bicknell, The Case for Voluntary Smallpox Vaccination, 346 NEw ENG.J. MED.
1323, 1323 (2002) (stating that the 119 million Americans born after the termination of
mass vaccinations would be fully vulnerable to smallpox); D.A. HENDERSON, RISK OFA DE-
LIBERATE RELEASE OF SMALLPOX VIRUS; ITS IMPACT ON VIRUS DESTRUCTION (Ctr. for Civilian
Biodefense Stud. Working Paper 1999 (stating that "in most communities, at least 90% of
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In all earlier periods of human history, smallpox epidemics, as
horrible as they were, knew some natural limits. When the virus rav-
aged a particular community, mostly striking children who had been
born since the last major outbreak, it would eventually run out of
fresh victims because most of the older local people were protected
via their exposure to, and survival of, prior smallpox waves. Today,
however, our "herd immunity"176 has been lost-the nervous bulk of
the American and global population is fully exposed. 177
Moreover, there is no certainty that a case of smallpox today
would be quickly diagnosed and treated as such. No one has had the
occasion to make that particular identification for over two decades,
so the routines for prompt assessment and treatment have not been
practiced.1 7 8 Our capacity for isolation and quarantine have likewise
atrophied, and many states' public health laws and institutions have
fallen into desuetude. 1
79
the population will be fully susceptible to smallpox with perhaps 20% of adults having
some protective immunity and none of the children"), at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.
org/pages/agents/risk.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2003); WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note
52, at http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/smallpox/factsheet/htm. Few people received
more than one smallpox vaccination, but even a relatively old vaccination might accord
some degree of protection against a subsequent smallpox infection, perhaps lessening the
severity of the disease or its communicability. Henderson et al., supra note 43, at 2131.
176. See P. Fine, Herd Immunity: History, Theory, Practice, 15 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 265-302
(1993) (defining herd immunity as "the resistance of a group of people to attack by a
disease to which a large proportion of the members are immune, thus lessening the likeli-
hood of a patient with a disease coming into contact with a susceptible individual"); Small-
pox: Increasing Herd Immunity Would Enhance Post-Bioterrorist Attack Intervention, VIRUS WKIL.,
Jan. 14, 2003, at 16 (noting that a program of "pre-emptive voluntary vaccination and vacci-
nation of first responders ... could enhance the effectiveness of post attack intervention").
177. In this respect, the global situation regarding vulnerability to variola is more akin
to that of the native peoples of the New World when they first encountered smallpox im-
ported from Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Because none of them
had acquired immunity by surviving earlier epidemics, entire populations were simultane-
ously impacted, and death rates far exceeded those common in locations where smallpox
episodes were a recurrent feature of communal experience. See FENNER ET AL., supra note
14, at 238-40 (chronicling the impact of smallpox upon early settlers to North America);
TUCKER, supra note 95, at 9-10 (describing Spanish conquistador Hernando Cortes march-
ing his troops into the Aztec capital on August 13, 1520 to find the streets lined with the
bodies of smallpox victims). Of course, the availability today of an efficacious vaccine radi-
cally alters the comparison.
178. See Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. & Marilyn Werber Serafini, Be Afraid, Be Moderately
Afraid, 31 NAT'LJ. 806, 813 (1999) (noting that when a patient presents flu-like symptoms,
doctors will not immediately turn their attention to the possibility of biological weapons);
Lawrence K Altman, Smallpox Vaccine Knowledge Found Lacking, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2002, at
A32 (reporting that public health professionals and the general public are ill-informed
about the dangers of smallpox and vaccination).
179. See Bioterrorism Preparedness: CDC's Public Health Response to the Threat of Smallpox, Tes-
timony Before Sen. Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. on Labor, HHS, Educ., and
Related Agencies, 107th Cong., at 3 (2001) (stating that the "CDC is creating diagnostic
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In sum, the world's heroic triumph over smallpox-perhaps the
single greatest public health accomplishment in history-remains in-
complete. Even in 1973, when the prospect of success in the ISEP was
at last coming within reach, the seeds of the current dilemma could
be discerned: should we retain the last residues of variola as a sort of
planetary insurance policy against contingent future needs and as the
substrate for additional research activities, or should we promptly de-
stroy it to further minimize the probability of future disastrous
outbreaks?
II. MILITARY AND TERRORIST THREAT OF SMALLPOX
AS A BIOLOGICAL WEAPON
A. Biological Weapons in Combat
The world's experience with disease as an implement of warfare
is long, diverse, and unspeakably nasty. Certainly, military officials
have always had to take into consideration the accidental outbreaks of
deadly or incapacitating illnesses-smallpox prominent among
them-that could decimate the troops or rob them of their fighting
fitness at unpredictable moments.1 80 Fragmentary historical records
suggest that it may have been smallpox that killed one-quarter of Ath-
ens' soldiers and innumerable civilians in 430 B.C., undermining the
city-state in its interminable warfare with Sparta;"s1 that Alexander the
Great's footsoldiers may have suffered brutally from smallpox in 327
B.C. while invading India; 82 and that the Great Wall of China could
and epidemiological performance standards for state and local health departments and
will help states conduct drills and exercises to assess local readiness for bioterrorism"),
available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/dpanel/cdtest.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2003);
George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1337,
1337-38 (2002) (noting that "the CDC has advised all states to review the adequacy of their
laws, with special attention to provisions for quarantining people in the event of a smallpox
attack"); Matthew K Wynia & Lawrence Gostin, The Bioterrorist Threat and Access to Health
Care, 296 Sci. 1613, 1613 (2002) (discussing crucial obstacles to U.S. public health
preparedness); Laura Meckler, Smallpox Defense Includes Quick Use of a Quarantine, DETROIT
FREE PREss, July 9, 2002 (reporting that federal health officials are preparing contingency
plans for mandatory quarantine of Americans who might be exposed to a smallpox pa-
tient), at http://www.freep.com/news/health/pox9_20020709.htm (last visited Apr. 2,
2003).
180. Incapacitating an enemy soldier might sometimes be even more advantageous than
killing him, because a sick or injured belligerent would consume far more of his col-
leagues' time, energy, and resources than would a dead one. PAUL E. STEINER, DISEASE IN
THE CIVIL WAR: NATURAL BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN 1861-1865, at 35-36 (1968).
181. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 214-15; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 19.
182. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 214; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 17.
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repulse the invading Huns, but not the virus they injected into the
empire in 243 B.C.'1
3
Centuries later, smallpox accompanied, and materially assisted,
the Spanish conquistadors in overwhelming the indigenous peoples of
Central and South America.1 84 Because the Aztecs, Mayans, and Incas
had never previously encountered variola, they were all fully suscepti-
ble to it, whereas the Spanish, who had survived their individual bouts
with smallpox, seemed invulnerable.18 5 Millions of Native Americans
died precipitously from variola, and their civilizations fell in sequence
to the vastly outnumbered invading forces of Hernando Cortez and
Francisco Pizarro. l"6 Likewise, the various participants in the Euro-
pean colonization of North America,187 the French and Indian
War,188 the American Revolution,8 9 and the U.S. Civil War were buf-
feted by a variety of uncontrollable diseases, including smallpox, that
slashed their military effectiveness. 9
Further, deliberate applications of what we would now term biolog-
ical weapons (BW) and chemical weapons (CW), collectively known as
CBW, had been routinely undertaken throughout history.'91 For ex-
ample, ancient warriors episodically attempted to foul each others'
183. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 216; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 18, 165-67.
184. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 236-38; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 205-15.
185. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 236-37; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 207.
186. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 236-38; HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 205-15.
187. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 234-45 (noting that smallpox brutalized Indian villages
and European settlements alike during the early North American colonial period).
188. Id. at 245 (noting that smallpox affected battles during the French and Indian
War).
189. Id. at 257-62 (asserting that British troops were generally more frequently vario-
lated than were colonials, inspiring fears that they might initiate the deliberate spread of
smallpox as a battlefield tactic).
190. l. at 274-77 (noting that during the Civil War, smallpox affected the South more
because the Confederacy had less access to reliable vaccination).
191. See Flowerree, supra note 24, at 999; TUCKER, supra note 95, at 19-21. The three
partially-overlapping categories of ordnance must be distinguished. Essentially, a "biologi-
cal weapon" (such as smallpox or anthrax) relies upon a living organism (or upon infective
material derived from such an agent) that causes a disease by reproducing itself inside
humans, animals, or plants. Flowerree, supra, at 999. A "chemical weapon" (such as mus-
tard gas or nerve gas), in partial contrast, relies upon a substance-in solid, liquid, or
gaseous form-that causes direct toxic effects (deadly or incapacitating, long or short
term) to the tissues, organs, or functions of its subjects. Id. A "toxin weapon" (such as
rattlesnake poison or tricothecene) is a sort of grey area. It embraces chemical substances
that are produced naturally by living organisms (and the various synthetically produced
analogues of those natural substances) that can directly harm a target, without reproduc-
ing themselves inside it or creating a "disease." Id. Although these definitions are impre-
cise, and although scientific reality sometimes confounds our ability to categorize novel
weapons concepts into discrete pigeonholes, the existing structures are the best available.
William Lawler, Progress Towards International Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 13
U. TOL. L. REV. 1220, 1222-26 (1982) (discussing how the distinctions between biological
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wells and rivers with diseased animals or other toxins. 192 In one noto-
rious incident, fourteenth century Tartars besieging the Crimean city
of Caffa catapulted plague-infested cadavers over the city walls, trig-
gering a debilitating epidemic, which fleeing merchants then trans-
ported throughout the known world.' 93
Most infamously, during the latter stages of the French and In-
dian War, the British North American commander, Sir Jeffrey Am-
herst, plotted with his subordinates to dispense smallpox-infested
blankets among the Indians threatening Fort Pitt in western Penn-
sylvania, exhorting his troops to: "Try Every other Method that can
Serve to Extirpate this Execrable Race."' 9 4 Shortly thereafter, a devas-
tating smallpox epidemic indeed broke out among the Mingoes,
Delawares, and Shawanoes of the Ohio River valley, although it is not
completely clear from the historical record whether the British treach-
ery was responsible. 915 Similarly, an eighteenth century white trader,
furious that Indian raiders had stolen some of his equipment, exacted
his revenge by presenting them, ostensibly as a token of peace, with a
keg of rum wrapped in a flag that had been contaminated with vari-
ola-an early model of incipient biological terrorism.' 96
and chemical weapons played a role in strained early efforts toward disarmament in the
United Nations).
192. Ancient Indian, Greek, and Roman literature each abound with references to poi-
sons being wielded in combat against an individual, an army, or a city. The true military
effectiveness of these primitive potions and projectiles is hard to assess, but the concept of
using biology and chemistry in combat-as well as the pattern of the public being revolted
by that use-were well-established even before New Testament times. John Ellis van Court-
land Moon, Controlling Chemical and Biological Weapons Through World War II, in II ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL, supra note 24, at 657 (stating that prohibitions against poisoning
weapons, wells, and food were honored in India, by "the Artharva Veda (ca. 1500-500 B.C.)
and the Law of Manu (ca. 200 B.C.-A.D. 200)," and "classical Greeks and Romans saw [such
methods of poisoning] as a violation of is gentium, the law of nations").
193. Mark Wheelis, Biological Warfare Before 1914, in BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS:
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND USE FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO 1945, at 8, 13-15 (Erhard
Geissler &John Ellis van Courtiand Moon eds., 1999) [hereinafter BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN
WEAPONS]; Mark Wheelis, Biological Warfare at the 1346 Siege of Caffa, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 971, 973 (2002).
194. Bernhard Knollenberg, General Amherst and Germ Warfare, 41 Miss. VALLEY HIST.
REV. 489, 493 (1954) (chronicling letters exchanged between General Jeffrey Amherst and
Colonel Henry Bouquet throughout the summer of 1763).
195. FRANCIS PARKMAN, II THE OREGON TRAIL: THE CONSPIRACY OF PONTIAC 648-49 (Li-
brary of America 1991) (1853) (referencing a report from Gershou Hicks, which men-
tioned smallpox at Fort Pitt and among the Mingoes, Delawares and Shawanoes); Moon,
supra note 192, at 658 (noting that "[wihether the scheme [by Amherst] was implemented
and whether it led to the smallpox epidemic among the Native Americans [in the Ohio
Valley] remains a matter of historical dispute"); Wheelis, Biological Warfare Before 1914,
supra note 193, at 21-24.
196. HOPKINS, supra note 43, at 236 (noting that many died as a result of this act).
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In the twentieth century, application of the incorporeal forms of
combat reached new levels of sophistication and volume. A bestiary of
chemical weapons such as chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas
fouled the battlefield in World War I and claimed at least 1,300,000
casualties, including 91,000 deaths. 9 7 The Kaiser's Germany also
tried to use primitive biological weapons as well, sending saboteurs to
the United States, Russia, Argentina, and other countries to spread
anthrax and glanders (another infectious animal disease) among cav-
alry and draft animals intended for use at the front. 98
Remarkably, biological and chemical weapons inventories were,
for the most part, idle during World War II,1"9 despite the fact that all
sides were ostentatiously equipped with immense arsenals of novel
noxious substances,2 °° and despite the fact that all parties worried per-
petually that the opponent might seize an advantage by sudden initia-
tion of the poisons.20 ' The most conspicuous exception to this
general pattern of reciprocal self-restraint was Japan's use of a menag-
erie of biological weapons, including smallpox, against eleven cities in
Manchuria, and its accompanying set of macabre experiments with
biological weapons conducted by the infamous Unit 731 upon at least
three thousand civilians and prisoners of war.20 2
197. CHARLES PILLER & KEITH R. YAMAMOTO, GENE WARS: MILITARY CONTROL OVER THE
NEW GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES 30 (1988).
198. Wheelis, Biological Warfare Before 1914, supra note 193, at 35, 40-41; see also JOHN
PARKER, THE KILLING FACTORY: THE Top SECRET WORLD OF GERM AND CHEMICAL WARFARE
38 (1996) (noting the Germans' use of glanders against the Allies' horses).
199. Italy used chemical weapons against Ethiopia in 1935-36, and Japan used chemical
weapons against China beginning in 1937, but the central battlefields remained largely
"clean" during 1939-45. Moon, supra note 192, at 666-72; Yuki Tanaka, Poison Gas: The Story
Japan Would Like to Forget, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Oct. 1988, at 10, 15-17 (providing ex-
amples of Japan's use of poison gases against China during the Sino-Japanese War).
200. PILLER & YAMAMOTO, supra note 197, at 31-32 (noting that in 1942, the United
States invested $1 billion in its chemical and biological programs, and that Germany had
the capacity to produce twelve thousand tons of gas per month, including the revolution-
ary agent tabun-the original nerve gas).
201. Donald Avery, Canadian Biological and Toxin Warfare Research, Development and Plan-
ning, 1925-45, in BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS, supra note 193, at 190, 211-12 (noting
that U.S. authorities feared thatJapan might launch high-altitude balloons laden with BW
against the west coast of North America); Moon, supra note 192, at 668-70 (noting that
Britain felt especially vulnerable to a potential Nazi chemical weapons attack).
202. PETER WILLIAMS & DAVID WALLACE, UNIT 731:JAPAN'S SECRET BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
IN WORLD WAR II 31-50 (1989) (describing the secret activities of Unit 731); Erhard
Geissler, Implications of Genetic Engineering for Chemical and Biological Warfare, 1984 WORLD
ARMAMENTS & DISARMAMENT SIPRI Y.B. 421, 423 (noting that "[t]hese experiments in-
cluded infection with massive doses of plague, typhus, dysentery, gas gangrene, typhoid,
haemorrhagic [sic] fever, cholera, anthrax, tularaemia, smallpox, tsutsugamushi and glan-
ders"); Doug Struck, Tokyo Court Confirms Japan Used Germ Warfare in China, WASH. POST,
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For its part, the United States sustained a major biological weap-
ons enterprise during and after World War 10.23 President Roosevelt
approved a secret biological weapons apparatus employing four thou-
sand people, with a budget of $60 million and expansive facilities in
four states.2°4 Plans were developed to produce thousands of bombs
laden with anthrax or botulin toxin, for use against either Germany or
Japan in the late stages of the conflict.20 5 Subsequently, the United
States stockpiled no fewer than thirty-five different types of biological
weapons, by 1969 totaling some 40,000 liters of anti-personnel agents
and 45,000 BW shrapnel bombs and other devices.20 6 Variola was a
particular focus of attention: "We made a beautiful powder for small-
pox," one U.S. biological weapons officer recalled, adding, "We used
chemicals to protect it during dissemination and aerosolization" to
spread the virus more effectively.
207
Aug. 28, 2002, at A15 (reporting that a Japanese district court found that Japan had con-
ducted germ warfare against China during World War II).
203. The United States, along with Germany and Britain, publicly promised not to use
chemical weapons unless an enemy state initiated that form of combat first-a taboo that
mostly held during World War II. Moon, supra note 192, at 669 (noting that Germany,
Great Britain, and the United States pledged to abide by the Geneva Protocol in Septem-
ber 1939). However, these undertakings were vague as to their applicability to biological
weapons, and President Roosevelt never issued a pledge clarifying the U.S. position regard-
ing first use of BW. JUDITH MILLER ET AL., GERMS: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND AMERICA'S
SECRET WAR 38 (2001) ("With intelligence agencies warning that Tokyo and Berlin had
biological weapons, Washington began to mobilize against germ attacks in 1942. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt publicly denounced the exotic arms of America's foes as 'terrible
and inhumane,' even while preparing to retaliate in kind.").
204. STEPHEN ENDICOTT & EDWARD HAGERMAN, THE UNITED STATES AND BIOLOGICAL
W/TARFARE: SECRETS FROM THE EARLY COLD WAR AND KOREA 31 (1998); John Ellis van Court-
land Moon, US Biological Warfare Planning and Preparedness: The Dilemmas of Policy, in BIOLOG-
ICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS, supra note 193, at 215; see also ED REGIS, THE BIOLOGY OF DOOM:
THE HISTORY OF AMERICA'S SECRET GERM WARFARE PROJECT 25-32 (1999) (describing the
collaboration between British scientists and George W. Merck, Roosevelt's head of the War
Research Service).
205. Moon, U.S. Biological Warfare Planning, supra note 204, at 248-49; Moon, supra note
192, at 670 (stating that of the many potential BW tested, only anthrax and botulinus toxin
were actively developed).
206. JULIAN PERRY ROBINSON, II THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE:
CB WEAPONS TODAY 234 (1973); see also Susan Wright, Evolution of Biological Warfare Policy:
1945-1990, in PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL ARMS RACE 26, 34 (Susan Wright ed., 1990); Mar-
tin Enserink, Secret Weapons Tests' Details Revealed, 298 SCI. 513, 513-14 (2002) (discussing
the release of Department of Defense documents, which detail tests involving pathogens
and toxic chemicals).
207. Shannon Brownlee, Clear and Present Danger, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2001, Magazine,
at W08 (quoting Bill Patrick, a former bioweapons pioneer who worked at Fort Detrick,
Maryland); see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 203, at 59-60 (stating that scientists at Fort
Detrick developed a method to turn freeze-dried variola into a fine powder which could be
placed in small aerosol generators or atomizers).
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B. Legal Regulation of Biological Weapons
At the same time that various armies around the world were plan-
ning, procuring, and practicing for this widely-anticipated biological
and chemical warfare, public opinion and the international legal com-
munity were uniting in opposition. A profound loathing for these
poisons is of ancient provenance; the same cultures that conveyed sto-
ried illustrations of the use of CBW also generated the beginnings of a
legal regime restraining their application. Indian, Greek, and Roman
codes all abhorred these unconventional weapons, 208 and interna-
tional law publicists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries like-
wise pronounced them beyond the pale of civilized conduct. 209
A fistful of treaties-the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg,210
the 1874 Declaration of Brussels,211 and the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions 212 -continued the international legislation against CBW,
and post-World War I agreements further deepened that global con-
sensus. 2 3  The key instrument, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 2 14 re-
208. See Moon, supra note 192, at 657 (stating that "[b]y the end of the classical period,
the prohibition against poison was a principle of customary international law").
209. See id. at 658.
210. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight (St. Petersburg Declaration), Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens (ser. 1) 474,
reprinted in A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS CONTROL AGREE-
MENTS 85 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2000).
211. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,
August 27, 1874, 4 Martens (ser. 2) 219, reprinted in A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HuMANI-
TARIAN LAW AND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, supra note 210, at 87.
212. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 26
Martens (ser. 2) 949, reprinted in A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, supra note 210, at 93; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land, October 18, 1907, 3 Martens (ser. 3) 461-503, reprinted in A MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, supra note 210, at
103. This declaration, containing the same language as the 1899 "Laws and Customs of
War on Land," was signed by the countries that were later to become the principal belliger-
ents in World War I. Article 22 of the 1907 treaty affirms that " [t]he right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." Id at 105. Article 23 continues,
"[i]n addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbid-
den . . . to employ poison or poisoned weapons." Id. at 106.
213. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of
Versailles), June 28, 1919, art. 171, 2 Bevans 43, 119. The treaty prohibited "the manufac-
ture and importation" of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids,
materials or devices" by Germany. Id.
Similar provisions were inserted into the post-war peace treaties with other defeated
countries. See Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare,
Feb. 6, 1922, 25 L.N.T.S. 202. Under Article 5 of the Five-Power Washington Naval Limita-
tion Treaty, the parties observed that "the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,
and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the gen-
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sponded to the horror of battlefield toxins by prohibiting "the use in
war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous
liquids, materials or devices" 215 and recording the parties' further un-
dertaking "to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological
methods of warfare."216
Unfortunately, the Geneva Protocol-still in force for 132 parties,
including the United States217-hardly constitutes a complete solu-
tion to the problem of CBW for several reasons. First, that treaty bans
only the use in warfare; it does not inhibit parties' development, pos-
session, deployment or proliferation of the regulated arms.218 In fact,
through a series of reservations, countries mostly retained the right to
apply biological and chemical weapons in retaliation, if some other
country violated the taboo first.2 19 Large CBW arsenals, therefore,
eral opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in
treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties" and affirmed their assent to
such a prohibition. Howard S. Levie, Humanitarian Restrictions on Chemical and Biological
Warfare, 13 U. TOL. L. REv. 1192, 1994-95 (1982). The United States Senate gave its advice
and consent to ratification of this treaty without a single dissenting vote, but the treaty
never entered into force, because France declined to ratify it due to an unrelated disagree-
ment over the provisions governing submarines. Moon, supra note 192, at 664.
214. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
215. Id. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 67.
216. Id., 94 L.N.T.S. at 69.
217. The United States signed the Geneva Protocol in 1925, but did not ratify it for fifty
years. See W. Hays Parks, Classification of Chemical Biological Warfare, 13 U. TOL. L. REv. 1165,
1170 (1982) (noting that intense lobbying from CW enthusiasts scuttled the Geneva Proto-
col in the U.S. Senate, where it lingered until President Truman withdrew it in 1951). The
treaty was re-submitted by President Nixon and ultimately consented to by the Senate and
ratified by President Ford in 1975 following a protracted debate about the coverage of
specialized chemicals known as herbicides and riot-control agents. Id.
218. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 214, 26 U.S.T. at 571, 94 L.N.T.S. at 67. The prohi-
bition against the first use of chemical weapons probably ripened into a norm of customary
international law at some point in the twentieth century and thus became binding even
upon states that did not adhere to the Geneva Protocol or any other treaty incorporating
the rule. Such a customary norm "results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOIRIGN
RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1986). It may arise from treaties that are
"designed for adherence by states generally," and are in fact widely accepted, but it is not
binding upon a state that consistently demonstrates its dissent from the putative rule. Id.
§ 102 cmt. i; see also Parks, supra note 217, at 1167 (noting agreement among legal scholars
that the prohibition against first use of CW in war has become a part of customary interna-
tional law); cf Harry H. Almond, Jr., Control over Chemical Weapons-Personal Perspectives on
the Emerging United States Position, 13 U. TOL. L. REv. 1203, 1205 (1982)).
219. A reservation is a unilateral statement through which a state "purports to exclude
or modify the legal effect" of selected provisions of a treaty. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, entry into force, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333. See Moon, supra note
192, at 664 (quoting the French reservation to the Geneva Protocol, which states that the
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could be sustained and expanded indefinitely.22° Second, the treaty
incorporates no mechanisms for verifying or compelling parties' com-
pliance with the undertakings. 22' There are no provisions for inspec-
tions, data reporting, or the like, nor are there institutions for
resolving the inevitable disputes about treaty interpretation and appli-
cation or for enforcing the obligations against violators. 22
Third, vocabulary employed in the Geneva Protocol speaks in-
artfully of banning "bacteriological" methods of warfare.223 Today, we
know that the complex world of microorganisms includes many crea-
tures besides bacteria that are of potential biological weapons applica-
tion, such as viruses, fungi, and rickettsia.224 While the parties to the
Geneva Protocol have subsequently affirmed that its terms apply fully
to all manner of microorganisms, 225 regardless of the scientific catego-
treaty would "cease to be binding" on France in its dealings with "any enemy State whose
armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol").
220. Parks, supra note 217, at 1170-71 (noting that due to the multiplicity of reserva-
tions, the Geneva Protocol did not develop into a prohibition against possession or use of
chemical weapons per se). The threat of retaliation in kind against a state that had initiated
CW use became, in effect, the treaty's primary enforcement mechanism, thereby perhaps
actually encouraging some countries to maintain a CW capability.
221. Id.
222. Most modern arms control treaties regarding nuclear, chemical, and other weap-
ons have come to incorporate elaborate provisions regarding verification of compliance
because American political leaders insisted upon exacting, legally-binding procedures to
provide assurance that each side fulfills its undertakings. In fact, the majority of the text of
most arms control treaties is composed of definitions, counting rules, inspection proce-
dures, and the like. The basic "ban" provisions of the treaty are usually easier to negotiate
and to draft than are the mechanisms for deterring, detecting, and correcting violations.
See generally GRAHAM, supra note 38 (discussing the negotiations for several disarmament
agreements).
223. Geneva Protocol, supra note 214, 26 U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 69. In the Geneva
Protocol negotiations, the delegate from Poland argued that future bacteriological warfare
could be even more inhumane than chemical warfare; this was the first occasion upon
which an international instrument explicitly incorporated what we now recognize as a dis-
tinction between BW and CW. Jerzy Witt Mierzejewski & John Ellis van Courtland Moon,
Poland and Biological Weapons, in BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS, supra note 193, at 65-67;
Moon, supra note 192, at 664.
224. Viruses are generally much smaller and simpler than bacteria, possessing fewer of
the hallmark characteristics of life forms; they were discovered later than bacteria and were
largely unknown at the time of the negotiation of the Geneva Protocol. JOSEPH CIRIN-
CLONE, DEADLY ARSENALS: TRACKING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCrION 46 (2002). Rickettsias
are another heterogeneous group of usually pathogenic microorganisms infecting arthro-
pods, mammals, and others, causing diseases such as Rocky Mountain spotted fever.
Emilio Weiss, Rickettsias, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MICROBIOLOGY 585, 585 (Joshua Lederberg
ed., 1992).
225. Moon, supra note 192, at 664-65.
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ries discovered after 1925, the language employed by the drafters is
not, on its face, so comprehensive.2 26
C. Biological Weapons Convention
Diplomats therefore undertook persistent efforts to extend or
elaborate the Geneva Protocol in various ways, but these mostly stalled
for much of the inter-war and immediate post-World War II eras.2 2 7
In 1969, the United States injected fresh energy into the subject when
President Richard M. Nixon unilaterally pledged to renounce all
forms of offensive biological warfare, to destroy the existing U.S.
stockpile of such weapons, and to close or convert to other purposes
all facilities that had previously been used in the production of the
despised armaments. 228 Within two years, the United States and the
226. Geissler, supra note 202, at 435-36 (arguing that even though the scientific meaning
of the term "bacteriological" is narrower than the term "biological," it has always been
accepted that in the legal context of the Geneva Protocol, the two words are exact syno-
nyms). The United Nations General Assembly likewise concluded that "the Geneva Proto-
col embodies the generally recognized rules of international law prohibiting the use in
international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless
of any technical developments." Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons,
G.A. Res. 2603-A, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 16-17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2603A
(XXIV) (1969).
227. For many years, issues about the enhanced regulation of biological and chemical
weapons were ensnared in a larger debate about the pursuit of "general and complete
disarmament," which would have required articulation of a full-scale, time-specific pro-
gram for dismantling all categories of weapons before any concrete steps could be under-
taken regarding any particular class of arms. ACDA TrATY BOOK, supra note 26, at 3.
Only after protracted delay did participants grasp the virtue in seizing whatever opportuni-
ties might be available for immediate incremental progress in regulating selected catego-
ries of arms. Even after that, however, countries disagreed about the wisdom of treating
biological weapons separately from chemical weapons. Many worried that extending the
Geneva Protocol to impose tighter limits on only one subset of weapons would implicitly
license even greater competition in the other. Eventually, pragmatists were attracted to
the idea of isolating whatever portions of the overall disarmament problem appeared ame-
nable to prompt resolution-and for a variety of reasons, control of biological weapons was
.ripe" far sooner than of chemical weapons. See Lawler, supra note 191, at 1224-26 (discuss-
ing the United Kingdom's position that chemical and biological methods of warfare be
dealt with separately, and that a treaty prohibiting biological methods be concluded
swiftly) (citing Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967
and 1968, U.N. Doc. DC/231 at 39, Annex I (1968)); see also Flowerree, supra note 24, at
1005 (stating that on August 16, 1971 the UN General Assembly endorsed the BWC, which
addressed only biological and toxic weapons); Aida Luisa Levin, Historical Outline, in
STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
5, 5-7 (Erhard Geissler ed., 1990) (noting that the issue of whether to deal with biological
and chemical weapons separately was one of the foremost on the agenda at the 1970 ses-
sion of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)).
228. Richard Nixon, Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Pro-
grams, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RicHARD NIXON 1969, at
968 (1971). President Nixon declared that "[m]ankind already carries in its own hands
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Soviet Union produced a consensus draft of a suitable treaty to inter-
nationalize those commitments, 229 and the Convention on the Prohi-
bition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their De-
struction (commonly referred to as the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion or BWC) 210 was formally opened for signature in 1972 and
entered into force in 1975.231 Today, the treaty has attracted 144 par-
ties, including all five permanent members of the United Nations Se-
curity Council, as well as most of the countries of significant
proliferation concern, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.232
The BWC fixes many of the shortcomings of the Geneva Protocol.
The newer instrument is much more expansive in its verbs (parties
too many of the seeds of its own destruction," and that "[b] iological weapons have massive,
unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable consequences." Id. at 968-69. The United
States, therefore, renounced its use of biological agents, confined its biological research to
defensive measures, and disposed of its existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. Id. at
968-69.
Also on November 25, 1969, Henry Kissinger issued National Security Decision Memo-
randum 35, elaborating the policy by declaring: "The United States bacteriological/biolog-
ical programs will be confined to research and development for defensive purposes
(immunization, safety measures, et cetera). This does not preclude research into those
offensive aspects of bacteriological/biological agents necessary to determine what defen-
sive measures are required." National Security Decision Memorandum 35 from Henry Kis-
singer to the Vice President et al. (Nov. 25, 1969), in PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL ARMS RACE,
supra note 206, at 403-04. Following the American declaration, several other countries
followed suit, with Canada, Sweden, and Great Britain announcing that they possessed no
biological weapons and had no plans to create any. Flowerree, supra note 24, at 1005.
229. The primary forum for the negotiations was the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament, a United Nations affiliate charged with responsibility for articulating arms
control agreements. In reality, the critical bargaining was conducted bilaterally between
the United States and the Soviet Union, who developed and then tabled separate but iden-
tical drafts of a BW treaty. The document was then debated and approved by the other
participating countries. Flowerree, supra note 24, at 1005; Lawler, supra note 191, at 1228-
31.
230. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 23, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
The U.S. Senate gave unanimous consent to ratification of the BWC. Flowerree, supra note
24, at 1005.
231. ACDA TREAwTY BooK, supra note 26, at 124. President Richard Nixon hailed the
BWC as "the first international agreement since World War II to provide for the actual
elimination of an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of nations." Id. at 122. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee somewhat delayed consideration of the BWC in order
to clarify outstanding issues regarding the Geneva Protocol at the same time. Id. However,
President Gerald Ford signed the two instruments of ratification simultaneously. Id.
232. FIF-rH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATE PARTIES TO THE BWC CONVENTION, LIST OF
STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUC-
TION, AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON
THEIR DESTRUCTION (2002), available at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/btwc/convention/
documents/btwcsps.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). Notable non-party states include Israel,
Egypt, Syria, and Sudan. See id.
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promise "never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile,
or otherwise acquire or retain" the relevant weapons,) 233 its nouns (it
proscribes "[m]icrobial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever
their origin or method of production") ,234 and its adjectives (it uses
the modifiers "biological" and "bacteriological" interchangeably, to
help ensure that all manner of microscopic organisms are
encompassed) 235
At the same time, the BWC, like its predecessor, still suffers from
profound institutional shortcomings in the vital areas of verification
(lacking effective mechanisms for assuring a party that its treaty part-
ners are complying with their obligations) 23 6 and enforcement (omit-
ting sufficient structures for adequately investigating allegations of
violations and resolving disputes).23 7
233. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 23, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at
166. The BWC does not explicitly ban "use" of the weaponry, as the Geneva Protocol had,
since a country could not plausibly use biological arms without violating the prohibitions
against possession. Id.; ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 26, at 9 (describing the Geneva
Protocol).
234. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 23, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at
166.
235. Id. at 590, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 167. Article I of the treaty specifies "microbial or other
biological agents," without citing "bacteriological" (as the document's title does), but arti-
cle X reverts to the phrase "bacteriological (biological)" in describing the international
exchange of scientific and technological information. Id. at 587, 590, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166,
167.
236. See Tibor T6th et al., Verification of the BWC, in CONTROL OF DuAL-THrEAT AGENTS:
THE VACCINES FOR PEACE PROGRAMME 67, 67-76 (Erhard Geissler & John P. Woodall eds.,
1994) (acknowledging that the BWC has no provision for monitoring or verification, and
evaluating the potential verification measures reviewed by an Ad Hoc Group of Govern-
mental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific
and Technical Standpoint (VEREX) in 1991 and VEREX II-IV through 1994); see also
NICHOLAS A. SIMS, THE EVOLUTION OF BIOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT 82-118 (2001) (examining
the treatment of verification and strengthening measures throughout the history of the
BWC). Most other modern arms control instruments have incorporated elaborate mecha-
nisms for exchanges of data regarding treaty-limited items, for various types of on-site in-
spections, and for other "transparency" measures to enhance confidence in other parties'
compliance. See Thilo Marauhn, Routine Verification Under the Chemical Weapons Convention,
in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION-IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS 219
(Michael Bothe et al. eds., 1998) (stating that "[r]outine verification is the primary means
to ensure compliance under the [Chemical Weapons] Convention, while challenge inspec-
tions and investigations of alleged use serve to fill the remaining gaps in the overall verifi-
cation system").
237. See SIMS, supra note 236, at 23-25 (explaining that the BWC's compliance regime is
not the equivalent of true verification). BWC parties commit themselves "to consult one
another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objec-
tive of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention." Biological Weapons
Convention, supra note 23, 26 U.S.T. at 588, 1015, U.N.T.S. at 167. Further, any party may
lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council if it finds that another party
has acted in breach of its BWC obligations, and parties undertake to cooperate in carrying
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Moreover, the BWC struggles uphill against the persistent phe-
nomenon of "dual capability. '23 s That is, many of the same sub-
stances, equipment, and procedures that are relevant to biological
weapons programs are simultaneously integral to a wide range of com-
mercial applications in diverse sectors of the global civilian economy
from pharmaceuticals to plastics to foodstuffs.23 9 Allowing those myr-
iad peaceful invocations of biotechnology, while constraining their
military crossovers is a trick the treaty drafters were unable to accom-
plish with perfect precision.240 In addition, the treaty allows parties to
undertake defensive military biological inquiries such as developing im-
proved BW sensors, decontamination procedures, and gas masks, even
while acknowledging that the dividing line between offensive and de-
fensive employments is obscure and ephemeral at best.24 1
In the case of smallpox, for example, the BWC's permission for
retention of the pernicious virus for "prophylactic, protective, or
other peaceful purposes ' 242 would enable a party to retain at least
small quantities of variola and to undertake research upon it that
might be susceptible to being secretly twisted to a one-sided military
advantage. 243 Any benign innovation, such as an improved vaccine or
out any investigation that the Security Council initiates. Id. at 588-89, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 167.
In contrast, the Chemical Weapons Convention creates a new international organization
with significant verification and dispute-resolution responsibilities. See Andrea DeGuttry,
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CON-
VENTION-IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS, supra note 236, at 119, 121-22 (discussing the
creation and powers of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons under
the Chemical Weapons Convention).
238. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Allergic Reaction: Washington's Response to the BWC Protoco
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July-Aug. 2001, at 3 (addressing the issue of dual-use equipment
and facilities while arguing that the U.S. should be advocating a stronger verification
protocol).
239. See id. (explaining that many of the same products and procedures can be used for
peaceful or military purposes).
240. Erhard Geissler, Arms Control, Health Care and Technology Transfer Under the Vaccines
for Peace Programme, in CONTROL OF DUAL-THREAT AGENTS: THE VACCINES FOR PEACE PRO-
GRAMME, supra note 236, at 10-16, 23 (acknowledging that while the BWC permits research,
development and production of 'dual-threat' agents for peaceful purposes, it is difficult to
discern those operations from others which may have an offensive objective).
241. See Susan Wright, Biowar Treaty in Danger, 47 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Sept. 1991,
at 36-37 (addressing the BWC's ambiguity with regard to defensive and offensive biological
agents research); see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 203, at 84 (stating that the U.S. military's
"defensive" programs in 1980-86 supported scores of research projects aimed at making
novel pathogens, increasing toxin production, defeating vaccines, inhibiting diagnosis, and
outwitting protective drugs).
242. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 23, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at
166.
243. Geissler, supra note 240, at 11 (citing testimony of V. Sidel, past president of the
American Public Health Association, on the subject of the difficulty inherent in separating
defensive and offensive programs).
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effective antiviral medications that might enable one country to de-
fend itself better against its neighbor's offensive BW use might, after
all, also become a basis for a treaty violator to seek to use the im-
proved capabilities to sponsor its own BW aggression with less fear of
retaliation in kind.244
D. Protocol Negotiations
In response to those perceived shortcomings, BWC parties have
undertaken still further deliberations and negotiations, now stretch-
ing over more than a decade, to amend that treaty too.2 45 A difficult
balancing act is required: any steps that provide greater "trans-
parency" for military-related BW activities will also carry the inherent
danger of jeopardizing legitimate defensive secrets as well. 246 Each
participating government may therefore be schizophrenic about
greater openness. Partly, it will seek greater insight into the BW-re-
lated activities of its neighbors and potential rivals, but partly it will
also seek to shield from foreign oversight any of its own defensive BW-
related military programs that might, if kept secret, enhance its ability
to overcome an illegal BW attack that might one day be launched
against it.2 4 7 Private industry, too, has a great deal at stake in these
negotiations: private pharmaceutical companies and others on the
cutting edge of innovative biological technology might find their pro-
prietary production techniques and other confidential business infor-
244. See id. (" 'To mount a program specifically for medical "defense" against such [dual-
threat] agents would appear to others in the world to be simply a continuation of an arms
race in these weapons'") (quoting Sidel's testimony before the Committee on Governmen-
tal Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Senate (Feb. 9, 1989)).
245. T6th, supra note 236, at 67-68. Parties to the BWC have long considered a variety of
proposals, floated in a range of negotiating fora, for different types of supplements or
amendments that would strengthen, clarify, or extend the treaty to deal with its perceived
shortcomings. Id. at 68. A series of voluntary "politically binding" measures proved inade-
quate over the years, as too many countries declined to provide the full and timely reports
suggested by reformers, so the effort progressed toward the articulation of a legally binding
instrument that would require treaty parties to supply additional information and access,
to better ensure the transparency of their BW-related activities. See Graham S. Pearson, The
Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention Is Within Reach, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, June
2000, at 15; Nicholas A. Sims, The BTWC in Historical Perspective: From Review to Strengthening
Processes to an Integrated Treaty Regime, DISARMAMENT F., No. 4 2000, at 19, 20-22, available at
http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-artl09.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
246. See Nicholas A. Sims, Control and Co-operation in Biological Defence Research: National
Programmes and International Accountability, in CONTROL OF DUAL-THREAT AGENTS: THE VAC-
CINES FOR PEACE PROGRAMME, supra note 236, at 56, 61-63 (discussing Canada's introduc-
tion of the concept of transparency mechanisms at the Third Review Conference in 1991
and stating that governments would need reassurance that there is no threat to their
security).
247. See id. at 61.
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mation in danger of exposure via intrusive data reporting
requirements or on-site inspections."'
With all that complexity, it should be no surprise that the negotia-
tions to strengthen the BWC have crept along at only a snail's pace. 2
49
Indeed, it may be more remarkable that any progress at all has been
registered. For many years, the United States government resisted
convening any formal bargaining sessions on the basis that it would be
impossible to craft a suitable compromise.25 ° Still, by the summer of
2001, it appeared that a solution might be within reach: a lengthy,
complex, and delicately-balanced package of compromises was emerg-
ing from the negotiations. 251  The draft protocol fully satisfied almost
no one, but many countries and outside observers grudgingly con-
ceded that it might make a modest contribution to enhanced confi-
dence in parties' BWC compliance at an acceptable CoSt.2 5 2
248. See Rosenberg, supra note 238, at 3 (stating that the reasons for U.S. rejection of
proposed provisions include the threat to commercial proprietary information); FED'N OF
AM. SCIENTISTS, PERSPECTIVES ON THE BWC COMPLIANCE REGIME: ISSUES AFFECTING INDUSTRY
1988, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/perspectives.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
249. See Levin, supra note 227, at 10-14 (tracing the history of the BWC); Sims, supra
note 245, at 19 (characterizing the history of the BWC as without "a simple linear progress
ever onward and upward, but . . . complicated").
250. Levin, supra note 227, at 10. Indeed, the United States was unwilling to refer to the
negotiations as an effort to produce a "verification protocol" for the BWC, because it has
concluded that true "verification" of compliance with the terms of the treaty can never be
achieved. See Freedberg & Serafini, supra note 178, at 809. Instead, the goal was described
in more modest terms, as an attempt to draft a "transparency" instrument that will incorpo-
rate a variety of "confidence-building measures," which will collectively enable countries to
feel somewhat more reassured about other states' behavior, but which will not approach
the high level of certainty demanded in most other arms control applications. See Sims,
supra note 246, at 61-62; Erhard Geissler, Agreed Measures and Proposals to Strengthen the Con-
vention, in STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES, supra note 227, at 43.
251. Seth Brugger, Executive Summary of the Chairman's Text, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May
2001, at 10. The draft protocol totals 210 pages, comprising 30 articles, 3 annexes, and 9
appendices. Id. It incorporates a tiered system of declarations about states' BW-related
activities, different types of on-site inspections and visits, a new international organization
to implement the accord, penalties for non-compliance, and a program of international
scientific and technical cooperation and assistance. Id.
252. Marie Isabelle Chevrier, A Necessary Compromise, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 2001, at
14-15, 33; Robert P. Kadlec, First, Do No Harm, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 2001, at 16-17,
32; James F. Leonard, An Essential First Step, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 2001, at 18-19;
Michael Moodie, Building on Faulty Assumptions, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 2001, at 20-23;
John Steinbruner et al., A Tough Call, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 2001, at 23-24; Alan P.
Zelicoff, An Impractical Protocol, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 2001, at 25-27. See generally
HENRY L. STIMSON CTR., COMPLIANCE THROUGH SCIENCE; US PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY Ex-
PERTS ON A STRENGTHENED BIOWEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION REGIME (2002) (noting that in-
dustry experts concluded that the draft protocol would not have sufficient inspection
powers to detect all violations, but that several components of the proposed treaty would
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The Bush administration, however, suddenly spiked the incipient
deal.25" The draft protocol, according to the United States, was irre-
trievably defective in two contrasting dimensions. First, it failed to es-
tablish a sufficiently robust inspection regime to detect, and thereby
to deter, potential cheating by other countries. 254 Second, the intru-
sions it did warrant would be unacceptably costly in compromising
U.S. private industry's trade secrets and the national government's
military secrets.2 55 Instead, the United States proposed an alternative
series of reforms, including reciprocal commitments to strengthen
each party's national legislation prohibiting BW-related activities and
establishment of a regime for international inspections of suspicious
outbreaks of disease.256 By the end of 2001, however, the United
States also unilaterally proposed terminating the protocol negotia-
tions altogether-a surprise move that threw the diplomatic commu-
nity into stark confusion about the future course of BWC
proceedings.257
E. Soviet and Russian BWPrograms
The Soviet Union, throughout the cold war era and even after-
ward, compiled and maintained the world's largest, most ambitious
be useful), available at http://www.stimson.org/cbw/pdf/ComplianceScience.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 5, 2003).
253. See Rebecca Whitehair & Seth Brugger, BWC Protocol Talks in Geneva Collapse Follow-
ing U.S. Rejection, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 2001, at 26 (reporting statement by Ambas-
sador Donald Mahley, the head of the U.S. Ad Hoc Delegation, rejecting the draft
protocol).
254. See id.
255. See id.; GRAHAM S. PEARSON ET AL., STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL CONVENTION
REVIEW CONFERENCE PAPER No. 4, THE US STATEMENT AT THE FIFrH REVIEW CONFERENCE:
COMPOUNDING THE ERROR IN REJECTING THE COMPOSITE PROTOCOL 1 (2002), available at
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/RCP_4.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
256. See HENRY L. STIMSON CTR., supra note 252, at 11-12; Seth Brugger, U.S. Presents
Alternatives to BWC Protocol at Review Conference, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2001, at 22;
Jonathan B. Tucker & Raymond A. Zilinskas, Assessing U.S. Proposals to Strengthen the Biologi-
cal Weapons Convention, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 2002, at 10; John R. Bolton, Remarks to
the Fifth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Meeting (Nov. 19, 2001), http://
www.state.gov/t/us/rm/janjuly/6231.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2003); ARMS CONTROL ASS'N,
BRIEFING PAPER ON THE STATUS OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION (2002), http:/
/www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwissuebrief.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
257. Seth Brugger, BWC Conference Suspended After Controversial End, ARMS CONTROL To-
DAY, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 34 (noting that the U.S. was the only country to advocate aban-
doning the protocol negotiations); NICHOLAS A. SIMS, STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION REVIEW CONFERENCE PAPER No. 5, RETURN TO GENEVA: THE NEXT
STAGE OF THE BTWC FIFTH REVIEW CONFERENCE 2 (2002), available at http://
www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/RCP_-5.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2003); ARMS CON-
TROL ASS'N, supra note 256, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/
bwissuebrief.asp.
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258biological weapons program, a campaign in which smallpox was al-
ways singled out as an element of special prominence.259
Two related, somewhat redundant, and often feuding bureaucra-
cies undertook overlapping BW activities for the U.S.S.R. First, the
Ministry of Defense sponsored the full range of military biological and
chemical programs and succeeded in winning sufficient funds to as-
semble the world's largest, most capable CBW corps, equipped with
the most sophisticated offensive and defensive equipment.26 ° The
U.S.S.R. integrated those unconventional capabilities into its standard
war-fighting doctrine and training routines far more effectively and
comprehensively than did Western countries.261
Second, a shadow Soviet BW institution-created in the fateful
year 1973 262 -proceeded in even greater secrecy under the cover of a
civilian enterprise, "Biopreparat, ''26 1 which was ostensibly devoted to
medical and pharmaceutical investigations. 264 The Biopreparat archi-
pelago embraced fifty facilities across the country, employing approxi-
mately thirty thousand scientists and technicians on weapons
programs, and commanding a budget upwards of $1 billion
annually.265
Ken Alibek, a 1992 defector to the West who had formerly served
as Biopreparat's deputy director, maintains that the Soviets consid-
ered smallpox to be "their No. 1 strategic weapon." 266 Although the
258. KEN ALIBEK & STEPHEN HANDELMAN, BIoHAzARD, at x (1999).
259. See id at 19 (noting the caches of smallpox stored throughout the Soviet Union,
intended for use against the United States).
260. Id. at 40-41.
261. Id. at 160, 164, 295-300 (stating that U.S.S.R. microbiologists developed novel
strains of antibiotic-resistant anthrax and plague weapons and numerous Soviet govern-
ment organizations each played a role in developing biological weapons); MILLER ET AL.,
supra note 203, at 165-82; MONTEREY INST. OF INT'L STUDIES, CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION
STUDIES OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 9, THE 1971 SMALLPOX EPIDEMIC IN ARALSK, KAZAKHSTAN,
AND THE SOVIET BIOLOGICAL WARFAIR PROGRAM (Jonathan B. Tucker & Raymond A. Zilin-
skas, eds. 2002), available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op9/op9.pdf (last visited
Apr. 5, 2003); JULIAN PERRY ROBINSON ET AL., II THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE 161-84 (1973).
262. ALIBEK & HANDELMAN, supra note 258, at 41.
263. Id.
264. See TUCKER, supra note 95, at 145; David Hoffman, Deadly Germs from Cold War: Soviet-
Era Reveals Extent of Biological Weapons Research, WASH. POST, June 7, 2000, at A24.
265. SeeALiBEK & HANDELMAN, supra note 258, at 41-43; TUCKER, supra note 95, at 139-65;
Christopher J. Davis, Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the
Former Soviet Union and Iraq, 5 EMERGING INFECTIoUs DISEASES 509 (1999); Jonathan B.
Tucker, Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Dr. Kenneth Alibek,
NONPROLIFERATION REv., Spring-Summer 1999, at 1, 4 [hereinafter Biological Weapons in the
Former Soviet Union].
266. Wendy Orent, The End of the Trail for Smallpox ?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1998, at M2.
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far-flung BW empire explored numerous other biological agents
too-including anthrax, plague, Ebola, tularemia, and many others-
variola was always an item of special Soviet fascination and enterprise,
predating even the WHO's successful global smallpox eradication
campaign and persisting long after the BWC had rendered any such
offensive weapons programs patently illegal.26 7
Over a period of decades, Moscow succeeded in accumulating a
massive inventory of ready-to-use smallpox weapons. Some twenty
tons of a novel liquid agent were stockpiled, and continuous produc-
tion, to repeatedly refresh materials of short shelf-life, was undertaken
at the Ministry of Defense installation at Zagorsk.2 68 Several of the
largest, most powerful Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, the SS-
18s, were dedicated to the smallpox BW mission. 269 Each was capable
of depositing 375 kilograms of viral materials that could blanket 100
square kilometers of American territory.
270
Even as late as 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev was blithely reas-
suring nervous Western interlocutors that he was resolutely reining in
the remnants of the BWC-violating program, the illicit work on small-
pox and other pathogens nonetheless continued apace.2 7 1 Alibek
267. SeeALIBEK & HAN LEMAN, supra note 258, at 19, 110-15, 121-22 (asserting that a new
aerosol form of a variola weapon was tested at Vector in December 1990, and the produc-
tion line there was deemed capable of manufacturing 80-100 tons of smallpox virus annu-
ally); CTR. FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE STUDIES, SMALLPOX (2002) (stating that "Russia still
possesses an industrial facility that is capable of producing tons of smallpox virus annually
and also maintains a research program that is thought to be seeking to produce more
virulent and contagious strains"), http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/agents/
agentsmallpox.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). See also an eight-part series of articles by
William Kucewicz, Beyond Yellow Rain: The Threat of Soviet Genetic Engineering, WALL ST. J.,
April 23-May 18, 1984.
See also MONTEREY INST. OF IN T'L STUDIES, supra note 261, at 9, 122-13 (noting that an
accidental exposure during an open-air field testing of smallpox weaponry on
Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea in 1971 led to a small outbreak of the disease, with
three deaths and nearly fifty thousand emergency vaccinations); William J. Broad &Judith
Miller, Traces of Terror: The Bioterror & Threat, Report Provides New Details of Soviet Smallpox
Accident, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2002, at Al; David Brown, Soviets Had '71 Smallpox Outbreak,
WASH. PosT, June 16, 2002, at A25; Judith Miller, U.S. to Help Reduce Threat of Russian Arms,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at A8.
268. ALIBEK & HANDELMAN, supra note 258, at 111-12.
269. Preston, supra note 144, at 46.
270. ALIBEK & HANDELMAN, supra note 258, at 6, 111-12, 140-41; see also Joby Warrick,
Russia's Poorly Guarded Past, Security Lacking at Facilities Used for Soviet Bioweapons Research,
WASH. PosT, June 17, 2002, at A01 (noting that one standby facility, principally devoted to
production of other BW agents, was capable of generating 200 tons per year of smallpox
virus if war appeared imminent).
271. See ALIBEK & HANDELMAN, supra note 258, at 117-45; Tucker, Biological Weapons in the
Former Soviet Union, supra note 265, at 1 (Alibek's work at Biopreparat, which included
development of "three versions of a tularemia biological weapon, a sophisticated plague
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claims that Gorbachev at that late date explicitly and personally ap-
proved at least the broad parameters of a $1 billion expansion in the
bioweapons infrastructure, including funding a huge new Biopreparat
viral reactor to enhance the processing of variola virus for manifestly
offensive purposes. 72
Today, it appears that the illegitimate offensive Russian BW work
has at last been choked off, and a substantial effort, primed by at least
a dollop of Western financial assistance, has succeeded in converting
former weapons facilities and personnel into benign, civilian opera-
tions.2 73  The flagship of Biopreparat, the Russian State Research
Center of Virology and Biotechnology (Vector), has emerged as a
leading institution on the forefront of many areas of peaceful biologi-
cal and related research.274 Smallpox, in particular, has been the sub-
ject of varied proposals for Western collaboration with the Vector
laboratory, and the U.S. Departments of Defense and Health and
Human Services have reviewed $5 million worth of proposed joint
counter-bioterrorism projects focusing on development of refined ca-
pabilities for recognizing and diagnosing the illness and evaluation of
candidate antiviral medications.2
75
biological weapon, and a dry form of anthrax," continued through 1987); Orent, supra
note 266 (alleging that an improved smallpox virus was tested on prisoners).
272. See ALIBEK & HANDELMAN, supra note 258, at 117-18 (asserting that Alibek had seen
a document that Gorbachev had signed in 1985 authorizing a five-year $1 billion plan to
develop new biological weapons, including an intensification of smallpox BW efforts). Ad-
vanced work to develop weaponized versions of Marburg, Ebola, Lassa fever, and other
viruses continued at least until 1990. Id. at 133.
273. SeeJames Clay Moltz, Introduction: Assessing US Nonproliferation Assistance to the NIS,
NONPROLIFERATION REV., Spring 2000, at 55 (noting that since 1991 the United States has
allocated $2.7 billion for nonproliferation assistance and weapons dismantlement activities
in the former Soviet Union); Jonathan B. Tucker & Kathleen M. Vogel, Preventing the
Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapon Materials and Know-How, NONPROLIFERATION
REV., Spring 2000, at 88, 91 (noting Defense Department spending to secure Russian facili-
ties); Jean Pascal Zanders & Maria Wahlberg, Chemical and Biological Weapon Developments
and Arms Control, 2000 ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SIPRI Y.B.
509, 529-30; Judith Miller & William J. Broad, Dollars Are Weapon of Choice in the War on
Bacteria Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998, at A12; Warrick, supra note 270.
274. See Hoffman, supra note 264 (describing conversion from biological weapons into
peaceful applications at the Biopreparat facility in Oblensk, Russia).
275. See TUCKER, supra note 95, at 227-28; Sergey V. Netesov, The Scientific and Production
Association Vector: The Current Situation, in CONTROL OF DUAL-THREAT AGENTS: THE VACCINES
FOR PEACE PROGRAMME, supra note 236, at 133, 133-38 (noting collaboration with the World
Health Organization toward mapping the variola virus genome as well as other programs
with international groups); Richard Stone, Russia, NIH Float Big Plan for Former Soviet Bi-
oweapons Lab, 291 SCi. 2288, 2288 (2001) (discussing a proposal to transform Vector into
the International Center for the Study of Emerging and Reemerging Diseases); Ken Alibek
& Stephen Handelman, Smallpox Could Still Be a Danger, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1999, at A27
(asserting that four principal Soviet BW military installations remain off-limits for interna-
tional inspectors).
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At the same time, there is still a degree of secrecy associated with
the facility, despite frequent American and other visitors and the in-
jection of Western capital, technical advice, and collaboration. 276 Vec-
tor has, to date, refused to grant Americans full access to the smallpox
research areas, 277 impeded efforts to maintain a U.S. scientist on-site
to continuously monitor variola activities, and declined American re-
quests for access to certain unique smallpox virus samples.278 Accord-
ingly, some observers continue to harbor doubts about the complete
innocence of all Biopreparat's hidden corners.
279
In addition, there are the twin dangers of inadequate physical
security at some Russian facilities (with stocks of hazardous BW mater-
ials perhaps vulnerable to both petty theft and organized terrorist
strikes)28 ° and "brain drain" (with Russian scientists and military offi-
cials, extensively trained during the cold war in the arcane world of
offensive variola BW, now bereft of remunerative and professionally
rewarding opportunities in the post-Soviet economy, perhaps vulnera-
ble to inducements to sell their expertise on the global black market
to rogue states interested in perfecting a clandestine biological war-
fare capability of their own) .281
F. BWProliferation
The fear of the further spread of biological weapons capabilities,
in fact, is one of the leading nightmares afflicting international secur-
ity analysts today,282 and the specter of smallpox is often at the fore-
276. Peter Eisler, U.S., Russia Tussle Over Deadly Anthrax Sample, USA TODAY, Aug. 19,
2002, at IA; see also Netesov, supra note 275, at 135-37 (stating that in 1990 Vector wel-
comed Western visitors with the objective of discussing joint ventures and research).
277. Eisler, supra note 276.
278. Id.
279. SeeJudith Miller, CIA Hunts Iraq Tie to Soviet Smallpox, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at
A18 (noting Russia's possible biological weapons trade with Iraq); Orent, supra note 266
(expressing concern that covert BW work may still be proceeding in other Russian labora-
tories and that Russian BW experts may be tempted to offer their services to hostile em-
ployments); see also Eisler, supra note 276 (reporting that U.S. defense officials are
attempting to acquire samples of specialized variants of anthrax and smallpox from Rus-
sian officials, but have been frustrated by Moscow's delays).
280. See Will Stewart, Security Shambles As We Go Inside Smallpox Factory, SUNDAY MIRROR,
Dec. 8, 2002, at 23 (describing how one newspaper researcher was able to penetrate Vector
security using false documents); Warrick, supra note 270 (detailing the marginal security
improvements at Russian bioweapons facilities).
281. Scott Parrish & Tamara Robinson, Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls and Combat
Illicit Trafficking and Brain Drain, NONPROLIFERATION RFv., Spring 2000, at 112, 112. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-00-138, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: EFFORT TO REDUCE
FORMER SOVIET THREAT OFFERS BENEFITS, POSES NEW RISKS 5, 10 (2000).
282. See Zanders & Wahlberg, supra note 273, at 526-28 (discussing international
proliferation concerns and NATO's response).
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front.28 3 No fewer than ten countries have been the subject of
recurrent public speculation as covert BWC violators.28 4 In 2001, the
United States publicly and formally accused five states-Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, and Syria-of transgressing the Biological Weap-
ons Convention, and stated that additional unnamed countries could
be added to that unseemly indictment. 28 5
The smallpox virus, in particular, has attracted the attention of
these potential proliferators, and North Korea, Iran, and Iraq are re-
peatedly identified as leading suspects who may already have obtained
secret variola inventories from Soviet/Russian or other sources.2 8 6
Libya and Syria also frequently appear on the roster of participants in
a "variola race";287 others would add China, France, India, Israel, and
perhaps Pakistan, Cuba, South Africa, and the Czech Republic as
countries that may have covertly acquired the virus or attempted to do
so. 288 The sparse evidence on the public record is far from conclusive
283. See Lawrence K. Altman, The Precautions; U.S. Sets Up Plan to Fight Smallpox in Case of
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at IA (noting steps being taken by the Centers for Disease
Control to prepare the country for a smallpox attack); Roxanne Roberts, A War Game to
Send Chills Down the Spine, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2001, at COI (reporting grim results of a
military exercise simulating a release of smallpox by terrorists).
284. See ALIBEK & HANDELMAN, supra note 258, at 273 (explaining that Soviet intelli-
gence did not know of any BW programs in Eastern European satellite states, but had
detected evidence of such activities in Iraq, North Korea, China, Germany, and France);
MILLER ET AL., supra note 203, at 98-123 (describing Iraqi BW program before and after the
Gulf War); Zanders & Wahlberg, supra note 273, at 526-27; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
UNCLASSIFIED REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS, 1 JANUARY
THROUGH 30 JUNE 2001 (noting the suspected activity of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya,
Syria, Sudan, India, Pakistan, and Egypt), at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/
bian-jan_2002.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).
285. Judith Miller, Bioterror; U.S. Publicly Accusing 5 Countries of Violating Germ-Weapons
Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at BI [hereinarter Bioterror]; Bolton, supra note 256, at
http://www.state.gov/us/rm/janjuly/6231.htm. Later, the United States also formally ac-
cused Cuba of maintaining an illicit offensive BW program. Judith Miller, Washington Ac-
cuses Cuba of Germ-Warfare Research, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at A6.
286. See Richard Preston, The Specter of a New and Deadlier Smallpox, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2002, at A19.
287. SeeALIBEK & HANDELMAN, supra note 258 (identifying Libya and Syria as two of the
seventeen countries named by the U.S. Office of Technological assessment in 1995 as pos-
sessing biological weapons); CIRINCIONE, supra note 224, at 9 (listing Libya and Syria as two
of "approximately twelve nations suspected of having biological warfare programs").
288. TUCKER, supra note 95, at 186, 205 (noting CIA and military intelligence conclu-
sions that eight countries had retained undeclared variola stocks); William J. Broad &
Judith Miller, Government Report Says 3 Nations Hide Stocks of Smallpox, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
1999, § 1, at 1 (reporting that secret government intelligence assessment concluded that
Iraq, North Korea, and Russia are probably concealing smallpox virus stocks); Brownlee,
supra note 207 (speculating that the list may consist of Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Libya,
China, North Korea, and Iraq); Barton Gellman, 4 Nations Thought to Possess Smallpox,
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but is still very worrisome. 89
Few would doubt any longer the potential havoc and suffering
that deft application of smallpox or other biological weapons could
inject into a battlefield. While earlier generations of CBW arms suf-
fered categorically from imprecision, slowness, and other characteris-
tics that impeded their military effectiveness, modern variants can be
refined and steered with awesome effect.2 9 ° Contemporary biological
arms might be hardier, faster-acting, less susceptible to degradation
through sunlight or rain, and more impervious to defenses than their
predecessors. 29 1 Experts calculate that the cost per fatality of biologi-
cal weapons such as smallpox would be much lower than the compara-
ble figures for conventional, chemical, or even nuclear arms.292 That
potential lethality has not been lost on leading defense experts. Colin
Powell, U.S. Secretary of State and former Chair of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, remarked after the Persian Gulf War, "Of all the various weap-
ons of mass destruction, biological weapons are of the greatest con-
cern to me."293
G. Smallpox as a Terrorist Device
Sub-national actors, too, have responded eagerly to the lure of
CBW. Renegade use or attempted, threatened or hoax use of various
WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2002 (reporting that the CIA now judges Iraq, North Korea, Russia,
and France as possessing undeclared smallpox virus stocks).
289. North Korea and Iraq, for example, may have vaccinated their troops against small-
pox, suggesting that they anticipate possible wartime exposure to the virus. See Broad &
Miller, supra note 288 (stating that "blood samples from North Korean soldiers ... show
smallpox vaccinations" and that smallpox vaccine was being manufactured in Iraq).
290. See PILLER & YAMAMOTO, supra note 197, at 96-104 (explaining developments in
biological weapons).
291. See id. at 22-25 (stating that "[t]he new biotechnologies promise to 'improve' CBW
agents and enhance their ability far beyond the capacity of classical biochemistry, both
qualitatively and quantitatively"); Carina Dennis, The Bugs of War, 411 NATURE 232 (2002)
(discussing advances made in the production of smallpox); Richard Novick & Seth Shul-
man, New Forms of Biological Warfare?, in PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL ARMS RACE, supra note
206, at 103, 113-16 (describing modifications made to biological agents that will improve
their usefulness as weapons).
292. See LEONARD A. COLE, THE ELEVENTH PLAGUE: THE POLITICS OF BIOLOGICAL AND
CHEMICAL WARFARE 8 (1997) (providing 1969 costs of various types of military operations,
measured in casualties per square kilometer, ranging from $2000 for conventional arms,
$800 for nuclear, $600 for chemical, and $1 for biological); Keay Davidson, U.S. Gears Up
for Smallpox Threat, S.F. CI-RON., Dec. 6, 2002, at A12 (quoting D.A. Henderson as estimat-
ing that for $200,000, several skilled workers could construct an "impressive smallpox arse-
nal" in a work space no larger than a two-car garage).
293. GRAHAM S. PEARSON, DELIBERATE DISEASE: WHY BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IS A REAL CON-
CERN 5 (Int'l Sec. Info. Serv., Briefing Paper No. 6, 1996).
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poisons is of ancient provenance; 294 in recent years, however, as the
relevant technology has come within reach of additional deviant indi-
viduals and groups, the practice has accelerated.295 Both inside the
United States and abroad, efforts to apply biological weapons-espe-
cially anthrax, but numerous other deadly agents, too-have become
a distressingly familiar and expensive law enforcement and security
problem.29 6
The events of September 11, 2001 mandate that we attend with
new-found vigor to the danger that biological arms, smallpox promi-
nent among them, might have an irresistible appeal for an array of
these terrorist groups, perhaps even more than for regular armies.
297
Many have suggested that considerations of cost, accessibility, ease of
delivery, and staggering effect upon the target population would com-
bine to make modern BW the terrorists' "ultimate weapon."298
The bewildering anthrax attacks in October 2001299 strongly rein-
force this view. There, a group or individual, still unidentified as of
this writing, mailed only a handful of contaminated letters to a few
targets, resulting in five deaths and seventeen injuries. 3°° But the so-
cial consequences and the disruptions occasioned by the inevitable
accompanying blizzard of hoaxes, accidents, and cases of mistaken
294. Jack Spencer & Michael Scardaville, Understanding the Bioterrorist Threat: Facts and
Figures, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 11, 2001, at 2 (describing bioterrorist at-
tacks dating as far back as 1346).
295. See generally Toxic TERROR: ASSESSING TERRORIST USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS Uonathan B. Tucker ed., 2000) (presenting case studies of terrorist CBW attacks
or attempted attacks in Germany, Chicago, Los Angeles, Tokyo and elsewhere).
296. Id. at 1-2; Spencer & Scardaville, supra note 294, at 1, 13-17.
297. Geissler, supra note 202, at 442.
298. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-99-163, COMBATING TERRORISM:
NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENTS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AT-
TACKS 2 (1999) (concluding that "terrorists would need a relatively high degree of sophisti-
cation to successfully cause mass casualties with some . . . chemical and most biological
agents"); Jean Pascal Zanders et al., Risk Assessment of Terrorism with Chemical and Biological
Weapons, 2000 ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT & INT'L SEC., SIPRI Y.B. 537, 537 (surmising that
terrorists may cause mass casualties using "[r ] elatively small amounts of chemical or biolog-
ical (CB) warfare agents"); Bill Miller, Study Urges Focus on Terrorism with High Fatalities, Cost,
WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2002, at A03 (stating that a skillful terrorist biological attack could kill
one million people and inflict $750 million in economic damage). But see Sheryl Gay Stol-
berg, The Biological Threat; Some Experts Say U.S. Is Vulnerable to a Germ Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2001, at Al (reporting that carrying out a bioterrorist attack would be technically
challenging).
299. Joby Warrick & Steve Fainaru, Bioterrorism Preparations Lacking at Lowest Levels; De-
spite Warnings and Funds, Local Defenses Come Up Short, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2001, at A7.
300. Toni Locy & Laura Parker, Anthrax Case Remains Frustrating Mystery, USA TODAY,
Oct. 1, 2002, at 4A.
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identification, were profound."° ' Senate and House office buildings
in Washington, D.C. were closed for weeks;.. 2 many executive branch
agency mailrooms were abruptly shuttered and reorganized;3 °. major
media headquarters in New York and elsewhere were disrupted;30 4
and everyone across the country began to look with suspicion at even
the slightest irregularity in incoming mail.30 5 Even the President of
the United States had to reassure ajittery public that he did not have
anthrax,3 6 and he continued to evade the question of whether he had
received precautionary treatments of ciprofloxacin, the leading anti-
anthrax medication, which was itself the subject of panic buying. 0 7
A smallpox terrorism attack could be even worse.30 8 Indeed,
many experts would consider variola an "ideal" tool for deviant non-
state actors.30 9 The virus's lethality, the absence of any cure, and the
fear and loathing it has always inspired in human beings combine to
suggest that few BW agents could succeed in terrorizing a community
as viciously as smallpox. 310 Moreover, unlike anthrax, smallpox is fully
301. See Maria Glod, Authorities Cracking Down as Terror Hoaxes Take Toll, WASH. POST,
Oct. 22, 2001, at A01 (providing examples of hoaxes and mistakes in Washington, D.C.,
Florida, Texas, Virginia, and Maine).
302. See Washington in Brief WASH. PosT, Jan. 17, 2002, at A04.
303. See Spencer S. Hsu, Agency Responses to Mail Scares Vary; Lack of Uniformity Frustrates
Some, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at A1O.
304. See Locy & Parker, supra note 300.
305. See Glod, supra note 301 (reporting anthrax hoaxes and false alarms across the
country).
306. Francis X. Clines, U.S. Officials Voice New Worry After Traces of Anthrax Taint Off-Site
White House Mailroom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at Al.
307. See id. (stating that "there was no word on whether [the President] had undergone
the nasal swabbing or antibiotic treatment now familiar in the more intense anthrax
precautions").
308. Lisa D. Rotz et al., Public Health Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents, 8
EMERGING INFECrIous DISEASES 225, 226 (2002) (explaining that a Centers for Disease Con-
trol panel rated variola as a top priority in the risk matrix).
309. Nicholas Wade, Biological Warfare Fears May Impede Last Goal of Smallpox Eradicators,
201 Sci. 329, 330 (1978) (alleging that despite the availability of a vaccine, "[s]mallpox is
the ideal biological warfare agent since it is stable, easily aerosolized, simple to grow, and is
a terrifying disease with high lethality"); David Brown, Biologica Chemical Threat Is Termed
Tricky, Complex; Smallpox Virus is Most Feared in Array of Deadly Weapons, WASH. POST, Sept. 30,
2001, at A12 (claiming "[t]here's universal agreement that the smallpox virus is the single
most dangerous raw material for a non-nuclear attack"); Mike Nartker, U.S. Response: Bioter-
rorism Differs from Biowarfare, Official Says, GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 17, 2002 (quoting
Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, as
saying smallpox is "the perfect bioweapon" due to widespread population vulnerability and
the absence of an adequate therapy), available at http://www.nti.org/d newswire/issues/
newswires/2002_1_17.html 7 (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).
310. See Marilyn Werber Serafini, Ignorance Is No Defense, 33 NAT'L J., 3094, 3094-96
(2001) (asserting that "[o]f all the infectious agents that terrorists might seek to use
against the United States, the smallpox virus is perhaps the most feared, because it-unlike
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communicable between people: 311 once an epidemic has been
started, any person with vaguely flu-like symptoms becomes a potential
disease agent and thus a subject of apprehension and even anger12
Ominously, Osama bin Laden has reportedly devoted resources to ob-
taining variola weaponry.3 13
In short, people should take only the slightest comfort in the fact
that smallpox has not been used as a biological weapon or a terrorist
device in the past half century. It is probably only the fact of limited
access to variola that has provided that margin of safety. If rogue
countries or rapacious terrorists could get their hands on the virus by
extracting it from the two WHO inventories or in some other fashion,
the combination of their seemingly unlimited hostility and variola's
seemingly unlimited lethality could be tragic indeed.
III. GENETIC ENGINEERING AND "DESIGNER BUGS"
The third wonderful, yet ominous watershed event of 1973 was
the initiation of genetic engineering.314 Any description of the exqui-
site biotechnology underlying those DNA manipulation techniques
surely lies well beyond the scope of this Article, but at least a brief
introduction can provide a better basis for understanding the public
policy choices and risks we now face."1 5
The first step in genetic engineering is identifying and isolating a
particular gene-a segment of DNA or RNA that constitutes a unit of
inherited information-in the originating or donor organism.316 For
anthrax, pneumonic plague and other potentially weapon-ready diseases-is highly
contagious").
311. Id. at 3096.
312. On the other hand, there are also important reasons why terrorists might not con-
sider smallpox to be an optimal tool, including the availability of an effective vaccine, the
difficulty in obtaining access to variola virus samples, and the awkwardness of weaponizing
variola in aerosol form. See U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 156, at 2 (noting
that 90% of aerosolized smallpox dies within twenty-four hours); Siebert, supra note 140, at
55 (stating that most scientists think that smallpox would be a relatively poor biological
weapon); HENDERSON, supra note 175 (noting the "special skills" required to grow and
process smallpox), at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/agents/risk.html.
313. See Gellman, supra note 288 (pointing out that although there is no evidence that al
Qaeda has already obtained variola samples, the organization has spent money in an effort
to acquire the virus).
314. See BERG & SINGER, supra note 13, at 5 (explaining that at a meeting in June 1973
scientists asked the National Academy of Sciences to study the risk of experimenting with
recombinant DNA); Cohen, supra note 11, at 25 (noting that in 1973 scientists at Stanford
University reported constructing "biological functional DNA molecules that combined ge-
netic information from two different sources").
315. See generally BERG & SINGER, supra note 13, at 79-103 (describing the theory and
background behind recombinant DNA methods).
316. Id. at 3.
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example, human beings are thought to have upwards of 40,000 genes,
while variola, relatively large and complex for a virus, has about
187.3V 17 A genetic map of a creature's entire gene sequence, or gen-
ome, can help locate the particular segments of greatest interest, and
in the case of variola, scientists have now completed the full mapping
for ten different strains of the virus.318
The specified gene is then deftly sliced out of the overall DNA
structure, using specialized cutting enzymes, and the fragment is
transferred into a target cell of another species.319 This transporta-
tion can be accomplished in various ways. In one leading technique, a
virus serves as the vector, and vaccinia virus (the close relative of vari-
ola used for anti-smallpox vaccinations) has proven to be a particu-
larly adroit vehicle for this purpose. 2 ° The DNA snippet is woven
into the virus's original genome, and the transformed virus is then
allowed to perform its usual function-it invades the target cell and
releases its now modified DNA into the host. 2 ' The routine process
of viral infection involves the intruder's DNA insinuating itself into
the host cell's original genome, so whenever the cell reproduces, it
will generate additional identical copies of the altered genetic struc-
ture.32 2 This "recombinant DNA" can thereby merge the genetic
codes from two distinct creatures, permanently injecting a specified
gene into the chromosomes of the target cell, which thereafter will
evidence the altered behavior and pass the new trait along to suc-
ceeding cellular generations.3 23
317. See Preston, supra note 144, at 54 (comparing the number of genes in smallpox
DNA, 187, with that of the HIV virus, which has only 10).
318. Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Virus Stocks Report by the Secreta-
riat, supra note 163, at 3.
319. BERG & SINGER, supra note 13, at 99-102.
320. See Bernard Moss, Vaccinia Virus: A Tool for Research and Vaccine Development, 252 Sci.
1662, 1664-65 (1991) (explaining that vaccinia is much more efficient than most alterna-
tive methods for inserting genetic material into a target cell).
321. Theodore Friedmann, Overcoming the Obstacles to Gene Therapy, Sci. AM., June 1997,
at 96, 98; Philip L. Felgner, Nonviral Strategies for Gene Therapy, 276 Sci. Am., June 1997, at
102, 102.
322. See FENNER ET At.., supra note 14, at 71 (noting that variola is unusual because it
replicates itself in the cytoplasm of the invaded cell, while most other viruses invade the
cell's nucleus to accomplish their functions).
323. See BERG & SINGER, supra note 13, at 227 (noting that recombinant DNA technol-
ogy, through "introduction of altered genes into cells and whole organisms" enables biolo-
gists to better understand normal and abnormal physiological states and therefore is
among the most "profound implications" of genetic engineering).
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A. "Pharm Animals"
Amazing juxtapositions can be created in this way, marrying the
genetic legacies of organisms that could never mate in nature. 324 Bac-
teria, for example, are relatively easy to manipulate.32 5 Scientists can
now shanghai the genetic code of E. coli and related creatures, trans-
forming them into entities that can gobble oil spills,3 26 fix nitrogen,3 27
or produce human growth hormone3 28 (to treat dwarfism) and insu-
lin 329 (to deal with diabetes). Likewise, larger animals-goats and
pigs, for example-can be converted into factories that will generate
rare human "protein C," to assist in blood clotting.3 30
Comparable courses of gene therapy can also engineer previously
unimaginable plants that secrete their own insecticides, 3 ' orchards
that produce larger or more nutritious fruit,33 2 trees that grow taller
and straighter with less water and fertilizer,33 3 and "pharm animals3 3 4
that promise greater livestock hardiness, variety, and economy. Trans-
genic mammals may also be crafted with key aspects of the human
immune system, to serve as a reliable source of organs to transplant
into sick or injured humans, with less danger of rejection.33 5 Like-
wise, genetically modified mice or even primates can serve as models
324. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 25 (describing genetic engineering as a means of over-
coming the "natural barriers that normally prevent the exchange of genetic information
between unrelated organisms").
325. See id. at 25 (discussing the manipulation of E. coli).
326. See Bryn Nelson, The DNA Revolution: A Once-Overlooked Molecule Unlocked Life's Secrets
and Changed Science Forever, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 2003, at A6 (noting that General Electric
in 1980 received the first patent for bacterium engineered to assist in cleaning up oil
spills).
327. Biotechnology Has Come a Long Way, MALAYSIAN Bus., Dec. 1, 2001 (noting that genet-
ically modified bacteria that assist plants to fix nitrogen may save farmers money on nitro-
gen fertilizers).
328. Argentina Cow Clone Step Toward More Plentiful and Cheaper Growth DruLg Human
Growth Hormone, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Aug, 26, 2002.
329. Martinelli, supra note 13, at 243, 247.
330. William H. Velander et al., Transgenic Livestock as Drug Factories, Sci. AM., Jan. 1997,
at 70, 70.
331. BERG & SINGER, supra note 13, at 239.
332. Id.
333. Marc Kaufman, Tweaking Genes to Help Plants Survive Elements, WASH. POST, Oct. 21,
2002, at A09.
334. See Carol Kaesuk Yoon, If It Walks and Moos Like a Cow, It's a Pharmaceutical Factory,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2000, at A20 (describing "pharm animals" as creatures "concocted by
plucking a gene from one organism and inserting it into the DNA of another").
335. Raising Pigs for Organ Transplant, AGJOURNAL, Mar. 14, 2000, http://
www.agjournal.com/story.cfm?storyid=737 (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) (stating that re-
searchers have produced cloned pigs through a method that may lead to future successful
pig organ transplants into human beings).
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for testing new medicines, including novel anti-smallpox preparations,
before human trials could be safely undertaken.33 6
B. Military Applications
There is, however, a dark side to this new technology. 337 History
suggests that scientific advances-airplanes, radios, computers, and all
the rest-have sooner or later (and usually sooner) been turned to
military applications, as well as to their various peaceful civilian
uses.3 8 Biotechnology can be no different in this regard, and the po-
tential employments in biological warfare are truly intimidating.339
Just as the vaccinia virus has already proven to be a remarkably adapta-
ble substrate for genetic engineering, perhaps other members of the
orthopoxvirus genus, variola in particular, could be manipulated with
equal power, but this time to magnify the pathogenic possibilities.34 °
The prospect of "designer bugs,"34 ' potential BW agents possessing a
witch's brew of enhanced characteristics, is not beyond the imagina-
tion and may already be within reach. 42
BW agents modified by specialized genetic hitchhikers might be
crafted to display all manner of invidious traits: greater lethality;
quicker communicability; resistance to existing vaccines; and greater
persistence in soil, air, and water (or if the attacker's strategy so de-
manded, a much shorter lifespan, to enable an invading force to oc-
336. See, e.g., Erika Check, Monkey Smallpox Trial Suspended Over Painkiller Use, 418 NA-
TURE 265, 265 (2002) (reporting interruption of U.S. Army's testing of smallpox illness in
primates because of concerns over their pain).
337. In fact, there may be multiple potential down sides to genetic engineering: many
consumers remain dubious about the safety of genetically modified foodstuffs; at least one
experiment in gene therapy resulted in the death of the patient, leading to suspension of
related work at the University of Pennsylvania; the rapaciousness of the efforts to secure
patent protection for the results of genetic engineering has troubled intellectual property
law; and there are worries that genetic profiling may lead to disadvantages for people with
unfavorable genetic markers. See Kathryn Brown, Seeds of Concern, ScL. AM., Apr. 2001, at
52, 52; Eliot Marshall, Gene Therapy on Trial, 288 Sci. 951 (2000); Andrew Pollack, Scientists
Ponder Limits on Access to Germ Research, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at F1; Robert P. Lanza et
al., Xenotransplantation, Sci. AM., July 1997, at 54, 59.
338. Matthew Meselson, Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology, 48 CBW CONVEN-
TIONS BULL., June 2000, at 16, 16.
339. Id. at 16.
340. Preston, supra note 286 (noting that pox viruses are among the easiest to geneti-
cally modify because they so readily accept foreign genes, and that new strains of variola
could probably be genetically engineered in a small facility in relative safety, with little
prospect of outside detection).
341. Jon Cohen, Designer Bugs, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, July/August 2002, http://
www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/07/cohen-J.htm (last visited May 20, 2003).
342. See Dennis, supra note 291, at 232 (discussing recent advances by researchers "mix-
ing and matching traits from different microorganisms").
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cupy the battlefield that much sooner) .1 4  They might insinuate
themselves in unusual, unforeseen ways to circumvent existing de-
fenses. Perhaps they could be masked as natural outbreaks of disease,
so the victimized nation would not even recognize that it had been
deliberately attacked, or by whom.3 44 Conceivably, a recombinant BW
agent could be made "ethnically selective," in targeting only those
populations possessing certain racially unique attributes, while leaving
the attacker's home civilization intact.3 45
This specter is not simply a future fantasy: the U.S.S.R. may al-
ready have done it. The defector Ken Alibek asserted that Bi-
opreparat had succeeded in crafting a horrific "chimera" BW agent-
one that combines into a single pathogen the most evil features of two
or more distinct biological weapons agents, such as variola, Ebola, or
Venezuelan equine encephalitis.346 U.S. critics contest whether such
biological cocktails were actually created and whether they would nec-
essarily be more dangerous than a simple low-technology alternative
of merely inserting both types of virus into a single warhead or
bomb.3 4 7 But there is no doubt that this type of deft, malevolent bio-
engineering may already be feasible, and that variola may be an espe-
cially attractive vehicle for it, based upon its large size and manipula-
bility, as well as its unusual "transfection" ability to revive seemingly
dead virus particles via exposure to living relatives. 4 '
343. PILLER & YAMAMOTO, supra note 197, at 22-24, 96-104.
344. Id. at 23.
345. Malcom Dando, Benefits and Threats of Developments in Biotechnology and Genetic Engi-
neering, 1999 ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT & INT'L SEC., SIPRI Y.B. 596, 598, 609 (suggesting
that an ethnically-sensitive BW weapon might be feasible as the Human Genome Project
provides additional detailed information regarding the sequence and function of the full
DNA chain); see also PILLER & YAMAMOTO, supra note 197, at 24, 99-100; Erhard Geissler,
New Assessments of the Potential Value of BW and TW Agents, in STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGI-
CAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, supra note 227, at 15, 17
(Erhard Geissler ed., 1990) (discussing the possibility that CBW agents could be made
ethnically sensitive); Dennis, supra note 291, at 233.
346. ALIBEK & HANDELMAN, supra note 258, at 259-61.
347. Davidson, supra note 292 (discussing D.A. Henderson's conclusion that it would be
difficult to genetically engineer a stronger strain of variola, and his doubts that Soviet
scientists had succeeded in doing so); Geissler, supra note 202, at 428 (suggesting that
natural pathogens are so deadly that military forces or terrorists would have no need to
resort to genetic engineering to improve upon them); see als0 ALIBEK & HANDELMAN, Supra
note 258, at 258-62; TUCKER, supra note 95, at 157-59; Andrew Pollack, With Biotechnology, a
Potential to Harm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at F6 (describing critics' doubts that the Soviet
Union had produced such weapons).
348. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 80 (stating transfection occurs when a target cell is
simultaneously infected with both a dead, but physically intact, variola virus, and a live copy
of some other member of the Chordopoxvirinae subfamily; the enzymes from the latter
can help reconstitute and unleash the former, and fully communicable smallpox is
produced).
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The dual capability phenomenon plays a role here, too, as does
the traditional scientific ethos of openness in publishing research re-
sults.34 9 That is, explorations into the variola genome-necessary to
develop better vaccines and antidotes-may simultaneously reveal op-
portunities for circumventing those same evolving safeguards.3 50
There is something of a race between those who would craft improved
defenses against traditional or emerging diseases versus those who
would seek to multiply the pathogenic possibilities, and there is no
guarantee that the peaceful side of the ledger will always advance
faster.351
One specific illustration of the danger: as researchers unwrap the
genetic mysteries of variola, they have undertaken to publish their re-
sults3 5 2 for other scientists to review and to build upon. The full ge-
nomes for several strains of variola have already been displayed on the
Internet, and others will follow. 353 This generosity promotes free ex-
change of ideas and, not incidentally, helps reassure apprehensive ob-
servers that the initial researchers are not seeking any one-sided
military advantage in smallpox BW.3 54 But it also makes the fruits of
those labors readily available to those who would exploit them for
weapons purposes. It enables malicious DNA manipulators to save
some steps in trying to figure out how to twist the variola chromosome
in an even more despicable direction. 55
349. See Peter Aldhous, Biologists Urged to Address Risk of Data Aiding Bioweapon Design, 414
NATURE 237, 237-38 (2001) (discussing possibility of malign applications of published data
from legitimate projects).
350. See id. (expressing concern "about projects in which viruses are engineered to
evade or manipulate the immune system").
351. MILLER ET AL., supra note 203, at 64 (quoting U.S. bioweapons designer Bill Patrick,
"[i]t takes eighteen months to develop a weapons-grade agent and ten years to develop a
good vaccine against it"); Geissler, supra note 345, at 18-19 (discussing military specifica-
tions for use of BW and CW effectively in warfare); Douglas J. Feith, Biological Weapons and
the Limits of Arms Control, NAT'L INT., Winter 1986-87, at 80, 81 (asserting that BW competi-
tion systematically favors offenses over defenses, because "[n]ew agents can be produced in
hours; antidotes may take years").
352. See, e.g., POXVIRUS BIOINFORMATIcs RESOURCE CTR., COMPLETE GENOMES AVAILABLE
IN THE POXVIRUS BIOINFORMATICS RESOURCE (listing two strains of variola major, and one of
variola minor, as well as three substantial fragments, for which the full DNA encoding is
publicly available), at http://www.poxvirus.org/viruses.asp (visited Apr. 7, 2003).
353. See id.
354. SeeAldhouse, supra note 349, 237-38 (discussing pros and cons of publishing poten-
tially dangerous research results).
355. SeeJennifer Couzin, A Call for Restraint on Biological Data, 297 Sci. 749 (2002) (de-
tailing members of Congress' criticism of publishing unclassified scientific data that could
be of use to terrorists); Abigail Salyers, Science, Censorship, and Public Health, 296 Sci. 617,
617 (2002) (arguing against any attempt to restrict scientific publication as part of the
effort to impede bioterrorism); Rick Weiss, Polio-Causing Virus Created in N.Y. Lab, WASH.
POST, July 12, 2002, at A01 (noting that scientists can now create a viable polio virus by
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C. Variola Research Today
Until quite recently, relatively little variola-focused scientific re-
search had been undertaken in the United States. There were occa-
sional proposals to initiate a new program, but for the most part,
considerations of cost and competing priorities left the long-dormant
CDC samples largely undisturbed.3 5 6 In 1998-99, however, fresh impe-
tus emerged when the U.S. Departments of Defense, Energy, and
Health and Human Services jointly tasked the Institute of Medicine
(IOM), a branch of the National Academy of Sciences, to advise them
on the future scientific needs for retaining live variola virus for re-
search purposes.3 5 7 Subsequently, when the WHO in 1999 acquiesced
once again in deferring the planned destruction of the virus, it did so
with the understanding that a limited range of discrete research objec-
tives of the sort outlined by IOM would be pursued.3 5 Only a small
window of time was to be allotted for these purposes, and the WHO
specified that the inquiries must be conducted openly and would be
carefully monitored by the organization's own experts.35 9
following the published genome information, and perhaps could soon accomplish the
same feat with variola); see also Raymond A. Zilinskas & Jonathan B. Tucker, Limiting the
Contribution of the Open Scientific Literature to the Biological Weapons Threat, J. HOMELAND SE-
cuRiTY, Dec. 2002, at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/tucker.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2003) (discussing the problems posed by publication of variola research
results).
Other commentators minimize the danger of misuse of such technical information,
noting that there are much easier ways for terrorists to obtain suitable BW capabilities and
that genetic engineering of variola DNA would be a most unlikely avenue for them to
pursue, even if assisted by the published genomic data. See Nicholas Wade, DNA Map for
Bacterium of Plague Is Decoded, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2001, at A13 (noting that biologists have
decoded the full genetic map of the plague bacterium, another development that could be
used both for medical and hostile purposes).
356. HENDERSON, supra note 175 (stating that very few U.S. research projects had been
undertaken with intact variola in the prior twenty years), at http://www.hopkins-
biodefense.org/pages/agents/risk.html. In 1995, the U.S. Departments of Defense and
Health and Human Services had commissioned ajoint report on variola research possibili-
ties, which recommended a short-term program in pursuit of enhanced antiviral medica-
tions, new vaccines, and improved animal models for validating derived medicines.
However, only a portion of the recommended research was actually conducted. INST. OF
MED., supra note 170, at 11, 39-41. See also HENDERSON, supra note 158 (describing the
internal politics leading to the 1995 decisions, and the research activity generated thereaf-
ter, for which funding was limited and progress was slow), at http://www.hopkins-
biodefense.org/pages/news/deliberations.html.
357. INST. OF MED., supra note 170, at vii; see TUCKER, supra note 95, at 198 (stating that
government agencies sought a technical assessment of future research activities that might
require access to live, intact variola samples).
358. World Health Assembly, Res. 52.10, supra note 165, at 1-2.
359. Id. Of course, the projected December 31, 2002 deadline for completion of that
contemplated research has now slipped, too. See generally Advisory Comm. on Immuniza-
[VOL. 62:417
2003] SMALLPOX, GENETIC ENGINEERING, AND BIO-TERRORISM
The IOM report identified several different types of research that
could usefully be undertaken before the final destruction of the vari-
ola samples. Foremost among the goals would be the development of
an efficacious antiviral medication for employment in the event of a
future outbreak of smallpox or of other related viral diseases. 36 ° Cur-
rently, there is no worthwhile prescription to combat variola;361 one
or two compounds have demonstrated some possible utility, but much
more work needs to be done, including rigorous testing of candidate
medications against live variola samples, both in vitro and in
animals.3 62
A second objective would be the articulation of an improved vac-
cine-a prophylactic treatment that would safeguard against variola
without carrying so many of the dangers and contraindications that
have troubled the vaccine since Jenner's era.363 Some have suggested
that vaccinia, if it were to be proffered for the first time as a new drug
today, would not win approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA), for failing to meet modern standards for safety and
purity, and because it carries far more adverse side effects than any
other vaccination currently on the market to combat any other
disease.364
tion Practices, Vaccinia (Smallpox) Vaccine Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immu-
nization Practices (ACIP), MORBIrLY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. , June 22, 2001, at 1.
360. Public health officials have become worried about an upsurge in human monkey-
pox-a deadly but previously rare disease that has in recent years become much more
common in Central Africa and much more successful at being transmitted between human
hosts. The monkeypox virus belongs to the same genus as variola and vaccinia, and the
traditional anti-smallpox vaccination would provide protection against monkeypox, too,
but in a region where so many people have been afflicted with HIV, and are therefore poor
risks for vaccinia treatments, an improved vaccine or antiviral would be very valuable. See
Joel Breman & D.A. Henderson, Poxvirus Dilemmas-Monkeypox, Smallpox, and Biologic Ter-
rorism, 339 NEw ENG.J. MED. 556, 556 (1998);Jon Cohen, IsAn Old Virus Up to New Tricks?,
277 Sci. 312 (1997); Wendy Orent, Killer Pox in the Congo, DISCOVER, Oct. 1, 1999, at 74;
WORLD HEALTH ORG., MONKEvPOx, FACT SHEET No. 161 (1997), available at http://
www.who.int/inf-fs/en/factl6l.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
361. INST. OF MED., supra note 170, at 47.
362. Id. at 47-49. But see D.A. Henderson & Frank Fenner, Recent Events and Observations
Pertaining to Smallpox Virus Destruction in 2002, 33 CLINICAL INFECTIOuS DISEASES 1057, 1057-
59 (2001) (questioning the feasibility and wisdom of pursuing new antiviral drugs for
smallpox).
363. INST. OF MED., supra note 170, at 53-58 (addressing the development of new vac-
cines and the obstacles encountered in the search for a vaccine for immunocompromised
patients).
364. Id, at 55; see also Advisory Comm. on Immunization Practices, supra note 359, at 12-
13 (describing complications associated with the smallpox vaccine); Moss, supra note 320,
at 1664-65 (stating that the traditional vaccinia serum "was not sterile and undoubtedly
would not meet modem standards of purity and safety were it introduced today").
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Only slightly lower on the IOM priority list were two kinds of
long-sought improvements in the power to detect and identify variola
with accuracy and speed.365 First, more rapid diagnostic tests and pro-
cedures would be desirable in order to be able to confirm a case of
smallpox in the human body earlier and easier.3 66 Second, military
officials covet an ability to sense the virus in the environment, as in an
oncoming aerosol cloud of possible biological weaponry released by a
hostile enemy on the battlefield or by terrorists in an urban locale.367
Some of these objectives, and other functions that the IOM also
identified,36 would require sustained access to complete, viable vari-
ola virus, but for others, the critical experiments might be able to pro-
ceed by using only non-infective fragments. 369 Nevertheless, even the
expertise of the leading virologists and immunologists of the IOM
could not predict with certainty just when and how success in the re-
search program will ultimately be achieved.
Moreover, the danger of untoward-possibly even disastrous-
events cannot be entirely excluded. Accidents do happen, even when
people and institutions are being honest and careful. And surprising
results sometimes take a research program into unforeseen and un-
wanted directions. In 2001, for example, it was announced that a
team of Australian researchers had been seeking a new method for
controlling rodent populations by genetically altering the existing
The leading smallpox vaccination used in the United States, known as Dryvax, was first
officially licensed by the Food and Drug Administration in the 1970s, but that authoriza-
tion lapsed, and the manufacturer also needed fresh approval for the bifurcated needles
used to administer it and for the diluents (the liquids used to reconstitute freeze-dried
vaccine). See Ceci Connolly, FDA Grants License for Smallpox Vaccine, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2002, at A13. That new license was granted only in October, 2002. See id. Other smallpox
vaccines, including those donated by Aventis Pasteur and the additional millions being
produced by Acambis, PLC and Baxter International, Inc., will still require a lengthy certifi-
cation process. Id. Until that FDA review is completed, those vaccines could be adminis-
tered only under protocols applicable to investigational new drugs, which require a
cumbersome process of informed consent by each patient and careful post-vaccination
monitoring. Id,
365. INST. OF MED., supra note 170, at 59.
366. Id. at 61-62.
367. See id. at 60-61.
368. Other objectives highlighted by the Institute of Medicine panel included refined
mapping of the variola genome, enhanced understanding of the biological processes of
infection, and uncovering additional details regarding the cellular operations of the virus.
Id. at 63-71.
369. See id. at 84-85 (summarizing the committee's analysis of which research objectives
depend upon access to live variola, and which could proceed with less dangerous
substances).
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mousepox virus to craft a contagious contraceptive. 370 They stumbled
instead upon a technique for transforming that usually mild virus into
a deadly killer-a strategy that might also be adapted for the creation
of a "super" variola strain, immune to traditional vaccination. This
event serves as a timely warning that our current prowess in the field
of genetic engineering can veer without advance notice into intensely
hazardous outcomes. 71
D. Costs of the Research
These research programs, of course, are not free. One measure
of the cost is the exploitation of the scarce facilities in which these
ultra-hazardous experiments can proceed and the devotion of the few
scientists capable of conducting such sophisticated virology inquir-
ies.372 Because of the manifest dangers, work on intact variola can be
undertaken only within the confines of the most stringently-controlled
installations. These laboratories must be certified as meeting the stan-
dards of "bio-safety level 4" (BL-4), incorporating multiple, redundant
separations between pathogens and people.3 7 These facilities are un-
usual: there are only two in the United States (at the CDC in Atlanta,
and at the Army's Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland), and perhaps
four more around the world. 74  Smallpox experiments, therefore,
370. See William J. Broad, Australians Create a Deadly Mouse Virus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2001, at A6 (reporting the discovery made by scientists at the Australian National Univer-
sity in Canberra); Cohen, supra note 341, http://www.theatiantic.com/issues/2002/07/
cohen-j.htm. The mousepox virus is yet another member of the remarkably diverse ortho-
pox virus genus that includes variola.
371. See Broad, supra note 370 (stating that the discovery was made in 1999, but it was
not reported until 2001); see also Dennis, supra note 291, at 232; Gerald Epstein, Controlling
Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions Among the Research Community, Industry,
and the National Security Community, 27 CRITICAL REVIEWS IN MICROBIOLOGY 321, 335 (2001)
(noting that "if the human immune system responded to smallpox virus in the same way
that the mouse responded to the related mousepox, adding [a particular modified gene]
could increase smallpox's 30% fatality rate to 100%"); Ronald J. Jackson et al., Expression of
Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses
and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox, 75J. VIROLOGY 1205, 1208-09 (2001) (explain-
ing that a certain modified gene, when added to a virus related to mousepox, can be
lethal).
372. See INST. OF MED., supra note 170, at 39 (explaining how research on variola is
difficult because of the lack of facilities equipped to hold the virus).
373. See id. at 37 (noting that BL-4 requires "a separate building or clearly isolated sec-
tion of a building with a sealed internal shell[;] [o]uter and inner change rooms separated
by a shower[;] . . . [a] double-doored autoclave[;] . . . [s]ewer and ventilation lines"
equipped with special filters; individual supply and exhaust air tubes; and air pressure dif-
ferentials to ensure that air will flow inward to the more tightly-constrained environments).
374. See Martin Enserink, The Boom in Biosafety Labs, 288 Sci. 1320, 1320-21 (2000) (list-
ing known and proposed BL-4 labs); Laurie Garrett, The Return ofInfectious Disease, FOREIGN
Avr., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 66, 76 (explaining that of the existing BL-4 laboratories, "[I]ocal
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
must compete for time and attention with all other research into
other highly dangerous pathogens, which likewise can be conducted
only ensconced in BL-4 protections. 5 Some have argued, therefore,
that it is a mistake to place such a high priority on further smallpox
investigations when doing so inevitably displaces some inquiries into
AIDS, Ebola, West Nile, or other viral or bacterial agents of even
greater contemporary concern.3 7 6
Similarly, the projected fiscal costs of a smallpox research pro-
gram are intimidating. The typical timeline for introducing a new
pharmaceutical is extended and pricey: some say it can take ten to
twenty years and $500 million to research, develop, test, and certify a
new medication. 7  Would private enterprise be willing to invest in
such an extended campaign when the payoff-an anti-smallpox
medicine that may never be needed or purchased-is so contingent?
The World Health Organization certainly has no budgeted funds to
subsidize such an undertaking. Is it likely that the U.S. government
would devote adequate money over such a long term to deal with a
"dead" disease?3 78
Moreover, the ordinary developmental sequence is even more
problematic here, since traditional human trials could not ethically be
conducted with an illness as dangerous and incurable as smallpox. 9
The FDA, therefore, must modify its usual procedures for evaluating
political instability threatens to compromise the security of the two labs in Russia, and
budget cuts [may jeopardize] . . .the two in the United States and the one in Britain").
375. See INST. OF MED., supra note 170, at 39 (noting that live variola viruses have not
recently been researched as thoroughly as more immediately threatening viruses).
376. See Siebert, supra note 140, at 44 (noting some other dangerous viruses also stored
in BLA facilities).
377. WORLD HEALTH ORG., OVERCOMING ANTiMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: WORLD HEALTH RE-
PORT ON INFEcTIOUs DISEASEs 2000, at http://www.who.int/infectious-disease-report/
2000/otherversions/index-rpt2000_text.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2003); see also Preston,
supra note 144, at 56 (quoting D.A. Henderson as predicting that "to get a new antiviral
drug against smallpox is going to cost three hundred million dollars. The money simply
isn't there.").
378. Shannon Brownlee, Bad Reaction, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 28, 2002, at 15 (explaining
that pharmaceutical companies will not rush to produce anti-terrorism drugs when the
only likely market is driven by the federal government instead of by consumers); Rino
Rappuoli et al., The Intangible Value of Vaccination, 297 Sc. 937, 937-39 (2002) (noting that
the commercial market does not reflect the full social value of vaccines, so governments
ought to act to make the market more attractive to industry); Marilyn Werber Serafini,
Lieberman Pushes for More Bioterrorism Cures, 34 NAT'L J. 2003 (2002) (describing legislative
proposals to offer tax incentives, enhanced patent protection, and liability indemnification
to induce pharmaceutical companies to invest more resources in research into antidotes
against bioterrorism threats).
379. Kathryn C. Zoon, Vaccines, Pharmaceutical Products, and Bioterriorism: Challenges for the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 5 EMERGING INFEcrIOUS DISEASES 534, 534-35 (1999).
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and approving candidate new medications. The agency has already
indicated a sensible willingness to proceed with unusual dispatch and
flexibility regarding assessment of the efficacy of variola medications
entirely through animal trials, but a thorough program has yet to be
implemented.38 °
In short, genetic engineering capabilities have flowered in the
past three decades and now surge beyond earlier predictions, beyond
the recognition of the general public, and perhaps beyond social con-
trol. We now possess an unparalleled ability to manipulate the ge-
nomes of variola and all manner of other creatures-for good or for
ill.
IV. CURRENT STATUS
How do we now pull together the three strands-smallpox dis-
ease eradication, BW arms control, and genetic engineering-that ser-
endipitously emerged together in modern form beginning in 1973?
This section updates the relevant stories, focusing on their shifting
interactions, assessing our current situation in each area, and summa-
rizing the public policy dilemmas that their inexorable combination
now poses.
A. Smallpox
The crucible of September 11, 2001 has prompted a great many
changes in U.S. government policy and global practice,"' two of
which are of special importance for the struggle against smallpox.
First, the Bush administration hardened the United States opposition
to the imminent destruction of the last known remaining variola sam-
ples, thus completing a remarkable volte face in the American pos-
380. Id.; see also New Drug and Biological Drug Products; Evidence Needed to Demon-
strate Effectiveness of New Drugs When Human Efficacy Studies Are Not Ethical or Feasi-
ble, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,988 (May 31, 2002) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314 and 601); INST.
OF MED., supra note 170, at 50-51 (stressing the importance of developing adequate animal
models for studying smallpox, since candidate medications cannot be tested in human
subjects); Check, supra note 336, at 265 (noting that difficulties have emerged regarding
FDA certification of U.S. Army's experimental treatments of smallpox in animal models,
due to concern for the animals); D.A. Henderson & Frank Fenner, Recent Events and Obser-
vations Pertaining to Smallpox Virus Destruction in 2002, 33 CLINICAL INFECrIOUS DisEASES
1057, 1058 (2001) (observing that testing the variola virus on humans would not be possi-
ble unless there was an epidemic); Marilyn Werber Serafini, A New Smallpox Vaccine: How
Safe?, 33 NAT'L J. 3371 (2001); Altman et al., supra note 15; Mark Kaufman, FDA Acts to
Speed Bioterror Medicines, WASH. POST, May 31, 2002, at A01.
381. See Miller, Bioterror, supra note 285, (discussing how "[a] new awareness of the dan-
gers of germ weapons began with the Sept. 11 attacks").
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ture.3 8 2 Starting in 1985, the U.S. delegation to the WHO annual
meetings had consistently championed eradication. Louis W. Sulli-
van, then Secretary of Health and Human Services, announced at an
international health meeting that "there is no scientific reason not to
destroy the remaining stocks of the wild virus, '38 3 and he promised to
wipe out the CDC variola inventory promptly."8 4 That position had
been affirmed as recently as 1996, with the U.S. representative advis-
ing the WHO that "a two-year scientific and policy review in her coun-
try had concluded in favour of destroying the variola virus" and she
"hoped that the international community would commit itself firmly
to the chosen date.
3 85
By 1999, the Clinton administration reluctantly tacked in the
other direction, promoting a delay in destruction, and successfully
urging the WHO to allow two to three additional years of research of
the sort that the IOM had identified as being particularly worthwhile
in combating the threat of a re-emergence of smallpox. 386 In late
2001, however, as that supposedly final extension of variola's sus-
pended animation was proceeding, the Bush administration signifi-
cantly raised the bar. 8 7 In the era of dramatically heightened anti-
terrorism concerns, five new criteria would have to be satisfied before
the viral samples could be eliminated, including development of: (1)
a new vaccine, unencumbered by the side effects of vaccinia; (2) two
new antiviral pharmaceuticals, which would combat smallpox through
two independent cellular mechanisms; (3) enhanced environmental
detectors to identify variola quickly in the event of wartime or terrorist
applications; (4) augmented diagnostic capabilities for prompt confir-
mation of individual smallpox infections; and (5) a new capacity for
combating even genetically-altered modifications of the virus.38 8
Acknowledging the radically altered security environment, the Di-
rector General of the WHO quickly acquiesced to this new strategy in
382. Judith Miller, Germ Warfare; U.S. Set to Retain Smallpox Stocks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2001, at Al.
383. Siebert, supra note 140, at 33.
384. Id.
385. World Health Org., Committee A, Provisional Summary Record of the Seventh
Meeting, at 3, A49/A/SR/7 (1996); see also TUCKER, supra note 95, at 178-89 (noting the
positions of various countries with regard to the destruction of the variola virus stocks and
tracing the period of time over which these decisions were made).
386. Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Virus Stocks, Report by the Secretariat, supra
note 165, at 1.
387. David Brown, U.S. Wants the Smallpox Virus Preserved for Eurther Research, WASH. POST,
Nov. 17, 2001, at A9.
388. Miller, supra note 382.
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December 2001;389 the organization's executive board concurred in
January 2002;390 and the assembly (the top policy-making body in the
WHO) swallowed the new approach in May 2002.391
The second important policy shift occasioned in autumn 2001
was the sudden American decision to procure massive amounts of
smallpox vaccine immediately and to consider making it available to
the general U.S. population.39 2 Again, this u-turn in strategy had
older roots: The United States had terminated the routine smallpox
vaccination of civilians in 1972,393 and halted the practice for military
personnel after 1990, after concluding that the low risk of exposure to
the disease did not justify the continuous cost of sometimes fatal side
effects.394 In the years following the WHO's glorious global triumph
over the disease, the U.S. commitment to maintain a standby stockpile
of vaccine had atrophied. All vaccine production was halted in the
mid 1970s,39 and by 2000, it was estimated that only six to fifteen
million doses of vaccine remained in the United States, and much of it
had suffered discoloration and other effects of aging that caused some
to question its continuing potency.3 6
389. See Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Virus Stocks, Report by the Secretariat,
supra note 165, at 1.
390. World Health Org., Statement by the Director-General to the Executive Board at Its 109th
Session, EB109/2 (1999).
391. World Health Org., Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Virus Stocks, Report by
the Secretariat, A55/21, at 1 (2002); World Health Assembly, Res. 55.15, supra note 167, at 1.
392. See Bush's Comments on His Plan for Smallpox Vaccinations Across the U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2002, at A12 (noting that the U.S. has stockpiled enough of the smallpox vaccine
for the entire population in the event of a biological attack).
393. See id.
394. Advisory Comm. on Immunization Practices, supra note 359 (discussing how the
U.S. terminated automatic smallpox vaccination of military troops in 1990, and continued
to vaccinate only selected laboratory and health care workers); TUCKER, supra note 95, at
137 (noting that after 1980, U.S. military continued to administer one million smallpox
vaccinations per year to new recruits and to other service members at five-year intervals);
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTING AMERICANS: SMALLPOX VACCINATION
PROGRAM (2002) (explaining that the Department of Defense routinely vaccinated new
recruits and veteran service members against smallpox through 1984; but in 1984, vaccina-
tion was limited to new recruits, and was intermittent between 1984 and 1990 when it was
terminated altogether), at http://www.smallpox.gov/VacinationProgramQA.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 7, 2003).
395. See Dana Hedgpeth, BioReliance Vs. Bioterrorism, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2000, at E01.
396. See D.A. Henderson, Smallpox: Clinical and Epidemiologic Features, 5 EMERGING INFEC-
TIOUS DISEASES 537, 538 (1999) ("U.S. national vaccine stocks are sufficient to immunize
only 6 to 7 million persons. This amount is only marginally sufficient for emergency
needs. Plans are now being made to expand this reserve. However, at least thirty-six
months are required before large quantities can be produced."); LeDuc & Becher, supra
note 153, at 593.
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In 1999, the prestigious Working Group on Civilian Biodefense,
led by D.A. Henderson at Johns Hopkins University, concluded that
the nation's guard had been lowered too far, and recommended pro-
curing forty million new doses of vaccine. 9 7 At about the same time,
government officials undertook to examine the viability of the deterio-
rating existing stockpile and also to determine whether it could be
diluted and thereby stretched to provide adequate vaccine protection
to a much larger number of people.398
In addition, the government entered into two separate contracts
for additional smallpox vaccine production. 99 In 1997, the Depart-
ment of Defense ordered 300,000 doses for $22.4 million, as part of
the expanded Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program to protect troops de-
ploying to high-risk theaters.400 In 2000, the CDC awarded a $343
million contract for the manufacture of the 40 million doses recom-
mended by the Working Group, with deliveries to begin in 2004 and
run through 2020.401 Remarkably, it was at that time considered diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to accelerate the timetable for vaccine produc-
tion. The few facilities that could manufacture the required amounts
397. Henderson et al., supra note 43, at 2136; Judith Miller & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Sept.
11 Attacks Led to Push for More Smallpox Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at Al (reporting
that the expert group that had originally called for a civilian stockpile of 40 million doses
of smallpox vaccine later increased its estimate of the number needed to quell a possible
smallpox outbreak to 100-135 million).
398. NAT'L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, STUDY SEEKS TO DETERMINE EFFEC-
TIVENESS OF DILUTED SMALLPOX VACCINE (2001), available at http://www.niaid.nih.gov/fact-
sheets/btsmallpox.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003); LeDuc & Becher, supra note 153, at
593.
399. See Miller & Stolberg, supra note 397 (discussing two contracts for smallpox vaccine,
one military contract with Dynport for 300,000 doses to be delivered in 2005 or 2006 and
the civilian contract with OraVax for 40 million doses to be delivered after 2004). Report-
edly, the Department of Defense refused to share its vaccinia seed stocks with civilian agen-
cies, due to legal impediments (e.g., concerns over product liability) or simple
bureaucratic infighting. Brownlee, supra note 207.
400. See Bioterrorism Concerns Spark First Smallpox Vaccine Production in 30 Years, 3 CBW
CHRON., Dec. 2000, at 1; Hedgpeth, supra note 395; Miller & Stolberg, supra note 397;
Preston, supra note 144, at 60. The BioReliance contract, which could grow into an order
for one million vaccine doses for the military, is a part of a ten-year, $322 million venture
between the Department of Defense and DynPort for eighteen vaccines and antidotes
against several diseases. Bioterrorism Concerns Spark First Smallpox Vaccine Production in 30
Years, supra, at 2.
401. Bioterrorism Concerns Spark First Smallpox Production in 30 Years, supra note 400, at 1;
see a/sojames W. LeDuc & Peter B. Jahrling, Strengthening National Preparedness for Smallpox:
An Update, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 155, 155 (2001) (noting the increased small-
pox vaccine production).
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were already under strain, and expansion of their capabilities was
widely seen as prohibitively expensive.4 °2
After the anthrax scares in October 2001, however, everything
changed. Conscious that smallpox could wreck even greater havoc on
an unprepared population, the Bush administration immediately an-
nounced its intention to seek $509 million in emergency funding, to
procure 300 million doses of smallpox vaccine, enough to treat every-
one in America, by the end of 2002.4"3 The new batch would be man-
ufactured through a modern, cleaner process to avoid some of the
problems of the traditional vaccine.40 4 Disputes over contracting pro-
cedures and feuds between large and small potential bidders
threatened to disrupt the acquisition, but new contracts were quickly
let to accomplish the goal, and the 2000 CDC contract was also ab-
ruptly enlarged, with over fifty million doses somehow now able to be
delivered within months.
40 5
Fate then intervened in two propitious ways. First, not only was
the viability of the existing vaccine inventory confirmed, the experi-
ments in dilution proved successful-what had been seen as stocks
suitable to protect at most fifteen million people could now be multi-
plied five or even ten times.40 6 Second, Aventis Pasteur, a French
402. See HENDERSON, supra note 175 (noting, in 1999, that "probably not less than two to
three years" would be required to construct new facilities to achieve significant levels of
smallpox vaccine production), at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/agents/
risk.html; Philip K. Russell, Vaccines in Civilian Defense Against Bioterrorism, 5 EMERGING IN-
FEcrious DISEASES 531, 532 (1999) (explaining the difficulties associated with producing a
new stockpile of the smallpox vaccine).
403. See Kristen Hallam & Kim Dixon, Glaxo, Merck, Baxter Await Smallpox-Vaccine Award,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 20, 2001.
404. See Rosenthal, supra note 90, at 920 (explaining that the traditional vaccine and its
method of manufacture would not suffice for modem purity and safety standards).
405. Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Awards $428
Million Contract to Produce Smallpox Vaccine (Nov. 28, 2001), available at www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2001pres/20011128 (last visited Apr. 7, 2003). The new contract with
Acambis/Baxter calls for 155 million vaccine doses to be delivered by the end of 2002 at a
cost of $2.76 per dose; in addition, the original 2000 CDC contract with Acambis was accel-
erated and enlarged to 54 million doses. Id.
406. See Justin Gillis, Smallpox Vaccine Supply Could Be Stretched, WASH. POST, Mar. 29,
2002, at AlO (quoting the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Dis-
eases as saying that even a tenfold dilution of the vaccine would be safe and effective);
Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, NIAID Study Results Sup-
port Diluting Smallpox Vaccine Stockpile to Stretch Supply (Mar. 28, 2002), at http://
www.nih.gov/news/pr/mar2002/hhs-28.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2003). But see Sharon E.
Frey et al., Dose-Related Effects of Smallpox Vaccine, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1275, 1275 (2002)
(explaining that the dilution of the smallpox vaccine reduces the chances of an effective
vaccination). See generally Sharon E. Frey et al., Clinical Responses to Undiluted and Diluted
Smallpox Vaccine, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1265 (2002) (discussing the experimentation of
diluted versus undiluted smallpox vaccinations).
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pharmaceutical company, discovered a previously overlooked stock-
pile of 85 million doses of a similar vaccine in its warehouse in
Swiftwater, Pennsylvania and generously donated them to the U.S.
government.4 ° 7 Suddenly, instead of facing a dangerous shortfall, the
United States was awash in smallpox vaccine.408 Other countries, too,
began to follow the American lead, and undertook to procure new
vaccinia sources for themselves.40 9
Concomitantly, some worried Americans contemplated or advo-
cated immediate use of those emerging vaccine supplies. They pro-
posed a return to widespread smallpox vaccination-if not a revival of
the compulsory nationwide injections of bygone eras, then at least
making the protection available to any individual and family who (af-
ter being advised of the risks of side effects) affirmatively sought it.410
Senator Bill Frist (R. Tenn.), the only physician in the U.S. Senate,
advocated voluntary vaccination of the general public, 411 and a public
opinion poll indicated that sixty percent of the American population
would want to be vaccinated if the service were available.4" 2
407. See Ceci Connolly, Aventis to Donate Smallpox Vaccine, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2002, at
A02 (stating that Aventis planned to donate 85 million doses); Gina Kolata & Lawrence K.
Aitman, Smallpox Vaccine Stockpile Is Larger Than Was Thought, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at
Al (reporting the 85 million dose discovery).
408. See Connolly, supra note 407. The total U.S. inventory of smallpox vaccine could
soon reach as much as 711 million doses: 54 million to be produced under the recently
expanded 2000 CDC contract, 155 million under the 2001 HHS contract, 77 million from
the five-for-one dilution of the old 15.4 million doses long held in the inventory, and 425
million from a comparable dilution of the newly discovered Aventis Pasteur contribution.
Id. The inventory would be even greater if the existing vaccine stocks were diluted ten
times, instead of five, as the studies have suggested. See Martin Enserink, New Cache Eases
Shortage Worries, 296 Sci. 25, 25 (2002) (discussing the study conducted at St. Louis Univer-
sity which found that smallpox vaccine could be "diluted by a factor of 5 or 10 without
losing [its] potency").
409. William J. Broad & Judith Miller, Others Follow U.S. on Smallpox Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2002, at A6; Roy Eccleston, Washington Offers Allies Protection, AuSTRALLAN, Dec. 16,
2002, at 11 (discussing how the United States has prepared contingency plans to provide
vaccines to Australia and other allies); Tim Harper, Ottawa Orders 10 Million Anti-Smallpox
Doses, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 28, 2002, at A14 (describing Canada's smallpox vaccination
plan). Britain has recently ordered thirty million new doses of vaccine, Israel and Ger-
many six million each, France three million, and other countries smaller amounts. Broad
& Miller, supra. Israel has already vaccinated seventeen thousand soldiers, health workers,
and police against smallpox, with only two people suffering adverse reactions, and will
soon expand the program to reach forty thousand people. Dexter Filkins, Israel Will Ex-
pand Its Smallpox Vaccinations, but Not To Everyone, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2002, at A23.
410. See Bill Frist, Deciding Who Is To Be Protected Against Smallpox, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2002, at A15 (suggesting that Americans be given the opportunity to make informed deci-
sions about being vaccinated).
411. Id.
412. Veronique de Rugy & Charles V. Pefia, Responding to the Threat of Smallpox Bioterror-
ism: An Ounce of Prevention Is Best Approach, POL'y ANALYSIS, Apr. 18, 2002, at 1, 8-9; see also
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Still, the WHO, the CDC, and other health officials steadfastly
counseled against any return to mass vaccination, arguing that the
dangers of the vaccine's side effects meant that the traditional surveil-
lance-containment strategy "remains the best method of stopping a
smallpox outbreak."413 Experts suggested that the existing vaccine
would be contraindicated for up to twenty-five percent of the Ameri-
can population and that no vaccination should be offered to anyone
who had close household contact with someone for whom even indi-
rect exposure to vaccinia was contraindicated. 414 They calculated that
a nationwide vaccination program might result in 180-600 deaths,
thousands of severe illnesses, and days of lost work time for up to
thirty percent of those vaccinated.4 15 A substantial debate then
erupted in both scientific and public forums.4 16
Bicknell, supra note 175, at 1323-24; Robert J. Blendon et al., The Public and the Smallpox
Threat, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 426, 428 (2003); Ceci Connolly, Some Want Smallpox Shots Now,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2001, at A01; Associated Press, Most Americans Want Smallpox Vaccina-
tion, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at A8. However, others do not favor a widespread vacci-
nation campaign. See Gina Kolata, With Vaccine Available, Smallpox Debate Shifts, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2002, at A8 (describing how public sentiment can easily turn against vaccination
programs when the dangers of the vaccine appear greater than the actual threat of the
disease).
413. Press Release, World Heath Organization, World Health Organization Announces
Updated Guidance on Smallpox Vaccination (Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://
www.who.int/inf-pr-2001/en/state200l-16.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2003); see also Advisory
Comm. on Immunization Practices, supra note 412, at 18-20 (recommending smallpox vac-
cination only for specific groups). But see de Rugy & Pefia, supra note 412, at 5-6 (arguing
that ring vaccination strategy is not appropriate for countering a terrorist attack where the
population at large is unvaccinated); Michael Scardaville, Public Health and National Security
Planning: The Case for Voluntary Smallpox Vaccination, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Dec.
6, 2002, at 1, 3-4 (suggesting postattack vaccination would not suffice to deal with modern
bioterrorism).
414. Susan Okie, Studies Cite Smallpox Vaccine Tradeoff WASH. POST, May 8, 2002, at A03
(estimating that 25% of the U.S. population would be ineligible for vaccination, including
those who live with anyone in a high-risk group); see also Lawrence K Altman, Smallpox
Vaccinations Urged for Health Care Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2002, at A24 (stating as many
as thirty-eight million Americans could be a risk from vaccine complications).
415. See Bicknell, supra note 175, at 1324 (discussing the mortality and complication
effects of smallpox vaccination); Julie Kosterlitz, Who Counts?, 34 NAT'L J. 1296, 1302
(2002) (stating up to 500 people may die from the vaccine); de Rugy & Pefia, supra note
412, at 6-8 (suggesting that vaccinating the entire U.S. population could lead to up to 600
deaths and 2000 individuals with serious brain infections); Peter Gorner & Christi Parsons,
Some Wary of State Plan for Smallpox Vaccinations, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 2002, at NI (noting that
the CDC estimates around 30% of vaccinated people will feel too sick to work).
416. See Bicknell, supra note 175, at 1323; Anthony S. Fauci, Smallpox Vaccination Policy-
The Need for Dialogue, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1319, 1319-20 (2002); Paul W. Ewald, A Risky
Policy on Smallpox Vaccination, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at A21 (discussing voluntary vac-
cinations); How to Prepare for a Smallpox Attack, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, § 4, at 12; Katz,
supra note 168; Reuters, Mass Inoculations Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at B5 (report-
ing that the American Medical Association opposes mass smallpox vaccination).
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In June 2002, the CDC's key Advisory Committee on Immuniza-
tion Practices recommended only a small expansion of prior vaccina-
tion programs: treat two specific categories of health officials in each
state. These categories should include teams of officers who would be
dispatched immediately to investigate a possible smallpox outbreak,
and groups of hospital workers who would be designated to treat the
initial victims.4 1 7 These might total 15,000-20,000 "first responders"
nationwide, who would be carefully screened for contraindications
and vaccinated on a voluntary basis.41 By October, however, the com-
mittee had reconsidered the situation, and recommended expanding
the program to reach as many as 500,000 primary health workers in
half the nation's hospitals.419
The federal government, however, has aimed more than an order
of magnitude higher: it proposes to vaccinate some eleven million
soldiers, firefighters, police officers, emergency room staffs, and pri-
vate practitioner doctors and nurses in a multi-step process.4 2' As an-
nounced by President Bush on December 13, 2002, the first phase of
the plan mandates the vaccination-already well underway-of half a
million military service members, especially those in special forces
units and those deploying to high-threat areas such as the Middle
East.4 2 1 In January 2003, when new legislation was enacted protecting
hospitals against legal liability for adverse reactions, voluntary vaccina-
417. Lawrence K. Altman, Smallpox Proposal Raises Ethical Issues, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2002, at A9.
418. Id. After the termination of routine smallpox vaccination in the 1980s, the vaccine
was confined to only a limited number of researchers who actively work with the virus;
since 1983, eleven thousand people have received the vaccination. Id.
419. See David Brown, Panel Alters Advice on Smallpox Shots; Wider Use for Health Workers
Backed, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2002, at A03; David Brown, Panel Leery of Mass Smallpox Doses;
Major Risks Outweigh Benefits of Immunizing the General Public, Experts Say, WASH. POST, Oct.
18, 2002, at A02; Ceci Connolly, 2 Hospitals Refuse Call to Vaccinate Workers, WASH. POST, Dec.
18, 2002, at A02.
420. Bush's Comments on His Plan for Smallpox Vaccinations Across the U.S., supra note 392;
Stevenson & Stolberg, supra note 91; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., supra note
394, at http://www.smallpox.gov/VaccinationProgramQA.html.
421. See Associated Press, 1st Vaccinations Show 1 in 3 Soldiers Exempt, NEWSDAY, Dec. 21,
2002, at A10 (reporting that in the earliest round of vaccinations of members of the mili-
tary's smallpox response teams, 37% of those screened were ineligible for vaccination, ei-
ther because of their own contraindications or because they lived with someone who would
be at risk from side effects of exposure to vaccinia); Denise Grady, Pentagon Faces Difficulties
in Smallpox Shots for Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at 20 (noting problem of vaccinated
and unvaccinated service members working and living in close proximity, where the vac-
cinia infection might spread to those for whom it is contraindicated). Early vaccination
will also be offered to selected Department of State employees who are posted to vulnera-
ble overseas locations. Press Release, The White House, Protecting Americans: Smallpox
Vaccination Program (Dec. 13, 2002), at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/
20021213_l.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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tion began for 500,000 hospital workers and the staffs of local health
departments. 4 22  However, resistance from a variety of hospitals,
health workers' unions and others delayed the program; only a small
fraction of the anticipated vaccination coverage was achieved on
schedule. Additional legislation, to ensure financial compensation for
those injured by adverse reactions to vaccinia, may now encourage
greater participation.423 The next phase, originally earmarked for
March 2003 but now also delayed, calls for voluntary vaccination of a
full ten million health care workers, police, firefighters, and emer-
gency medical technicians across the country.4 24 By late 2003 or 2004,
smallpox vaccine would also be made available, for free, to private
citizens who "insisted" upon vaccination, although federal authorities
still strongly recommend against that step at this time.
4 25
In addition, the government's program creates a robust infra-
structure designed to expedite the delivery and application of small-
pox vaccinations for the general public in the event of any future
massive attack.4 26 Each state and the largest municipalities have been
charged to develop plans for voluntary large-scale administration of
vaccine to their entire populations-up to one million doses are to be
applied by each unit within the first ten days of an emergency. The
Centers for Disease Control has begun to review and comment upon
those draft plans, as well as to distribute its own guidance on details
ranging from what to tell the public to how many security guards a
vaccination station should expect to hire.42v
422. See Lawrence K Altman & WilliamJ. Broad, Vaccination; State Officials Question Small-
pox Timetable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at Al; see also Lawrence K Altman, The Bioterrorism
Threat; Health Workers Union Wary of Smallpox Vaccinations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at A23
(reporting a health care workers union's concern that a sufficient legal regime was not in
place to address vaccine-related problems).
423. Ceci Connolly, Lawmakers, White House Agree on Smallpox Compensation, WASH. POST,
Apr. 11, 2003, at Al1; Ceci Connolly, U.S. Smallpox Vaccine Program Lags, WASH. POST, Apr.
13, 2003, at A03.
424. Stevenson & Stolberg, supra note 91.
425. See id. (stating a new FDA-licensed version of the vaccine might be available to the
general public in 2004, but also explaining that HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson
promised to pursue "an orderly process" for making the current vaccine available to the
public, too, perhaps in summer 2003); see also Lawrence K. Altman & Denise Grady, The
Vaccine; Smallpox Shot Will Be Free for Those Who Want One, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, § 1, at
38 (explaining Secretary Thompson's vaccination plan).
426. See generally U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SMALLPOX VACCINA-
TION CLINIC GUIDE Annex 3 (2002) (providing a model plan for high volume "post-event"
smallpox vaccinations).
427. Press Release, U.S. Centers for Disease Control, CDC Initial Review of State Small-
pox Vaccination Plans Complete (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/
media/pressrel/r021212.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2003); see also Altman & Broad, supra note
422 (noting that on initial review, CDC finds draft plans encouraging); William J. Broad,
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President Bush, as the military commander-in-chief, was one of
the first to receive the smallpox vaccination, but he stressed that civil-
ians, including his own family, his immediate staff, the cabinet, and
members of Congress, would not be vaccinated at that time.428 Con-
comitantly, the federal government undertook a massive outreach
campaign to educate the medical community and the public about
bioterrorism in general and smallpox in particular 42 9-an effort that
surveys revealed was desperately needed, in light of the general misin-
formation and apprehension that had gripped the country."'
Still, the medical community was sharply divided about the wis-
dom of the proposed program, and some hospitals rejected vacci-
nating their staffs because they worried the injections would cause
widespread absenteeism due to adverse reactions, and employees
might inadvertently communicate vaccinia infections to their patients,
who were among the most vulnerable populations.4 1' The unknown
effect of the vaccine on children was also a source of great, un-
resolved, and perhaps untestable concern.4 2
U.S. Guide for Mass Smallpox Vaccinations: Recipe with Missing Ingredients, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2002, at A19 (revealing omissions in the CDC's guidelines); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Law-
rence K. Altman, The Plan; New Plan to Meet Smallpox Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at
Al (discussing the CDC's smallpox vaccination guidelines).
428. Stevenson & Stolberg, supra note 91 (commenting that even Vice President Dick
Cheney will not be vaccinated unless a smallpox attack occurs).
429. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Comprehensive
Information Provided on www.smallpox.gov (Dec. 13, 2002) (announcing a new website
for providing current information to the public and the medical community), at http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/20021213.html); see also Altman & Grady, supra note
425 (reporting that CDC is preparing to send 150,000 educational CD-ROMs to doctors
and to train 140 thousand through other programs).
430. Blendon et al., supra note 412, at 426 (concluding most Americans hold erroneous
beliefs about several critical smallpox facts and issues); Denise Grady, Bioterrorism; Scientists
Favoring Cautious Approach to Smallpox Shots, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 20, 2002, at Al (noting public
ignorance or misperception about basic facts concerning smallpox and vaccination).
431. See Kent A. Sepkowitz, How Contagious Is Vaccinia?, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 439, 443-
45 (2003) (discussing the risk of secondary transmission, through which health care work-
ers may accidentally infect their patients, especially those with compromised immune sys-
tems); Altman & Broad, supra note 422 (noting that some state officials and medical
authorities argue that they need more time to prepare for and carry out the ambitious
vaccination program); Connolly, supra note 419 (reporting Grady Memorial Hospital in
Atlanta and Virginia Commonwealth Hospital in Richmond refused to vaccinate their em-
ployees against smallpox); Vicki Kemper & Rosie Mestel, Medical Groups Criticize Bush's
Smallpox Plan, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, § 1, at 32 (alleging the government's smallpox
vaccination program will strain public health resources and pose health risks to medical
personnel); William Foege, Can Smallpox Be as Simple as 1-2-3?, WASH. PosT, Dec. 29, 2002,
at B05 (stating there is mixed reaction to President Bush's smallpox plan).
432. See Altman & Grady, supra note 425 (noting the smallpox vaccination has not been
tested on children); Donald G. McNeil Jr., Citing Dangers, Experts Warn Against Vaccinating
Children, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A27 (reporting the vaccine may be most dangerous
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B. National Security
The alterations in American security policy have been likewise
profound since the hijacked airliners slammed into the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. The United States is fighting terrorists and
their state sponsors in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere; the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security has been created to help craft a more
coordinated national strategy for domestic protection;4 3 and addi-
tional funding is pouring into a wide variety of new and previously
overlooked needs for protective personnel, training and
equipment.434
The incipient threat of biological terrorism, in particular, has ener-
gized much of the response. Money is now thrown at programs to
interdict the newly appreciated danger, at the same time that the com-
munity realizes its awesome vulnerability to conspiracies as simple and
as deadly as mailed anthrax spores. The wail of: "Why weren't we
warned about this-why weren't we prepared?" has already begun to
soften, as we appreciate that terrorism experts were, in fact, long
sounding a futile alarm, and that to a large extent, we can never be
fully insulated against these types of assaults. 5 In fact, the most
haunting unanswered questions now may be: "Why didn't it happen
sooner?" and "Where will it happen next?"
Simulation exercises in recent years have validated the profound
concerns about American vulnerability to BW in general, bioterrorism
more specifically, and smallpox in particular. Most prominently, a
2001 program denominated "Dark Winter" collected a panel of exper-
ienced senior government officials and challenged them with a hypo-
thetical smallpox outbreak involving three two-person teams
dispensing variola via simple aerosol spray devices at shopping malls
for children and teenagers, and ethical constraints may prohibit testing it to determine its
true level of risk); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Proposal to Test Smallpox Vaccine in Young Children Sets
offEthics Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at A14 (discussing a proposed pediatric smallpox
vaccination trial and related ethical questions and risks).
433. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (creating
the Department of Homeland Security).
434. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Sets Up Plan to Fight Smallpox in Case of Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at IA (reporting that the CDC has vaccinated 140 members of epide-
miologic teams that could be dispatched immediately to deal with a smallpox outbreak).
The CDC also has instituted a variety of professional training programs to assist health
workers in identifying and responding to smallpox cases, and it has increased physical
security at its Atlanta headquarters. Id.
435. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Judith Miller, Many Worry That Nation Is Still Highly Vulnerable
to Germ Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at A16 (stating that regardless of the amount of
money and preparation, most public health and intelligence officials agree "the nation will
never be fully prepared for or protected against a biological attack").
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in Oklahoma City, Atlanta, and Philadelphia.43 6 In the simulation,
even this expert group quickly lost control of the situation: by the
sixth day of the program, the nation's entire vaccine stockpile was ex-
hausted. By the end, thirteen days later, the disease had spread to
twenty-five states and fifteen foreign countries, 2600 people had died,
and another 11,000 were infected, with no end in sight.43 7 More than
200 other comparable counter-terrorism exercises, simulations, or
computer models have been run for a variety of federal, state, and
local officials with disparate, but often equally disconcerting results.43 8
At the same time, the Bush administration seems even more stri-
dently attached to a foreign policy of unilateralism-a willingness,
even an eagerness, to "go it alone" in international affairs, even if
other countries, including our closest traditional allies, urge a differ-
ent tack that might entail some compromise of America's solo prefer-
ences.439 While trying to assemble a broad international coalition for
action against al Qaeda and other terrorists, the United States has
not reciprocated by acknowledging other countries' interests or con-
cerns on a vast set of global agenda items.44 A wide array of treaties
436. Roxanne Roberts, A War Game To Send Chills Down the Spine, WASH. POST, Oct. 23,
2001, at Col.
437. See ANSER INST. FOR HOMELAND SEC., DARK WINTER, at http://www.homeland
security.org/darkwinter (last visited Apr. 9, 2003); see also Martin Enserink, How Devastating
Would a Smallpox Attack Really Be?, 296 Sci. 1592, 1592-94 (2002) (discussing the Dark Win-
ter simulation and related critique); Reuters, U.S. Called Vulnerable to Biological Attack; Small-
pox Simulation Alarms Officials, WASH. POST, July 24, 2001, at A05 (describing the
simulation). Analysts have generated other models of disease outbreak that are far less
pessimistic than the results of the Dark Winter exercise. William J. Broad, Study Favors
Different Track on Smallpox, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at A17
438. See, e.g., Joby Warrick & Steve Fainaru, Bioterrorism Preparations Lacking at Lowest
Levels; Despite Warnings and Funds, Local Defenses Come Up Short, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2001,
at A07 (explaining that funding for the more than 200 counterterrorism training exercises
conducted by the federal government came from the 1996 Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction Act). See also Thomas V. Inglesby et al., A Plague on Your City: Observations
from TOPOFF, 32 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 436, 436-37, 443-44 (2001) (explaining that
"Operation TOPOFF 2000"-so designated because it was designed to train "top officials"
of the U.S. government-was the largest simulation exercise of its kind to date). TOPOFF
included three simultaneous crises: a chemical weapons event in Portsmouth, NH, a radio-
logical event near Washington, D.C., and a bioweapons event involving the bacteria that
causes plague in Denver. Id. The exercise revealed vulnerabilities in many areas, includ-
ing problems of leadership and decision-making, poor prioritization and distribution of
scarce human and pharmacological resources, and the overwhelming of hospitals and
other health care facilities. Id.
439. See Steven Erlanger, Europe Seethes as the U.S. Flies Solo in World Affairs, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2002, at A8.
440. David E. Sanger & Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Takes Steps to Bolster Bloc Fighting Terror,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001, at Al.
441. See Barbara Crossette, Washington Is Criticized for Growing Reluctance to Sign Treaties,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at A5.
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on anti-personnel landmines, 442 the International Criminal Court,443
global climate change, 444 nuclear test ban, 445 children's rights, 4 46 the
law of the sea,447 and other matters has received widespread acclaim
and overwhelming multilateral support.48 Yet, the United States has
rigidly stayed away from each of them when American priorities were
not fully satisfied.449
The proposed protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention
provides yet another important illustration of this worrisome trend.
That proffered instrument, the product of a decade of incremental
give-and-take, is hardly perfect. The ineffable tradeoff it makes be-
tween openness (to enhance confidence that other countries are not
violating the obligations) and privacy (to protect defense-oriented na-
tional security information, as well as corporate confidential business
data from abusive intrusions), can always be second-guessed. 5 ° More-
over, the BWC, an agreement between sovereign states, will inherently
have relatively little to do with terrorism by private actors. The treaty
regulates behavior by and between countries, and was not crafted with
insidious non-state actors principally in mind.
Still, it came as a surprise and a disappointment in 2001 when the
Bush administration so curtly rejected the draft protocol, and even
more so when it subsequently undertook to pull the plug on the en-
tire negotiation process. That highhanded approach generated con-
siderable acrimony, and the rest of the world has continued to
advocate an ambitious, legally-binding protocol, instead of the lesser
measures envisioned by the United States. 45' A one-year "cooling off
period" sufficed to avert an immediate diplomatic train wreck, and
the negotiators paused to consider Washington's new set of much
more modest proposals for BW arms control and to attempt to find a
mechanism to accommodate the evolving American positions. 52
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id
447. Jeffrey Gedmin & Gary Schmitt, Allies in America's National Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
5, 2001, § 4, at 13.
448. Crossette, supra note 441.
449. Gedmin & Schmitt, supra note 447.
450. See supra notes 253-257 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. reluctance to sup-
port verification measures).
451. See Elizabeth Olson, U.S. Rejects New Accord Covering Germ Warfare, N.Y. TIMES, July
26, 2001, at A7.
452. See Tucker & Zilinskas, supra note 256, at 10; Jonathan B. Tucker, In the Shadow of
Anthrax: Strengthening the Biological Disarmament Regime, NONPROLIFERATION REv., Spring
2002, at 112, 113-14.
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The Bush administration has proclaimed its continuing interest
in deriving new international methods to combat the accelerating
threats of biological warfare and bioterrorism, but in November 2002,
the hard-line American stance led to abandonment of the negotiators'
effort to draft a new treaty or even a consensus report detailing their
frustrated efforts.453 Annual diplomatic meetings, expected to be
truncated and minimally effective, will continue through 2005 with a
limited set of mandates and with little prospect for a universally ac-
ceptable protocol.4 54 Some portions of the recent U.S. suggestions for
a revised accord may provide a basis for further deliberations,455 but
only if the Bush administration would be willing to return to the nego-
tiating table and attempt to hammer out a new consensus.
Domestically, the federal government has redoubled its efforts to
interdict the dangers of bioterrorism, and state and local governments
also have injected new energy and resources into the problem.456
New legislation has facilitated the development of adequate emer-
gency response algorithms, and additional training and resources
have been showered upon the community's potential first responders,
empowering them to plan more conscientiously for the worst contin-
gencies.457 Observers conclude that the United States is now much
better prepared to identify and react appropriately to a BW attack,
especially a smallpox terrorism incident, but none could yet be satis-
fied with the still-evolving precautions.458
453. See Peter Slevin, US. Drops Bid To Strengthen Germ Warfare Accord, WASH. POST, Sept.
19, 2002, at A01 (reporting U.S. attempt to preclude additional negotiations on a BWC
protocol until 2006).
454. See id. (reporting Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton as suggesting that instead
of negotiating an ambitious treaty, countries should develop their own criminal laws
against germ warfare and resolve disputes over biowarfare violations through inspections
conducted by the United Nations secretary general).
455. U.S. DELEGATION TO THE 5TH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE BWC, FACr SHEET: U.S.
EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT (Nov. 14, 2002), at http://
usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02111405.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2003); see also Oli-
ver Meier, Bare-Bones Multilateralism at the BWC Review Conference, ARMS CONTROL TODAY,
Dec. 2002, at 19.
456. See Davidson, supra note 292 (citing dramatically increased supplies of vaccine and
improved readiness among local and state health officials).
457. Id.
458. See id. (quoting D.A. Henderson as saying, "It's been miraculous. We now feel
much better than we did a year ago" regarding the ability to spot and combat a smallpox
outbreak); see also Ronald Bayer & James Colgrove, Public Health vs. Civil Liberties, 297 Sci.
1811, 1811 (2002) (describing model legislation to enable state governments to respond to
bioterrorism without unduly impinging personal freedoms); Marilyn Werber Serafini,
Tulsa Gears Up for Bioterrorism, 34 NAT'LJ. 2613 (2002) (discussing Tulsa's monitoring and
readiness plan); Geoffrey Cowley, The Plan to Fight Smallpox, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 2002, at 44
(reviewing government plans for preparing against a potential smallpox attack); Stephen
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The most recent federal enactment is the Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. 59 The Act
broadly undertakes to improve emergency communication between
federal, state, and local health agencies, to mandate the development
of a comprehensive national plan to combat sudden disease out-
breaks, to train and educate public health professionals to recognize
bioterrorism incidents, and to fund a $1.2 billion expansion of the
stockpile of vaccines and drugs.46 ° In addition, the new law aims to
tighten security measures at biotechnology facilities and restricts ac-
cess to several dozen of the most dangerous pathogens, screening out
potential users with suspected terrorist connections.461 Despite its ag-
gressive reach, the enactment has been received relatively warmly by
the facilities it governs, even by the 190,000 manufacturers, laborato-
ries, and individual scientists who will now have to register as holding
any of the identified "select agents." '462
At this point, it is abundantly clear to all that the struggle against
bio-terrorism will be long, difficult, and multi-faceted. The process
also provides a timely reminder about the dangers of hubris: no secur-
ity system, even one tightly calibrated to respond to the new threats,
can ever be perfect. In April 2002-a time when federal security per-
sonnel and physical control systems should have been upgraded to
meet the highest standards-a test conducted by the U.S. General Ac-
Smith, US Plans a System to Detect Bioattack, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 2002, at Al (reporting
Centers for Disease Control is planning a computerized surveillance system to monitor the
national demand for key pharmaceuticals that could signal an outbreak of smallpox or
other bioterrorism).
459. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594.
460. Public Health Security and Bioterrism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
§§ 101, 121.
461. Public Health Security and Bioterrism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
§ 201; see also Interstate Shipment of Etiological Agents , 42 C.F.R. § 72, appendix A
(2002); Possession, Use and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins; Interim Final Rule,
67 Fed. Reg. 76,908 (Dec. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 331 & 9 C.F.R. pt. 121)
(providing regulations for the Department of Agriculture); Possession, Use, and Transfer
of Select Agents and Toxins; Interim Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,886 (Dec. 13, 2002) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 73, 1003) (providing regulations for the Department of Health
and Human Services); Preliminary Guidance for Notification of Possession of Select
Agents; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,363 (July 12, 2002).
462. See Virginia Gewin, Scientists Placated as US Bill Gets Tough on Bioterror, 417 NATURE
475 (2002) (reporting that many scientists are happy with the new legislation); see also
Diana Jean Schemo, After 9/11, Universities Are Destroying Biological Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2002, at A20 (reporting some laboratories are destroying their inventories of select
agents, potentially compromising future research undertakings, rather than register them
under the new statute and regulations); Diana Jean Schemo, Sept. 11 Strikes at Labs'Doors,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at F1 [hereinafter Sept. 11 Strikes] (noting that some scientists
are concerned regarding the secrecy mandate).
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counting Office demonstrated the extent of the ongoing problem. In
that experiment, a number of sophisticated, knowledgeable intruders
easily evaded the perimeter and inner security at four major federal
buildings in Atlanta, Georgia, the home city of the Centers for Disease
Control and its variola virus stockpile.463 The testers repeatedly
fooled guards into providing them with security passes and after-hours
codes, allowing them to enter and exit the supposedly secure facilities
with packages that were not examined by X-ray or magnetometers.
4 64
The CDC itself was not one of the four buildings targeted in the ex-
periment,465 and no challenges have been levied about the security of
the variola inventory and other hazardous pathogens housed there,
but one cannot be confident that such a shocking breach could never
occur.
The latest word regarding the possible threat of smallpox bioter-
rorism in the United States, and on the rising levels of that danger,
came in President Bush's December 2002 announcement of his re-
vised plan for smallpox vaccinations.4 66 Sounding notes of both reas-
surance and caution, he asserted, "Our government has no
information that a smallpox attack is imminent. Yet it is prudent to
prepare for the possibility that terrorists would kill indiscriminately,
who do kill indiscriminately, would use diseases as a weapon. "467
C. Science
Variola researchers have intensified their investigatory efforts,
continuing to make incremental, but inexorable, progress in their
quest to uncover more of their target's potent secrets. First, the ex-
isting viral inventory has been surveyed and catalogued with greater
precision than ever before.46 We now have a much better idea of
what sorts of materials are held in the CDC and Vector, how different
463. Security Breaches at Federal Buildings in Atlanta, Georgia: Testimony Before House Comm.
on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 1-3 (2002) [hereinafter Security Breaches at Federal Build-
ings] (statement of Ronald Malfi, Acting Managing Director, Office of Special Investiga-
tions, U.S. General Accounting Office).
464. Id.; see also David Firestone, Investigators Breach Security in 4 U.S. Buildings in Atlanta,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at A18.
465. Security Breaches at Federal Buildings, supra note 463.
466. Bush's Comments on His Plan for Smallpox Vaccinations Across the U.S., supra note 392;
William J. Broad, Bush Signals He Thinks Possibility of Smallpox Attack Is Rising, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2002, at A13.
467. Bush's Comments on His Plan for Smallpox Vaccinations Across the U.S., supra note 392.
468. World Health Organization, Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Virus
Stocks, A55/21 (Apr. 5, 2002); World Health Organization, Smallpox Eradication: Tempo-
rary Retention of Variola Virus Stocks, A54/16 (Apr. 11, 2001) (stating that since 2001, 50
more isolates from the Russian collection were studied).
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they are from each other, and how many of them may remain viable.
Second, the task of revealing the virus's genetic sequence has
progressed more swiftly than originally contemplated; no fewer than
ten diverse strains have now been thoroughly mapped.469
The leading candidate antiviral medication, cidofovir (or its im-
proved version, known as hdp-cdv) has fared well in in vitro tests in the
past year.4 70 It is now accepted as an Investigational New Drug by the
FDA, and may proceed soon to evaluation in animal models.471  No
fewer than 270 other potential antivirals have been assayed in cell cul-
tures, and 140 were selected for additional screening.472 Progress in
pursuit of a new vaccine was likewise described as encouraging, espe-
cially regarding a weakened strain of vaccinia called Modified Vac-
cinia Ankara (MVA), but no immediate breakthroughs are yet at
hand.473 Other tantalizing innovations in combating variola have also
been sketched out, but not yet fully developed. 474 An important ena-
bling step in support of these and other future projects is the develop-
ment of a suitable animal model for studying smallpox and its
469. E.g., World Health Organization, Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Vi-
rus Stocks, supra note 468, at 3 (reporting that ten full-length variola isolate genomes had
been identified as of April 2002).
470. World Health Organization, Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Virus
Stocks, supra note 468, at 4 (discussing cidofovir effectiveness against cowpox and monkey-
pox and possible use with current smallpox vaccines); see James E. LeDuc et al., Smallpox
Research Activities: US. Interagency Collaboration, 2001, 8 EMERGING INFECTIous DISEASES 743
(2002) (summarizing the results of a variola research collaboration between the CDC and
the National Institutes of Health).
471. See, e.g., LeDuc et al., supra note 470, at 743 (stating that an Investigational New
Drug application was filed for cidofovir in 2001).
472. Id. at 744 (reporting that over 700 possible antivirals have been screened in vitro
and stating that of those which show promise, more than 20 will be tested on animals);
James E. LeDuc & Peter G. Jahrling, Strengthening National Preparedness for Smallpox: An Up-
date, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUs DISEASES 155, 156 (2001) (reporting that 274 antiviral com-
pounds were screened for therapeutic activity against variola).
473. Cowley, supra note 458, at 44 (noting that "MVA is the most promising third gener-
ation vaccine); Steven Sternberg, Researchers on the Trail of a Better Smallpox Vaccine, U.S.A.
TODAY, Dec 26, 2002, § LIFE, at 7D (observing that immune responses are the same for the
live-virus vaccine and MVA, and MVA is safe enough to use on people with HIV and AIDS).
474. Sternberg, supra note 473 (setting forth possibilities such as using MVA to make
standard vaccine safer, a Japanese vaccine grown at seven degrees cooler than body tem-
perature, and dead vaccinia with chemicals to boost immunity); see also Rosenthal et al.,
supra note 90, at 920 (describing vaccine production options and their associated efficacy
and safety); Henry I. Miller & David Longtin, Don't Offer All Americans Smallpox Vaccinations
Now, USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 2002, at 15A (noting that pharmaceutical companies are devel-
oping a variety of poxvirus-based vaccines against HIV as well as therapies against cancer
and warning that those receiving the smallpox vaccine may develop long-term immunity
against related viruses that will interfere with those novel treatments); Jeff Nesmith, Artifi-
cial Antibody Might Thwart Smallpox, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 17, 2002, at 4A (revealing
that researchers have identified an antibody that may be useful as an anti-smallpox tool).
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potential therapies. Researchers have registered success in inducing a
variant of the disease in cynomolgus monkeys for this purpose.475
Also noteworthy is the uptick in cooperation between the two WHO
Smallpox Collaborating Centers, as American, Russian, and other ex-
perts have shared projects and further subsidized Vector's ongoing
conversion to fully civilian operations.47 6
Advances in the broader field of genetic engineering have also
progressed at a breathtaking pace. Most dramatically, researchers at
the State University of New York at Stony Brook (financed by the U.S.
Department of Defense) succeeded for the first time in July 2002 in
synthesizing a live virus.4 77 They assembled viable polio viruses by
combining raw chemicals step-by-step, following the publicly available
genetic sequence data.4 78 By crafting a functional pathogen "from
scratch, 479 the scientists have demonstrated the ability to elicit artifi-
cial life from nature's basic building blocks (which are now inexpen-
sively available by mail order), thereby validating a technique that
some said could be applied to other pathogens with relative ease and
speed and at surprisingly low CoSt.
4 80
Commentators disagreed about how readily the feat could be per-
formed on variola, whose DNA chain is many times longer and more
complex than polio's. Yet articulation of that technology certainly
calls into question the logic of destroying the CDC and Koltsovo sam-
ples. If endless inventories of new variola could some day be gener-
ated artificially in standard molecular biology laboratories, what would
475. LeDuc et al., supra note 470, at 744-45 (stating that earlier efforts with cynomolgus
monkeys did not produce a disease sufficiently similar to human smallpox, but more re-
cent tests indicate a successful animal model is possible); David Ruppe, Smallpox: U.S. Army
Derives Controversial Primate Host, Possible Bio-Defense Breakthrough, GLOBAL SECURITY NEW-
SWIRE, Jan. 24, 2002 (observing that exposing primates to high concentrations of aerosol-
ized smallpox resulted in only slight infection), at http://www.nti.org/dnewswire/issues/
2002/l/24/10p.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
476. SeeWorld Health Organization, Smallpox Eradication: Temporary Retention of Va-
riola Virus Stocks, supra note 468, at 2 (observing that advanced cooperation between VEC-
TOR and the CDC has begun); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON VARIOLA VIRUs RESEARCH, supra note 468, at 2 (cooperation between the two Centers
includes transfer of biological reagents).
477. Erika Check, Poliovirus Advance Sparks Fear of Data Curbs, 418 NATURE 265, 265
(2002).
478. Id.
479. Rick Weiss, Polio-Causing Virus Created in N. Y Lab, WASH. PosT,July 12, 2002, at A01.
480. Id. (noting that synthesizing a virus may cost only around $10,000); see also Andrew
Pollack, Scientists Create a Live Polio Virus, N.Y. TiMES, July 12, 2002, at Al (reporting that Dr.
Eckard Wimmer, the lead scientist of the team that synthesized the polio virus, stated that
they had made the virus in part as a warning of possible terrorist capabilities); Sylvia Pagan
Westphal, How to Make a Killer Virus, NEW SCIENTIST, July 20, 2002, at 6 (stating that the
steps followed by scientists who made the polio virus can be replicated by terrorists).
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be the point of eradicating the last natural stocks? The prescient 1999
Institute of Medicine report had contemplated the possibility of just
such developments, noting that the step-by-step building of active vari-
ola might soon be mechanically feasible, and adding, "There is no way
of predicting the rate at which such technologies might develop."48
Shortly after that innovation, another research team announced
that it had discovered a method for transferring a selected protein
from variola into vaccinia, thereby making the recipient virus one
hundred times more infective than the original, and explaining how
that particular protein is responsible for variola's unique ability to de-
feat the human immune system.482 Again, the technology offers be-
nign applications (it may eventually lead to advances in anti-smallpox
pharmaceuticals), but the potential for abuse is also manifest.4 83
These salient technological breakthroughs have also provoked a
political response: some have staunchly opposed publication of such
lurid results, arguing that the innovations can be abused by terrorists
or rogue militaries, co-opting the pure science insights for hostile ap-
plications.4" 4 The notion of classification, self-censorship, or other-
wise restricting publication of "contentious research" has been
asserted anew, but advocates of the free flow of scientific information
have again rallied to defend an open marketplace of ideas, even in the
485era of terrorism.
481. INST. OF MED., supra note 170 at 64-67; see also Michael Balter, On the Trail of Ebola
and Marburg Viruses, 290 Sci. 923, 925 (2000) (reporting that researchers have constructed
a DNA molecule complementary to that of the Ebola virus and used it in cultured cells to
produce Ebola RNA, thus concocting an infectious laboratory-created virus); Check, supra
note 477 (noting Eckard Wimmer's comment that now "You cannot eliminate a virus from
existence"); Rick Weiss, Genetic Find Could Lead to Creation of Life from Scratch in Lab, WAsH.
POST, Dec. 10, 1999, at A8 (explaining that "new research may enable scientists to engineer
life in the laboratory for the first time from essential chemical ingredients-not by altering
existing organisms, as genetic engineers do today").
482. Ariella M. Rosengard et al., Variola Virus Immune Evasion Design: Expression of a
Highly Efficient Inhibitor of Human Complement, 99 PROC. NAT'L AC.AD. Sci. 8808 (2002) (dis-
cussing how disabling the smallpox inhibitor of complement enzymes (SPICE) "may be
therapeutically useful if smallpox reemerges").
483. Schemo, Sept. 11 Strikes, supra note 462 (appraising the effect of new rules that
govern biological research).
484. See Couzin, supra note 355, at 749 (stating that members of Congress introduced a
resolution opposing publication of unclassified scientific data that could be of use to ter-
rorists); Check, supra note 477, at 265 (reporting that restrictions may be placed on scien-
tific publications for fear that they will be used by terrorists).
485. See Bruce Alberts & Robert M. May, Scientist Support for Biological Weapons Controls,
298 Sex. 1135 (2002) (stating that advances in science, facilitated by open publication, can
help decrease the threat of biological warfare by improving treatments); Gerald Epstein,
Controlling Biological Warfare Threats: Resolving Potential Tensions among the Research Commu-
nity, Industry, and the National Security Community, 27 CRITICAL REV. MICROBIOLOGY 321, 335-
36 (2001); P.J. Lachmann, Microbial Subversion of the Immune Response, 99 PROC. NAT'L AC.kn.
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In any event, two basic conclusions seem apt for future smallpox-
related inquiries. First, we can never predict when, where, or in what
direction future technological breakthroughs will occur. Scientific in-
quiries simply do not follow the timetables established by politicians
or comptrollers, nor do they adhere to a hope for exclusively peaceful
advantages. No matter how earnestly we seek a solution, and no mat-
ter how much money we throw at the problem, success is never guar-
anteed. Second, we will literally never exhaust all that variola might
be able to teach us. Even if our current techniques, equipment, and
conceptual models run through their entire repertoire of currently
contemplated experiments, it is certain that future generations of in-
vestigators, armed with enhanced tools and ideas, would be able to ask
questions of variola, and divine useful answers, that are beyond con-
temporary ken. So the process of plumbing variola's mysteries, and
discerning their applicability to other virology and immunology co-
nundrums, may literally never be completed.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
What, then, should we do about this array of public policy dilem-
mas? This section offers recommendations in six areas, drawing upon
each of the three strands of public policy identified above.
A. Retain the Variola Virus Samples
First, we should decide now to retain the remaining variola virus
samples indefinitely-essentially forever. Admittedly, the symbolic
value of complete eradication (originally of the disease, and now of
the causative virus) would be satisfying-nothing is so conclusive or
triumphant as permanent extermination of a hostile species. But that
cathartic gain is simply not worth what we would be losing by forego-
ing forever access to this unique genetic entity. There is still much we
can learn from variola. It is a unique creature, one that has so closely
accompanied human beings for millennia, and it has waged a battle
against us more skillfully than any other microorganism. Instead of
throwing it away, we should now follow Ovid's advice that we can learn
even from our worst enemies.4" 6
Sci. 8461, 8462 (2002) (arguing that inquiries like the variola-vaccinia gene transfer are
much more likely to assist in combating disease than in promoting terrorism); Schemo,
Sept. 11 Strikes, supra note 462 (reporting that government regulations "threaten to under-
mine the fundamental openness of science and campus life").
486. OVID, The Stoy of Athamas and Ino, in METAMORPHOSES 94, 95 (Rolfe Humphries
trans., 1955) (stating "to learn from enemies is right and proper").
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I also recommend abandoning once and for all the pretense that
what is at stake is only the "temporary" retention of the samples frozen
in the CDC and Vector laboratories. The smallpox saga is littered
with the WHO's missed deadlines for eradicating the species; on each
occasion when the virus truly seemed poised on the world's chopping
block, the organization has blinked, backed off, and then set another
unwittingly false execution date.487 It serves no purpose to continue
the charade of "final" deadlines; let us admit frankly that permanent
retention is appropriate.
Just as absurd is the current U.S. position that eradication could
be undertaken as soon as the list of five new research objectives is
met.488 Like Louis Carrol's White Queen, who struggled to believe six
impossible things before breakfast,"89 the American proponents have
advanced such an ambitious and rather arbitrary set of objectives, es-
tablishing unnecessarily arduous research goals, that the strategy can
only be understood as a thin veneer for permanent retention. Rather
than pretending to cling to that fixed agenda, we should now overtly
resolve to unlink the research protocol from the question of perpetua-
tion of the CDC and Vector repositories.
B. Produce More Vaccine, but Not 300 Million Doses
The United States and the entire world were long overdue for a
resumption of smallpox vaccine production. The global inventory
had fallen far too low; years of neglect and disinvestment caused the
known, viable stockpile to dwindle to unacceptable levels. 490 The pre-
September 11 recommendation of the Working Group on Civilian Bi-
odefense for a U.S. supply of 40 million doses49 1 was about right, if
somewhat on the conservative side. Subsequent initiatives by the De-
partments of Defense and Health and Human Services would have
built up to that level. Initially, this would have been accomplished
rather slowly, but the schedule has subsequently been accelerated.
The adventures in over-contracting since that time have illus-
trated, however, that no idea is so good, no undertaking so valuable,
that it cannot be wildly overdone. America does not need 300 million
487. See supra notes 160-167 and accompanying text (describing previous failures to fol-
low variola extermination dates).
488. See supra text accompanying note 388 (setting forth five criteria that must be met
before destroying variola samples).
489. LEwis CARROLL, THE COMPLETE ALICE & THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK 188 (2d ed.,
Salem House Publishers 1987) (1865).
490. See supra notes 147-153 and accompanying text (describing the amount of vaccine
available to the WHO to combat smallpox infections after 1980).
491. See Henderson et al., supra note 43, at 2136.
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vaccinia doses. We would never administer that many, and it is irre-
sponsible to propound the view that sheer wastage of hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in that way constitutes a valuable national "insurance
policy." And now, the combination of a newfound ability to dilute the
existing vaccine supply,492 with the belated discovery of the buried
treasure of an additional 85 million doses (probably also subject to
one-to-five dilution) donated by its manufacturer, 49 affords us vastly
more of the stuff than we could use.
At this point, it is simply wasteful to procure so much smallpox
vaccine and to create additional structures for administering it when
there are so many other health care and national security priorities
still unmet. Hospitals, state health agencies, and other institutions are
diverting funding and attention from other pressing needs-influ-
enza, for example, kills ten thousand or more Americans every year-
to perfect our defenses against a threat that is still described as
remote.494
In reality, if there ever were a smallpox outbreak, caused by any
plausible scenario of accidents, terrorism, or wartime use, we would
not vaccinate everyone in America. Doing so in an era of so many
immunosuppressed people and others with significant contraindica-
tions would injure and kill more citizens than the virus itself.49 ' In-
stead, we would rely upon the same methodology that conquered
smallpox around the world during the ISEP: rigorous surveillance to
identify promptly any emergent cases, followed by containment, via
urgent vaccination of anyone in the vicinity of a known case, or any-
one who might have incurred even indirect exposure to the virus. 4 9 6
A larger vaccination effort, if the initial attack were robust enough to
outrun the containment strategy, could be undertaken later, as
needed.49 v
492. LeDuc et al., supra note 470, at 743 (stating that Dryvax vaccine remains potent and
effective even when diluted to 1/5 or even 1/10 of its original strength).
493. Connolly, supra note 407 (reporting that Aventis Pasteur will donate 85 million
does of smallpox vaccine); Stevenson & Stolberg, supra note 91.
494. Ceci Connolly, Bush Plan for Smallpox Vaccine Raises Medical, Fiscal Worries, WASH.
POST, Dec. 15, 2002, at A33 (reporting the view of William Schaftner, chairman of prevent-
ative medicine at Vanderbilt University Medical Center).
495. Thomas Mack, A Different View of Smallpox and Vaccination, 348 NEw ENG. J. MED.
460, 462 (2003) (stating that more than 800 deaths may occur from complications if the
entire U.S. population was vaccinated).
496. See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text (describing the development of the
surveillance-containment method and its role in the ISEP).
497. Although each situation is, of course unique, some lessons can be derived from one
of the last outbreaks of smallpox in the United States. In 1947, a man infected in Mexico
imported the disease to New York, where he died in a Manhattan hospital, with the mis-
diagnosis of acute bronchitis. The correct assessment was not made until other cases of
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To ensure the success of that type of program, we will need to
upgrade the existing public health infrastructure in the United States
and elsewhere-another overdue investment we should be making
anyway. The institutional and personal mechanisms for timely detec-
tion of unusual diseases, for accurate diagnosis of them, and for dis-
semination and administration of the necessary treatments, are
archaic and in disrepair. 498 Capabilities for speedy communications
between health officials at different federal, state, and local service
providers have not kept pace with modern technology, nor with the
demands of an increasingly mobile population. Doctors and other
health professionals have not been trained to recognize smallpox, and
might not quickly or reliably appreciate its signs and symptoms, unless
tipped off by other sources.499 All of that must be fixed, and it should
not have required the upheavals of September and October 2001 to
sensitize us to that imperative.
When the massive new smallpox vaccine inventory becomes avail-
able, it should be housed in secure, reliably climate-controlled facili-
ties-not administered to the general public. Beyond selected military
personnel, primary health professionals, and other "first responders"
who might be placed at unusual risk, the general civilian population
should not be vaccinated, even if some of them affirmatively seek the
injection. The risks are simply too great: a nationwide program of
vaccination today would result in hundreds of deaths, thousands of
serious illnesses, and countless days lost from work and military ser-
vice-all at a time when no one in the United States has contracted
smallpox in over fifty years.500 Moreover, anyone who does receive
the vaccine becomes temporarily contagious with its vaccinia virus.
While that contagion is relatively mild for most people, it presents a
smallpox arose in people who had contact with him in the hospital, and eventually twelve
people were infected, of whom two died. In the associated panic, some six million New
Yorkers were vaccinated (more than half of them within a month). Six people died from
complications of the vaccine. FENNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 331-32; HOPKINS, supra note
43, at 293-94; Jimmy Breslin, Saving Public from the Pox, NEWSDAY, Nov. 19, 2002, at A4; see
also Mack, supra note 495, at 462 (arguing for a step-by-step approach, vaccinating addi-
tional groups of people only after we see how well the early rounds succeed).
498. See Foege, supra note 431 (proposing the following preparations to combat wide-
spread smallpox infection: "getting needed supplies in place ... training volunteers, Na-
tional Guard and public health workers how to vaccinate with bifurcated needles . ..
strengthening public health infrastructure... shipping vaccines nationwide overnight...
holding clinics in every high school").
499. Ceci Connolly, For Thompson and HHS, A 'Heightened Awareness', Response to Attacks Is
Both Immediate and Long-Term, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2001, at A29 (quoting a surgeon stating
that, "I've never seen a case of anthrax or smallpox" and emphasizing the importance of
training health professionals to recognize these diseases).
500. Delthia Ricks, 1st Shot for Smallpox Vaccine, NEWSDAY, Jan. 31, 2003, at A43.
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potentially lethal hazard for others who might be casually and un-
knowingly exposed in ordinary daily activities." ° '
Unless the threat of a smallpox attack suddenly appears to be
much more imminent, which the U.S. leadership has repeatedly as-
serted is not the case at the moment, this remains a situation in which
the duty of the government is to reassure a skittish public, not to hype
the threat of smallpox bioterrorism. The government should con-
tinue to withhold a treatment regimen that might initially appear to
be "erring on the safe side," but is, instead, simply erring.
50 2
C. Pursue Improved Bio-Detectors
One of the top priorities for the research agenda-affirmed by
the 1999 IOM study, by the subsequent WHO authorization for an
interim work program, and most recently by the Bush administra-
tion-is improved detectors.5 °3 These would seek both more rapid
and certain diagnosis of smallpox in a human body, and an enhanced
capacity for discriminating variola particles in the environment, where
a terrorist or aggressive military force might spew biological
weapons.504
This is one of the few areas where the research protocol aims at
an objective that is not only important, but achievable in the near
term. Moreover, it is also a topic for which perpetual access to live,
intact variola (and the concomitant requirement that the research be
conducted only within the shelter of high-containment BL-4 facili-
501. Ironically, programs advocating early vaccination of primary health care workers,
who would contribute to the first response to a potential smallpox outbreak, might exacer-
bate this danger. Unless quarantined for days or even weeks after vaccination, these health
professionals would run the greatest risk of passing the vaccinia virus to their current pa-
tients, who might be among the most vulnerable populations. Kemper & Mestel, supra
note 431.
502. Foege, supra note 431 (stating that the American public "should take comfort from
Bush's reassurance that the [smallpox] threat is not imminent"); see also Kemper & Mestel,
supra note 431 (reporting the concern of Dr. George E. Hardy, executive director of the
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, that the cost of a vigorous smallpox
vaccination campaign should not come at the expense of other public health programs).
503. See INST. OF MED., supra note 170, at 59-62 (explaining that studying ways to detect
smallpox is a compelling reason not to eradicate the variola virus); U.S. Opts to Keep Small-
pox Stock, VACCINE WEEKLY, Dec. 12, 2001, at 2.
504. See U.S. ARMY SOLDIER & BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL COMMAND, HISTORY OF CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL DETECTORS, ALARMS, AND WARNING SYSTEMS 35 (Kathleen S. Ciolfi, ed. (un-
dated)) (describing a laser than can detect biological aerosol clouds up to five kilometers
away).
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ties) 5° 5 might be unnecessary. Manipulating selected distinctive non-
infective fragments of the virus should suffice for many purposes.
In recent years, the U.S. military has experimented with, devel-
oped, and sought to deploy a range of broad-spectrum bio-detectors,
each of which has suffered from high cost, limited range of operation,
restrictions in the number of pathogens it can identify, and lack of
battlefield hardiness.50 6 Improvements, however, may be about to cas-
cade into availability, and they could offer commanders a vastly im-
proved ability for tactical warning about oncoming smallpox and
other BW.
50 7
This sector, therefore, is one of the most promising research ave-
nues, and it should be vigorously pursued, for applications in civilian,
urban anti-terrorism operations (such as at stadiums, subways, or of-
fice buildings), as well as on the organized battlefield. Accompanying
it ought to be additional training for the first responders, who would
have to know how to operate and maintain the equipment, what to do
with the information they were receiving from it, and how to deal on
an immediate basis with the emerging biological threats.
D. Pursue Broad Variola Research, but More Skeptically
If we could somehow suddenly get our hands on a new family of
broad-spectrum (or even variola-specific) antivirals and a safer,
equally effective vaccine, that would be wonderful, but magic is un-
likely to come to our assistance in that way, and step-by-step basic re-
search in those directions will not be cheap, easy, quick, or certain to
pay off.
Moreover, variola poses persistent special problems to research-
ers. The lethality of the disease forbids reliance upon the usual array
of required testing algorithms. 508 We cannot casually administer test
505. Bush Proposes Major Raise for NIH, Including $1.5 Billion in Bioterror Research, VACCINE
WKLY, Feb. 13, 2002, at 10.
506. MILLER ET AL., supra note 203, at 106-07, 120, 283-84 (describing problems with
biodetectors); U.S. ARMY SOLDIER & BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL COMMAND, supra note 504, 13-35
(tracing the development of biological agent detectors and describing how they function).
507. Rocco Casagrande, Technology Against Terror, 287 Sci. AM. 83 (Oct. 2002) (identify-
ing current biodetectors); Laurie Garrett, The Nightmare of Bioterrorism, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 76,
83-84 (2001) (discussing federal funding of biosensor research); Gary Stix, The Universal
Biosensor, 287 ScI. AM. 37 (2002) (describing the development of a new biosensor, TIGER
(triangulation identification for genetic evaluation of risks), that can detect bacterium,
virus, fungus, or protozoan); William J. Broad, Arms Inspectors in Iraq to Deploy New Technol-
ogy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at Al (discussing new warfare and antiterrorism
technology).
508. See Zoon, supra note 379, at 535 (explaining that test doses are not possible because
they would subject healthy humans to a lethal or permanently disabling agent).
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doses of new pharmaceuticals in controlled experiments to informed
volunteers and challenge them with the deadly, intact smallpox virus
to determine whether we have properly conceived a useable new
medicine.5 0 9 The Food and Drug Administration will have to demon-
strate unusual flexibility and creativity, therefore, to validate any new
anti-variola preparations through extended trials in cell cultures and
newly crafted animal models.
Additionally, the inescapable hazards of the subject mandate that
much of the investigatory work can be conducted only in the world's
precious few BL-4 facilities, where it will inevitably compete with other
pressing research programs, some of which ought properly to be ac-
corded an even higher priority. As great as the terrorist threat of
smallpox might be, after all, AIDS, Ebola, West Nile, dengue fever,
and a host of other viruses are current, not merely potential, killers of
human beings.
Moreover, it must be recalled that the probability is low that we
would ever want to administer even a new, improved vaccine to mas-
sive numbers of people. The likelihood of a new smallpox outbreak is
still quite remote (for all we know), and the surveillance-containment
strategy should (as it did during ISEP) obviate the necessity for univer-
sal vaccination. Likewise with an antiviral medication: it would surely
be handy to have such a treatment available in case of a smallpox out-
break, but it is not absolutely essential. Instead, we would rely upon
vaccination, which can effectively ward off the disease even if adminis-
tered as late as four days after the person is exposed to variola.51 °
Therefore only the earliest victims-those who fell ill before the dis-
ease was recognized as smallpox and the vaccination response was ini-
tiated-would rely solely upon post hoc antiviral treatment.51' That
category could encompass many people, depending upon the scena-
rio one has in mind, but it is not infinitely large. It is, therefore, not
worth devoting an unending stream of research dollars and displacing
valid research on other life-saving programs in its pursuit.
E. Pursue Other Basic and Related Research More Directly
Among the most tantalizing hopes for a successful variola re-
search program would be its potential applicability to other medical
509. Id.
510. D.A. HENDERSON, THE RESEARCH AGENDA UTILIZING VARIOLA VIRUS: A PUBLIC
HEALTH PERSPECTIVE (WHO Comm. Mtg. on Research, Working Paper 1999), available at
http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/agents/research.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2003).
511. Id.
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and biological sectors. Our explorations of smallpox may spawn di-
verse insights materially assisting in the battle against other stubborn
viral and bacterial agents. 512 More generally, enhanced understand-
ing of the variola infection process may elucidate some of the many
mysteries of the human immune system; for example, some research-
ers suggest that the program may generate nuances about the phe-
nomenon of the human body's problematic rejection of organ
transplants. 51
3
All those future applications would surely be desirable, and the
possibility of realizing them must be factored into decisions about how
much and what types of variola research to undertake. But surely the
wiser national strategy would be to approach those other desiderata
directly, rather than through the filter of smallpox. That is, if we seek
to learn more about other viral diseases, let us study them. If the ob-
jective is to improve our understanding of immunology or organ
transplants,5 14 we must devote the necessary resources directly to
those issues, rather than hope that appropriate insights will serendip-
itously emerge from a research program that is focused on other
objectives and driven by other goals.
There are so many threatening microorganisms in the world to-
day, and rapacious new diseases seem to be emerging with such stun-
ning regularity, 515 that a concerted national and international health
strategy is needed to combat them. The priorities among competing
research opportunities ought to be decided on a coherent, compre-
hensive basis, rather than just hoping that smallpox inquiries-which
may jump to the head of the funding queue for external, political
reasons-can be justified on this wider rationale.
In any event, additional resources will be required. One vivid il-
lustration of the current paucity is the scarcity of BL4 laboratory
suites and related hospitalization facilities.5 1 6 These institutions are
expensive to construct and demanding to maintain, and the hazards
512. SeeJoklik et al., supra note 168, at 1226.
513. Id.
514. See Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Anthrax Effects Still Troublesome, NEWSDAY, Sept. 24,
2002, at A27 (arguing that the United States should devote resources to the public health
system, rather than to biological weapons agents).
515. See Denise Grady, Managing Planet Earth, On an Altered Planet, New Diseases Emerge as
Old Ones Re-emerge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2002, at F2 (noting that since the mid 1970s, a new
array of previously unknown diseases has arisen).
516. See Rex Dalton, Residents Force Review of Biodefence Lab, 419 NATURE 423, 423 (2002)
(explaining that the only large BLA labs in the United States are located at the CDC in
Georgia and at Fort Detrick in Maryland).
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they contain will inspire NIMBY-related neighborhood opposition.517
But they constitute a vital component in a rational research strategy.
The only way to conduct the quantities of cutting edge research we
need-for smallpox and other related viruses, or diverse health
threats more generally-will be to expand the availability of these pre-
mium facilities.518
Physical security, too, is an essential component-for the existing
WHO Collaborating Centers in Atlanta and Koltsovo, as well as for any
other institutions that may touch biological disease agents. These
days, it is commonplace to suggest that anti-terrorism protections
must be enhanced.5 19 Although this modern threat is surely stagger-
ing, it is only one kind of danger, and not necessarily the most proba-
ble. Industrial accidents happen at even excellent facilities;520 spies
still seem to lurk everywhere; 521 disgruntled employees can create
havoc in endless ways. Georgia and Novosibirsk certainly have their
share of natural disasters: hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, and floods
occur everywhere, without much warning. The busy Hartsfield Inter-
national Airport is only a few miles from the CDC Atlanta
headquarters.
All of this is not to suggest that the sky is falling; both the CDC
and Vector have recently been certified by the WHO as incorporating
adequately stringent physical security protections surrounding their
precious variola stocks.522 But we cannot become complacent. The
reality these days is that security is an ongoing process, and the protec-
tions must be constantly reviewed and the routines frequently varied,
to stay one step ahead of the emerging dangers.
F Fight Global Terrorism in Other Ways
The challenge of modern super-terrorism demands a diverse,
multi-faceted response. The front lines of the battle will depend ini-
tially on improved, and sometimes unconventional, military capabili-
517. See id (explaining that these facilities must be developed in collaboration with com-
munities because of potential injuries and the environmental impact of the facilities).
518. See id (neighborhood opposition has delayed efforts to build a BL-4 complex in
Hamilton, Montana).
519. See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 140 (explaining that with the recent threats of biolog-
ical attack, Jeffrey Koplan said "the CDC needs to tighten security and enhance lab
capacity").
520. See Weiss & Snyder, supra note 141 (discussing an accidental release of anthrax
spores at Fort Detrick).
521. Pincus, supra note 173 (reporting on the flourishing spy business).
522. World Health Organization, Report by the Secretariat, Smallpox Eradication: Tem-
porary Retention of Variola Virus Stocks (2000), A53/27.
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ties; on enhanced intelligence operations, to collect warning data and
conduct better threat assessments; and on skillful diplomacy, to rally
the world community to the cause and deter other states from assist-
ing or harboring terrorists.
Law can also play a role here, specifically international law re-
garding anti-terrorism and biological weapons, and the BWC should
be the centerpiece of the effort. The United States should take the
lead in enhancing that treaty, not in undercutting it. If the 2001 draft
protocol was deficient,523 the proper place for America is out in front,
working to develop better concepts and mutually acceptable language
to accomplish the difficult goals, not lagging behind and dragging our
feet. The current posture exhibits the worst forms of unilateralism:
The United States expects the rest of the world to rally behind us in
the struggle against international terrorism in our time of great need,
but we have so far been unwilling to demonstrate the requisite good
faith to craft a workable, broadly acceptable solution for a document
that could, if America demonstrates a bit more flexibility and a good
bit more effort, materially assist the joint enterprise.
Of course, even an amended BWC, by itself, could tackle only a
small portion of the overall problem. Other accords and strategies
will be necessary to cut off terrorists' access to their traditional fund-
ing sources, to interdict their supply of weapons, and to impinge upon
their travel and communications. But an enhanced BWC could be-
come a useful tool. It could drive the countries to make the pursuit of
BW by rogue states and terrorists appreciably more cumbersome and
time-consuming.524 It could enhance countries' confidence that their
treaty partners were reliably abandoning offensive biological opera-
tions, making it safer for them to adhere to the same path. The nego-
tiations surrounding a BWC protocol could also become a focus for
other efforts-for example, the idea of making bioterrorism an inter-
national crime,5 25 subject to prosecution in a new international tribu-
nal or (through the concept of "universal jurisdiction") in the
523. David P. Fidler, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and International Law, 3 CR. J. INT'L L. 7,
13-14 (2002) (critiquing the 2001 draft protocol).
524. See id. at 14 (arguing that the immediate adoption of a BWC protocol would reduce
the threat of biological weapons proliferation and bioterrorism).
525. See Michael Barletta et al., Keeping Track of Anthrax: The Case for a Biosecurity Conven-
tion, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May/June 2002, at 57 (discussing some of the ideas from
the fifth BWC review conference, including urging treaty members to criminalize the pos-
session and use of bioweapons).
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national judicial system of any country that could get its hands on the
perpetrator.526
Most of all, the United States should follow a version of the Hip-
pocratic Oath: whatever we do to combat biological warfare and bio-
terrorism, we should avoid making the situation worse. American
policy has not always heeded that wise, if basic, injunction. Our uni-
lateralist approach to the BWC disregards the sensitivities, the inter-
ests, and the potential contributions of other countries, driving them
away from collaboration with us, instead of seeking areas of accord.
For example, it was revealed in September 2001 that the United
States had sustained a program of evading, if not quite violating, the
BWC by covertly acquiring biological weapons-related materials on the
international black market, and testing them to discern their capabili-
ties and to divine strategies for negating them.527 In addition, the
United States had constructed, in a secret location in the Nevada de-
sert, a prototype, non-functional biological weapons factory, purport-
edly to demonstrate how easy it would be for terrorists or rogue states
to acquire indigenous BW capability by purchasing dual-capable
equipment and materials on the open market.5 28 While these efforts
may have had entirely legitimate and salutary objectives, they certainly
came close to violations of the BWC and the United States surely
would have protested mightily if any other country had secretly under-
taken to skate so close to the edge of the treaty. Demonstrations of
that sort, manifesting a disregard for the most important treaty in the
field and a lack of concern for the opinions of our partner states, do
not assist the effort to rally the world community against bio-
terrorism.5 29
In addition, the United States should be much more attentive to
the perhaps fleeting opportunity to assist in Russia's demilitarization
526. Every state has the authority to inflict punishment for selected categories of crimes
recognized by the community of nations as being offenses of global concern, regardless of
any specific connection to that state. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 404 (1986). Traditionally, only a few egregious activities (e.g., piracy,
slavery, genocide) were recognized as legitimate topics of this universal jurisdiction, but
the category is growing to embrace, for example, war crimes and aircraft hijacking. Id.
cmt. a.
527. Rosenberg, supra note 514 (explaining that other countries have voiced concerns
over secret U.S. biodefense projects that "push against the limits of international
prohibitions").
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program, beginning with Vector and the rest of Biopreparat. For a
decade, the United States has allocated modest sums through the
Nunn-Lugar and other threat reduction programs, 5s° to facilitate Mos-
cow's efforts to account properly for all the weapons of mass destruc-
tion produced in the Soviet era, to rein in those materials and
facilities under adequate security, and to begin the laborious and ex-
pensive process of destroying them or converting them to peaceful
applications. 53 l That is a wonderful idea-a genuine win/win solu-
tion-resulting in peacefully promoting an objective that obsessed the
United States throughout the cold war era: how to reduce the threat
that Soviet nuclear, biological, chemical, and other weapons pose to
our homeland. We have, through quite paltry U.S. contributions, sup-
ported the dismantling of far more weapons than earlier generations
of our generals and diplomats could have imagined, all without firing
a shot.
The time has come to accelerate that program, even as the cur-
rent U.S. leadership seems to be backing away from it.5" 2 Biological
weaponry offers a particularly propitious opportunity: the facilities
and the personnel that formerly masterminded the Soviet BW pro-
gram should have ample scope for conversion into peaceful civilian
applications. If catalyzed by Western capital, management advice, and
other support, the Biopreparat apparatus should be transformed into
a home for profitable and benign pharmaceutical, agricultural, and
industrial research and production.533
Vector has already undertaken important steps in this direction,
yanking itself from the Soviet weapons programs into the modem
world economy.534 Much more could be done in this vein to help
530. Press Release, Federation of American Scientists, United States and Russia Extend
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement (June 24, 1999), available at http:/
/www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctr/news/b6241999_bt307-99.htm (visited Apr. 10, 2003).
531. Id.
532. Christine Kucia, Congress Gives Bush Three-Year Waiver for Threat Reduction, ARMS CON-
TROL TODAY, Dec. 2002, at 24; Richard G. Lugar, The Next Steps in U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,
ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2002, at 3 (recounting efforts to obtain legislative authority to
waive stringent limitations placed on assistance to Russian weapons dismantling programs);
Editorial, Safeguarding Soviet Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2002, at A32 (reporting that the
Bush administration is internally divided about continuing assistance to Russia for weapons
dismantling).
533. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-00-138, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: EF-
FORT TO REDUCE FORMER SOVIET THREAT OFFERS BENEFITS, POSES NEW RiSKS 4-6 (2000)
(explaining that the U.S. strategy for addressing proliferation threats has been to fund
research activities that increase the Russian institutes' openness to the West and redirect
scientists toward peaceful civilian research).
534. See Ken Alibek & Stephen Handelman, Don't Give Russia the Smallpox Franchise,
PLAIN DEALER, May 26, 1999, at lIB (explaining that Vector has ended its military function
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other Russian sites ensure that the conversion to civilian activities is
irreversible and that the key scientists and other alumnae of the mili-
tary operations find sufficiently remunerative opportunities in peace-
ful enterprise so that the apparition of brain drain to hostile states
and applications is avoided. It would not require very much U.S.
money to help make all that happen, but it would require some.
Moreover, a more constant approach and a commitment to genuine,
enduring leadership in facilitating the transformation are required,
guided by an appreciation for true, long-term U.S. and global
interests.
Finally, we need to re-examine security standards across the
board, beginning with fresh appraisal of the mechanisms at the CDC
and Vector, and especially with tightening the general access to dan-
gerous pathogens."' The new U.S. legislation has initiated the pro-
cess, restricting-but not rigidly over-restricting-who can obtain
which of the most dangerous potential BW substances, for what pur-
poses, and pursuant to what safety strictures.5 36 This is another area
where international cooperation is essential: there are hundreds of
germ banks around the world that observe radically different stan-
dards regarding sales of even the most lethal substances.5 3 7
CONCLUSION
Regarding retention or destruction of the smallpox virus, the cur-
rent United States posture is doing approximately the right thing, but
for many of the wrong reasons. We should, at the bottom line, pre-
serve those last frozen exemplars of variola, and should undertake an
orderly, substantial program of long-term research on its microscopic
operations and on possible ameliorative pharmaceuticals. We should,
however, overtly commit to preserving this unique viral resource per-
manently, not setting yet another unrealistic deadline, and not pur-
and the United States is encouraging its scientists to make the transition to peaceful
research).
535. Russia, Iraq and Other Potential Sources of Anthrax, Smallpox and Other Bioterrorist Weap-
ons, Hearing before the House Committee on International Relations, 107th Cong. 20 (Dec. 5,
2001) (testimony of Elisa D. Harris, Research Fellow for International and Security
Studies).
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537. Michael Barletta et al., Keeping Track of Anthrax: The Case for a Biosecurity Convention,
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dles First, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2001, at A27.
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porting to tie the destruction timetable to implausible short-term
research successes. 8
Here, however, the current U.S. approach seems unnecessarily
and unwisely driven by misbegotten military objectives, which should
properly play only a relatively minor role in the drama. That is, even
if rogue states or terrorists were known to have preserved their own
secret stashes of variola, that deceit by itself would not be a sufficient
reason for the United States to cling to the CDC inventory. After all,
we would never retaliate in kind for a variola attack, even if we knew
for certain who had launched it.539 We would respond, instead, with
the full panoply of conventional military and diplomatic tools at our
disposal-but the United States rightly foreswore offensive biological
warfare and jettisoned its capacity for that kind of combat three de-
cades ago.
The United States does not require perpetual access to live vari-
ola in order to upgrade most of our defenses against its possible use.
Intelligence, diplomacy, conventional military operations, and the do-
mestic public health infrastructure can be enhanced without it; these
will constitute our real protection against a revival of smallpox. For
some important purposes, such as developing improved bio-detectors,
enhanced antiviral medications, and safer vaccines, research building
upon the intact virus is still required, but we should not over-state how
urgent those needs are, or how soon we might accomplish the desired
breakthroughs.
Moreover, by doing the right thing for the wrong reasons, the
United States may make the current security situation appreciably
worse. For example, if we continually demonstrate unilateralist disre-
spect for the BWC54 0 and for the other sovereign states that have been
struggling against long odds to improve it; if we communicate to for-
eign governments that we are perpetuating our own covert BW-related
programs, sliding right up to the line of activities banned by the
treaty;541 and if we enable the suspicious among them to harbor con-
spiracy theories that the United States has, in fact, retained an interest
538. SeeJoklik et al., supra note 168, at 1226 (explaining the importance of increased
effort to understand the disease).
539. See Stephanie A. Powell, U.S. Diplomacy and the Future of the BWC, ARMS CONTROL
ADVISORY (2002), available at http://www.lawscns.org/media/acadvisory/ACAdvisory012
402BWC.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
540. See Powell, supra note 539 (noting that at the last BWC conference, the U.S. indi-
cated its preference for a unilateral approach to BWC verification and its unwillingness to
engage in the formal treaty-negotiating process), available at http://www.lawscns.org/
media/acadvisory/ACAdvisory012402BWC.html.
541. See Rosenberg, supra note 514.
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in an offensive BW program of its own, then surely we will have under-
cut our true objectives. Furthermore, if we advertise to other coun-
tries and to non-state actors that bioterrorism (and especially
smallpox) is the sort of attack we fear the most, and are most vulnera-
ble to, will that not inspire them to proceed further in those noxious
directions?
In so many ways, the United States and the world have progressed
well beyond the standards of 1973. In security, health, technology,
and many other sectors, we have succeeded in exploiting and refining
the innovations that first reared their heads in that most pathbreaking
year. The intervening period has witnessed the revolutions in genetic
engineering, promising the ability to manipulate the natural world in
breathtaking ways; the culmination of the global campaign against
smallpox, the first, and still the only, disease that the world has ever
managed to eradicate; and the achievement of the Biological Weap-
ons Convention, the first genuine measure of true disarmament in the
modern era.
The question now is whether we will continue to be the masters
of those diverse, and now inextricably inter-related, areas of public
policy, or whether the sheer complexity of the issues and the difficulty
of sorting through the permutations they offer will instead empower
the problems to propel us blindly forward.
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